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Abstract 
This thesis examines contemporary developments in critical theory and good 
international citizenship in order to develop a normative framework for the evaluation 
of humanitarian intervention. Situated at the interface of critical theory and practice in 
international relations, the thesis investigates the concepts of legitimacy, normativity 
and evaluative standards, and explores problems surrounding their practical application 
in relation to NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999. 
The research builds on recent developments in discourse ethics to formulate, 
ground, test and evaluate a critical theoretical framework. This framework is presented 
as a series of `communicative imperatives' which might inform initiatives in conflict 
resolution. The `communicative imperatives' are derived from an analysis of 
contemporary debates around Habermasian discourse ethics and good international 
citizenship. The research thus explores several existing applications of Habermasian 
discourse ethics in international relations, notably Linklater's, and examines recurrent 
concerns relating to the relationship between the universal and the particular in 
normative international theory. The argument draws upon Benhabib's procedural 
emphasis, Shapcott's move towards Gadamerian hermeneutics and feminist critiques of 
discourse ethics in order to formulate a conception of dialogue that gives critical 
purchase on contemporary practices of exclusion and coercion; practices that all too 
often remain unproblematised. 
What emerges is a clearer understanding of the need for communicative fairness 
in processes of conflict resolution - rather than a substantive standard of right - and an 
appraisal of how such a procedural evaluation can be justified and applied. This, then, 
is a theoretical analysis of the potential and limitations of an evaluative framework 
which prioritises `good communication' in the practices of international deliberations. 
It seeks to test the communicative imperatives in the particularity of the deliberations 
surrounding the intervention in Kosovo. Consequently, it draws conclusions about 
communicative practice during the conflict and the implications of a communicative 
model both for international relations and what it means to be a good international 
citizen. 
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A note on names and pronounciation 
A few notes are necessary to explain the terminology used in this thesis due to 
the common usage of more than one language in Kosovo. When referring to inhabitants 
of Kosovo I refer to `Kosovo Serbs' or `Kosovo Albanians' to distinguish between 
ethnicities. From time to time I also employ the term `Kosovar' which means `Kosovo 
Albanian'. Personal names are given in the relevant language or as in publications. 
Kosovo, as the name of geographical territory, is also contested. Serbs refer to it as 
`Kosovo-Metohija', whilst Albanians refer to it as `Kosova' or `Kosove'. For 
simplicity and in conformity with international practice, I will refer to it throughout as 
`Kosovo'. This does not, however, indicate a position on the issue of Kosovo's political 
status. Serbian is used for place names within Kosovo although, once again, this does 
not indicate a position on language policy in Kosovo. 
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Introduction: Theory and Practice in International Relations 
The problem 
By narrowing the space for dialogue you create a boxing ring. 
Alexsander Baljak' 
One of the underlying problems in international relations remains the persistent 
question of "what should we do? " This is primarily an ethical question and haunts our 
deliberations over our role, be it as individuals, non-governmental organisations, or as is 
most often the case, as states, in global disorder, conflict and instability. The concept of 
humanitarian intervention which emerged in the 1990s in response to evidence of mass 
suffering, ethnic cleansing and varying kinds of violence, sought to provide an answer 
which reflected what was referred to as the `conscience of humanity'. No longer was it 
acceptable to stand by and watch as internal conflicts were waged by states, or 
paramilitary organisations often connected to states, against their own people. The 
global technological revolution meant that such events had become armchair viewing 
for substantial proportions of the world's population, and inactivity lay uncomfortably 
alongside growing awareness of human suffering. Emerging doctrines such as the droit 
d'ingerence2, and the responsibility to protect3 have become the tools with which we 
address this moral question, yet they have also established the challenges that 
humanitarian intervention holds for traditional norms of non-intervention and 
sovereignty. Humanitarian intervention offers a critique of traditional norms of 
international society which indicate a preference for order rather than justice, and 
reveals the clash between established norms of human rights and state-centric national 
interests. In place of non-intervention and sovereignty, norms which reify the practices 
of the state, humanitarian intervention raises questions of humanity, cosmopolitanism, 
responsibility and justice. 
It is necessary to clarify what we mean when we refer to intervention, as this is a 
complex issue and refers to a range of actions taken by actors external to a particular 
' Heidrun Serlie Rohr (ed. ) 2005: Dialog - Mer Enn Ord, Nansenskolen, Lillehammer, p. 95 2 Joelle Tanguy, 2003: `Redefining Sovereignty and Intervention', Ethics and International 
Affairs, 17(1), p. 142; The term was coined in the late 1980s by Mario Bettati and Bernard 
Kouchner 
The Responsibility to Protect, December 2001, Report of the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty 
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crisis. Broadly, forms of intervention may include the use of force4, economic and 
political sanctions, negotiations or dialogue, and the involvement of NGOs, non-state 
actors or international organisations; the element common to these different types of 
intervention is their claim to act for humanitarian purposes. The context of Kosovo, 
which is the focus for the testing and evaluation of the theoretical framework presented 
here, offers two aspects of intervention which we are primarily concerned with. First, it 
refers to the use of force by NATO states in 1999, and secondly, it refers to the dialogue 
which surrounded the decision to intervene militarily. Whilst the dialogue leading up to 
NATO's intervention remains the object of critique in Chapter 5, other opportunities for 
communicative engagement which may come under the rubric of intervention but do 
not refer to military action are central to the exploration of agency and legitimacy in 
international relations undertaken here and are highlighted in preceding chapters. 
NATO's intervention in Kosovo arguably represented the clearest clash between 
conflicting norms in contemporary politics. It took place at the end of a decade fraught 
with questions over the rights and wrongs of humanitarian interventions from Bosnia to 
Haiti, Somalia and Rwanda. The conflict was between the Serbian state and its own 
citizens in Kosovo, where ethnically-oriented, socially and politically divisive and 
violent methods of repression were carried out against the majority population of 
Kosovar Albanians. The decision to intervene in Kosovo emerged as one which not 
only challenged the existing interpretations of international law and humanitarian 
intervention, but also challenged contemporary understandings of the `right', of how we 
ought to act in certain circumstances. Arguably, although it was the moral argument 
which provided the justification to intervene, it did so with dubious qualifications of 
consensus. These moral and ethical problems seem unlikely to disappear, making it 
crucial to ask how recourse to humanitarian intervention will be decided in the future, 
and how such interventions will be conducted. Thus, the moral impulse to protect 
others, which is fundamental to concepts of humanitarianism and cosmopolitanism, 
cannot be detached from complicated notions of process and consequences. The means 
by which such policies are constructed and their sources of legitimacy are crucial to any 
future formulations of norms of intervention. 
4 The term `humanitarian intervention' in this context refers to `the threat or use of force across 
state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave 
violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without 
the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied. ' Holzgrefe, Keohane (eds. ) 
2003: Humanitarian Intervention, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 18 
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Humanitarian intervention provokes a powerful set of emotive claims to justice, 
morality and legitimacy in contemporary societies. The case study of Kosovo, the 
concept of good international citizenship and its responses to humanitarian intervention 
allow us to explore notions of agency and legitimacy in international relations which 
address the following questions. Has the controversy over a norm of humanitarian 
intervention and the related moral dilemmas resulted from inadequate communicative 
practices, a lack of reflexivity and recognition of intersubjectivity? Can good 
international citizenship incorporate a principle of discourse? Is a discursive approach 
to decision-making procedures in conflict situations able to help us assess the 
legitimacy of the decision to use force? If so, what kind of moments of illegitimacy can 
such a communicative framework reveal in the decision to use force in Kosovo? To 
answer these questions we must not only be willing to interpret the intervention in 
Kosovo from the perspective of deliberative legitimacy5, but to look to critical theory 
and Habermas's discourse ethics for the tools with which to do so: can the theory 
identified - discourse ethics and critical theory - enable us to better understand 
legitimacy in international relations? With this in mind, a set of rigorously grounded 
evaluative criteria will be formulated and used to analyse communicative practice in the 
case of Kosovo. The aim here is to see what can be learnt through such an approach 
and what problems arise, particularly as regards the relationship between theory and 
practice. 
Kosovo: a case study 
Kosovo illustrates the dilemma characterising humanitarian interventions which 
`pits powerful normative beliefs and international legal conventions against each other: 
state sovereignty and the rule of law may be violated to protect or promote individual 
rights. '6 These legal and moral issues were merged in the key question surrounding 
NATO's intervention of whether or not humanitarian intervention can be legitimate in 
the absence of explicit Security Council authorisation, highlighting concerns over who 
has the authority to intervene and on what grounds. Whilst it is generally agreed that 
5 The term comes from Corneliu Bjola, 2005: `Legitimating the Use of Force in International 
Politics: A Communicative Action Perspective', European Journal of International Relations, 
11(2). See also Bernard Manin, 1987: `On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation', Political 
Theory 15(3) 
6 Neta Crawford, 2002: Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization, and 
Humanitarian Intervention, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 402 
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only the UN Security Council can authorize external intervention, we are presented with 
a paradox in which international law (in the form of the UN Charter) only permits the 
use of force in the cases of self-defense against armed attack or collective security. 
Article 2(4) of the Charter prohibits the threat or use of force by states.? The Security 
Council is empowered to authorize the use of force on the basis of its responsibility 
towards maintaining international peace and security. However, the Charter also grants 
importance to human rights. How can these be reconciled? Reisman suggests that 
assigning the near exclusive right to use force to the Security Council is only workable 
if the responsibility of the Council is restricted to resisting threats to and breaches of the 
peace and acts of aggression. If the mandate of the UN Security Council is also 
extended to the protection of human rights, then this becomes impossible as `there are 
profound, possibly unbridgeable divides between the permanent members'. 8 Despite 
the famous verdict of the Independent International Commission on Kosovo that 
NATO's actions were `illegal but legitimate'9, consensus on the relationship between 
legitimacy and morality and legality as regards the use of force remains as elusive now 
as it was in 1999. 
Regardless of the legality of the war, it was shown that the human rights 
discourse has the capacity to challenge the primacy of international law. This raises 
questions concerning the role of human rights in world politics. Chandler argues that 
this has become accepted as a fait accompli and that for some academics, critical 
discussion of the human rights framework is unproductive and dangerous; Midgley 
insists we should accept its dominance unquestioningly, acknowledging that: 
there may be uncertainties about the central justification for human rights, 
but warn[ing] that academics should not take an approach that is 
`predeterminedly destructive'. Instead, they should be positive about the 
`mysterious' power of the human rights concept which has emerged as a 
result of the `immense enlargement of our moral scene'. 10 
This approach to the human rights framework and the concomitant justifications it 
secured for intervention was largely accepted during the conflict in Kosovo without 
' Bruno Simma, 1999: `NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects', European Journal 
of International Law, 10(1); Tom Farer: `Humanitarian intervention before and after 9/11: 
legality and legitimacy', Holzgrefe, Keohane (eds. ), 2003 
8 M. Reisman, 1999: `Kosovo's Antinomies', The American Journal of International Law, 
93(4), p. 861-2 
9 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000: The Kosovo Report, p. 186 
10 David Chandler, 2002: From Kosovo to Kabul, London, Pluto Press, p. 14, citing Midgley 
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sufficient critical scrutiny of its implications for the manner in which the conflict and 
those involved in it were portrayed, and thus dealt with. 
A review of the literature on Kosovo shows that by and large such writing has 
focused on the period 1998-1999, with less consideration of the international dimension 
to the conflict prior to 1998. The period prior to 1998 is usually only considered in 
order to provide a particular interpretation of the political history of Kosovo. il As 
Bellamy notes, this suggests that there was no international dimension prior to 1998.12 
Despite the fact that `this proposition itself presupposes a decision (made by influential 
states and international organisations) that the conflict should not be seen as an 
international one prior to 1998, it is also factually inaccurate. ' 13 Consequently, by 
failing to consider the debates and key issues before 1998, we might think that the 
conflict which broke out then took the West by surprise. A closer look at the preceding 
period indicates that this is far from the truth and that the refusal to place the simmering 
and predictable conflict in Kosovo on the international agenda paved the way for the 
situation which broke out in 1998. In addition to moments of engagement by the 
international community prior to 1998, there were a number of missed opportunities for 
creative political engagement. Furthermore, while attention is frequently paid to 
significant international events like Dayton, more often ignored is the political action by 
citizens within Kosovo and Serbia which, if supported, might have yielded political 
alternatives. Certainly, the existence of these political activities and the international 
reaction to them casts doubts on the essentialized, pre-given identities given those 
involved by the international community and the language of last resort used to justify 
the strategic shift to military intervention in a situation cast in oversimplified, black and 
white terms. 
Those in favour of military intervention maintained that all diplomatic remedies 
had been exhausted; there was an imminent risk of humanitarian catastrophe and the 
only prospect for an effective humanitarian intervention seemed to depend on acting 
outside the Security Council, as this forum was blocked by Russia's ("unreasonable") 
" See Miranda Vickers, 1998: Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo, London, C. 
Hurst & Co.; Julie Mertus, 1999: Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War, London, 
University of California Press; Noel Malcolm, 2002: A Short History of Kosovo, London, Pan 
Books 
12 Alex Bellamy, 2001: `Kosovo: After the War, the War of Words', The International Journal 
ofHuman Rights, 5(3), 2001, p. 99 
13 ibid. 
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threat of veto. Anti-interventionists declared NATO's actions as illegal without explicit 
authorisation from the UNSC and therefore fundamentally challenging the prohibition 
on recourse to force within existing international law. They do not accept the argument 
that diplomatic means were properly used or exhausted: 
They point to the exclusion of Russian diplomatic participation prior to 
NATO's recourse to war, the rigidity of the Holbrooke/Rambouillet 
formula, the absence of any evident diplomatic effort to induce China and 
Russia to accommodate the Security Council majority by shifting their 
veto to an abstention. Critics of the NATO intervention compare this 
pattern of prewar negotiation with the success of the war-ending 
diplomacy, which was based on a major Russian role and face-saving 
gestures toward Belgrade that included willingness to "conceal" the 
NATO-led peacekeeping force beneath a UN cover story. 14 
These differences fuelled parallel debates concerning the actual conduct of the war both 
in terms of military strategy and political motivation. 
Much of the literature on intervention in Kosovo covers the issues with broad 
brushstrokes, reaffirming the dominance of one of several positions. Less of the 
literature recognises the fluctuations in positions held by the Kosovo Albanians or the 
less radical elements within Serbia. By painting an oversimplified picture, many 
important nuances connected with the potential for dialogue are lost in the entrenchment 
of international norms, be it territorial integrity, sovereignty and non-intervention, or 
human rights, the victimisation of the Kosovo Albanians, and emerging arguments for 
military intervention in the name of humanitarianism. A lack of contextual sensitivity 
to the position of Kosovo within the dissolution of Yugoslavia, a preference for ethnic 
animosity as the root cause of conflict and the absence of in-depth knowledge of 
domestic politics renders these accounts bereft of the subtleties of the negotiations, the 
interests and the positions held by all actors involved in the crisis. With a few 
exceptions, the conventional debates concerning legitimacy in relation to Kosovo do not 
look at legitimacy from a normatively grounded communicative approach. 
An International Relations approach 
The moral and ethical problems raised by humanitarian intervention are 
addressed in most mainstream international relations paradigms. The shift in focus 
beyond the boundaries of the realist paradigm has increasingly led to approaches which 
14 Richard Falk, 1999: `Kosovo, World Order, and the Future of International Law', American 
Journal of International Law, 93(4), p. 851 
7 
are no longer entirely state-centric. The boundaries between domestic and international 
politics have become increasingly blurred as the political and economic processes of 
globalisation erode sovereign state boundaries and the location of authoritative norms 
and values is questioned. International Relations is no longer simply the analysis of the 
relations between securely demarcated sovereign states in an anarchic world. Although 
the struggle for power and security remains undiminished in the face of global security 
challenges in a post Cold-war era, the realist claim that war and anarchy are endemic 
within the international system is no longer universally accepted. Critics of realism 
belong to a broad spectrum of opinion and increasingly, cosmopolitans. critical 
international theorists, constructivists and post-structuralists have argued that the 
Western idea of progress, often embodied by the construct of the sovereign state, has 
created many of the global problems we now face. As Linklater and MacMillan argue, 
the: 
growing sense that anarchy is what states make it is not coupled with any 
resounding confidence in the state's capacity to bring about profound and 
necessary political change. The contention that the state is an obstacle to 
peace and justice is not new. What is new is the conjunction whereby 
many authors deny that political boundaries are essentially fixed or that 
the context of anarchy is immune to significant change, yet 
simultaneously resist traditional theoretical and practical alternatives 
anchored in Western conceptions of nature, freedom, progress, the state 
and gender. ' 15 
Whilst the concept of globalisation and its impact are contested, it has, arguably, 
led to the simultaneous challenges of increased integration and increased fragmentation. 
The state remains central in both of these processes but it is no longer the only pivotal, 
nor indeed always the most important, actor. Increased integration and fragmentation 
have raised moral questions which lay dormant during the bi-polar ideological struggle 
of the Cold War era, demanding that attention be paid to the location of responsibility 
for ethical and moral concerns and laying the foundations for a closer analysis of 
inclusionary and exclusionary practices. Such responsibilities include: minority groups 
whose rights are being violated by sovereign authorities; the role of the world 
community in preventing conflict and resolving existing conflict, particularly 
concerning issues of self-determination and its role in rebuilding failed 
states/communities. 
15 Linklater, MacMillan (eds. ) 1995: Boundaries in Question: New Directions in International 
Relations, London, Pinter Publishers, p. 5 
a 
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It is clear that the sovereign state is no longer necessarily a form of political 
community that provides the requisite forms of human security and stability. The 
power of the state in its many forms is often perceived as the principal threat to minority 
or subordinate groups. This reflects the arguments of groups such as refugees, ethnic 
minorities and asylum seekers, who claim that their identities and interests are excluded 
from the dominant images of nation or community as constructed by the state. The state 
itself operates as a system of inclusion and exclusion through its prescriptions for 
membership - citizens and aliens - and the concepts of sovereignty and territoriality. 
16 
This practice of inclusion and exclusion is repeated at an international level by 
principles which determine membership of the society of states -a practice which bars 
non-state groups from representation. 
Traditional understandings of good international citizenship claim to identify 
normative criteria which can inform legitimacy and specify a key agent - the state. It is 
from a perspective which conflates the possibilities for good international citizenship 
with the role of the state that this concept will be critiqued. Consequently, this concept 
will be examined in terms of its critical capacity for analysing legitimacy and its 
preference for (and limitations of) agency. Bearing in mind the problematic role of the 
state in addressing humanitarian intervention, the concept of good international 
citizenship and its evolution is charted and critiqued with the intention of incorporating 
a reflexive element sensitive to inclusive and exclusive practices in state practice. 
While Lawler locates the idea of the `good' state firmly within classical internationalism 
and this research locates good international citizenship within a critical-theoretical 
framework which problematises the role of the state and questions its ability to engage 
in fair communicative practices key to legitimacy, I would nonetheless suggest that 
there are parallels which can be drawn concerning the role of the state and its ethical 
responsibilities. As Lawler describes it: 
In evoking a spirit of cosmopolitan-mindedness rather than full-blooded 
cosmopolitanism, it occupies a precarious normative space between the 
poles of contemporary international political debate. In invoking the 
possibility of the state as a morally-driven agent with `purposes beyond 
itself, it simultaneously invites the charge of `idealist' naivety from 
realists, of being timid and anachronistic from more thoroughgoing 
16 Andrew Linklater, 1992a: `The Question of the Next Stage in International Relations Theory: 
A Critical-Theoretical Point of View', Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 21(1), p. 83 
9 
cosmopolitans, [and] of being an example of `statist myopias' from post- 
structuralists'. 
17 
While the role of the state is questioned increasingly within critical international 
thought, as Lawler points out, the further erosion of state capacities may not be matched 
by the evolution of effective and, perhaps more importantly, legitimate structures of 
local, regional or global government in a cosmopolitan or post-sovereign world. '8 As 
indicated, current notions of good international citizenship generally see the state as the 
primary agent in international relations although, in line with Evans' original concept, 
see it as an ethical actor rather than one governed solely by national interests. ' 9 By 
focusing on issues of exclusion intrinsic to citizenship within the nation-state, Linklater 
claims that analogous concepts of citizenship might be adopted in international 
relations. Consequently, by rethinking the boundaries of the modern state, Linklater 
attempts to overcome the tension between `the rights of citizens and duties to the rest of 
humanity'. 2° Despite the challenges to the principles of sovereignty and non- 
intervention offered by solidarist understandings of good international citizenship, they 
do not critically analyse the definitions of order and justice or the power inequalities 
inherent in these ideas. It is not clear that an intersubjective methodology concerned 
with communicative fairness as key to legitimacy informs the processes through which 
states who claim to be good international citizens arrive at decisions to intervene. 
Without necessarily using the language of good international citizenship, the 
mainstream schools of thought in international relations have some conception as to 
what it means to be a good international citizen in accordance with their values and 
principles. Communitarians, cosmopolitans, realists, liberals, pluralists, solidarists, just 
war theorists: all have their own understanding of how states should behave. Most of 
these schools of thought recognise some form of normative perspective and seek to 
offer some notion of a standard of right; a normative standard by which states 
understand their roles and responsibilities in response to the problems of human 
suffering. 
" Peter Lawler, 2005: `The Good State: in praise of `classical' internationalism', Review of 
International Studies, 31(3), p. 433 
18 ibid. p. 440 
19 Gareth Evans, 1989: `Making Australian Foreign Policy', Australian Fabian Society, 
Australia, Pluto Press; Tim Dunne and Nicholas Wheeler, 1998: `Good international citizenship: 
a third way for British foreign policy', International Affairs, 74(4) 
20 Andrew Linklater: `What is a Good International Citizen? ', in Paul Keal (ed. ) Ethics and 
Foreign Policy, UK, Allen and Unwin, 1992 (henceforth, Linklater, 1992b) 
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There are two main theoretical and methodological problems with many of these 
approaches: Firstly, they focus on the need for substantive standards, rather than on 
process. A focus on process permits scrutiny of claims of legitimacy and justification 
for action or for the adoption of particular positions, as well as for the way in which 
such actions or positions may necessitate particular practices of exclusion or coercion. 
Secondly, wittingly or otherwise, they participate in what Beck calls `methodological 
nationalism'. Beck defines the concept of methodological nationalism as taking the 
following ideal premises for granted: 
it equates societies with nation-state societies, and sees states and their 
governments as the cornerstones of a social science analysis. It assumes 
that humanity is naturally divided into a limited number of nations, which 
on the inside, organize themselves as nation-states and, on the outside, set 
boundaries to distinguish themselves from other nation-states. 21 
Just as Beck does not see this critique as a thesis of the end of the nation-state, neither 
does a critical theoretical understanding of good international citizenship perceive the 
role of the nation-state as obsolete. No longer, however, is it sufficient for social 
inequalities, justice, law, politics and cultural identity to be negotiated solely against the 
background of the nation-state. By opening up questions of security in terms of these 
issues the state can no longer remain the sole, or even primary, referent. 
By locating good international citizenship within a critical-theoretical 
perspective, this research seeks to play a part in reconfiguring our understanding of 
`ethical behaviour' in international relations and the subsequent role of the state. It is 
with this in mind that it will be suggested that states may be neither the only, nor 
necessarily the best, actor capable of meeting the criteria laid out by a revised 
understanding of good international citizenship. The precepts of good international 
citizenship can, it will be argued, apply to all actors in terms of core commitments to 
dialogue and reflexive practice, although the term clearly recognises the role of states 
within this framework and in terms of the case study of Kosovo. While both 
universalist and particular conceptions of justice and morality are problematic, as we 
shall see in Chapter 2, some notion of universality is required to maintain normative 
power. However, complicated issues concerning the relationship between theory and 
practice arise which must be acknowledged. The relationship between these two 
21 Ulrich Beck, 2002: The Terrorist Threat: World Risk Society Revisited', Theory, Culture 
and Society, 19(4), p. 51 
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parallel and connected debates is a theme which runs, both implicitly and explicitly, 
throughout this work. 
The move to Critical Theory 
Certain manifestations of good international citizenship by themselves are 
insufficient to answer the basic moral question, "What should we do? " when faced with 
extremes of human suffering, and when humanitarian intervention faces the triple, 
interlinked, dilemmas of legitimacy, justification and application. We should, therefore, 
move to a theory which can assist in interpreting and addressing these dilemmas, 
notably that of legitimacy. Such a theory is critical theory and, in particular, 
Habermas's discourse ethics. While Habermasian critical theory seeks to retain a 
practical intent, discourse ethics is appropriate because Habermas recognises the 
centrality of communication and dialogue to questions of justification and offers 
normatively grounded regulative criteria for a communicative ethics. It is through a 
consideration of recent developments of Habermasian discourse ethics that our 
theoretical framework will be constructed. Although unable to shed light on how, or 
indeed if, military intervention for humanitarian purposes should be carried out, this 
theoretical framework seeks to expand our understanding of the legitimacy of the 
process by which the decision to use force is taken so that we may begin to address 
some of the problems faced within a state-centric and often strategic process. This 
research problematises current practices of exclusion and coercion, locating specific 
examples in the international deliberations surrounding the intervention in Kosovo and 
revealing how these communicative and structural distortions impacted upon the 
deliberative process and the legitimacy of the intervention. 
Critical theory neither rejects institutions of modernity such as the state, nor 
accepts them uncritically. 22 The intersection of critical theory and international 
relations has led to increased focus on the ways in which images of ethnic identity, 
national interests, states and global values aid in the constitution of power relations 
which favour some but disadvantage many others. Thus, it addresses the ways in which 
22 The term "critical theory" is intended to refer not only to the influence of the Frankfurt 
School, notably Habermas, on international theory, but also to the broader influence of other 
aspects of critical thought, including post-structuralism and constructivism, on areas such as 
political theory, IR theory and feminism. 
12 
structures and beliefs function to exclude or marginalize specific groups. 
23 The 
concepts of emancipation and reflexivity are important for the relationship between 
theory and practice embedded in a critical theoretical approach - how do established 
practices of inclusion and exclusion impact on people? 24 Critical theory is intended to 
reflect upon the social context which has given rise to it, its function within that society 
and the purposes and interests of its practitioners. Such reflections are then built back 
into the theory. In this way, there is something of the dialectical about it; taking a 
determined stance against the prevailing positivism, critical theory understood that the 
facts and our theories about them are part of an ongoing dynamic historical process. 25 
The way we perceive the world and the way the world is are mutually constitutive. 
Booth suggests that critical theory is intended to help create social and political 
conditions which are more conducive to human flourishing than the present 
conditions. 26 Critical social theory should not only offer greater understanding of the 
social world, but also guide its practical transformation. There are two branches of 
normativity intrinsic to critical theory: diagnostic and remedial. Habermas articulates 
this in his discussion of theory and practice: `In the one case, we have a social praxis, 
which as societal synthesis, makes insight possible; in the other case, a political praxis 
which consciously aims at overthrowing the existing system of institutions. ' 27 These 
two normative elements reflect the dual intention of the communicative framework 
presented here: first, it is intended to serve as a critical tool to analyse and critique 
dialogue and the construction of dialogue, and secondly, it is intended to offer a 
normative approach to dialogue in the context of conflict resolution. 
The moral question which haunts debates in International Relations, "What 
should I do? ", becomes particularly problematic when either the norms or values which 
help provide an answer are in doubt or contested, or when one's actions will affect the 
interests of others. Both of these conflicts are present in the debates on humanitarian 
intervention. White's theoretical framing of this dilemma as the tension between the 
23 Stephen K. White, 1991: Political Theory and Postmodernism, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, p. 8 
24 The self-conscious difficulties rasied by these issues are noted in Martin Jay, 1996 (2°d edn): 
The Dialectical Imagination, Berkeley, University of California Press, p. xxviii 
25 Max Horkheimer, 1931: `The Present Situation of Social Philosophy and the Tasks of an 
Institute for Social Research', http: //marxists. org/reference/archive/horkheimer/1931 /present- 
situation. htm, accessed June 2007 
26 Ken Booth, (ed. ) 2005: Critical Security Studies and World Politics, London, Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, p. 267-9 
27 J. Habermas, 1974: Theory and Practice, London, Heinemann Educational Books, p. 2 
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`responsibility to act' and the `responsibility to otherness' offers a helpful perspective 
for thinking about this problem and for understanding the present approach to it. 28 The 
argument for a communicative framework suggests that such conflicts are best resolved 
through the application of a communicative, rather than instrumental, rationality. 
Bearing in mind the primarily moral nature of the humanitarian intervention debate and 
the tendencies of all sides to make claims to justice and norms, then such dialogue 
belongs to the realm of moral discourse, bringing us to Habermas's discourse ethics. 
Any application of Habermas raises a number of significant problems 
concerning the relationship between theory and practice and the extent to which 
Habermas's notions of universal moral norms can translate into practical politics. 29 On 
the one hand, there are general problems with using Habermas as a guide for action 
rather than critique, whilst on the other, there are specific problems in applying 
Habermas's theory of communicative action, and in particular the principles of 
discourse ethics, to the study of the use of force in international relations. As Habermas 
did not apply the theory of communicative action to conflict in international relations, 
and his theory is based on a communicative rationality, so the very noticeable presence 
of strategic, or instrumental, rationality within international politics and its relationship 
with communicative action must be accounted for. 
Critics of Habermas30 argue that discourse ethics ensures that any practical 
communicative politics is likely to be authoritarian, and that consequently, Habermas is 
unable to deliver practical advice to those wishing to resist colonising processes. 
Alternatively, they argue that it is too abstract a theory to offer guidance in a world 
tainted by inequalities, power and distortion. This framework, through a recognition 
and negotiation of the mutually constitutive relationship between the universal and the 
particular, not only offers a corrective to Habermas's universalism, but also seeks to 
offer practical guidance to those who wish to recognise and establish forms of 
communicative fairness in deliberative situations without anticipating their outcomes. 
In other words, it offers a means to examine process and claims to legitimacy through 
an understanding of exclusion and coercive behaviour present in practice, and not, as 
other schools of thought on humanitarian intervention attempt to determine, a 
28 White, 1991 
29 Ricardo Blaug, 1999: Democracy: Real and Ideal, Albany, State University of New York 
Press 
30 For a discussion of critics see David Rasmussen, 1990: Reading Habermas, Basil Blackwell, 
Oxford 
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substantive standard of right. Communicative action is an intersubjective process, not 
an end in itself, and such an approach helps avoid charges of utopianism and its at times 
dangerous, totalising consequences. In order to develop this approach, we will attempt 
to flesh out a number of concepts within critical theory which anchor this orientation, 
drawing on the concepts of hermeneutics, difference feminism and placing an emphasis 
on procedure. 
The resulting theoretical framework is presented as a series of `communicative 
imperatives'. These indicate criteria which not only provide us with a normative power 
of critique, but also guide us towards understanding what might constitute `good 
communication' in the here and now. The communicative imperatives focus on process 
rather than offering any substantive solution to the dilemmas posed by the concept of 
humanitarian intervention, thus retaining the space Habermas saw as requisite for 
participants and actual dialogue to determine substantive content. The theory which 
grounds the communicative imperatives affects both our understanding of process and 
raises questions concerning who may be a relevant subject for those processes. 
The plurality of legal and moral positions regarding humanitarian intervention 
demonstrates the need for an intersubjective methodology in order to examine the 
process by which particular norms are validated. Such a method should, however, also 
be able to offer normative standards with which to judge competing positions. A 
communicative rationality is an appropriate means with which to ground an analysis of 
existing legitimacy in practical deliberations because it offers normative standards of 
democracy with which to judge process; without this we are faced with relativistic 
claims to truth and rightness likely to prevent us from acting in the face of events such 
as genocide, ethnic cleansing, or crimes against humanity. It suggests, in other words, 
not that the use of military force in Kosovo was right or wrong (there will be no 
revelation from `above'), but that if we are to have a greater understanding of conflict 
and conflict resolution, then we must be able to adequately theorize the processes of 
legitimacy and justification which are key elements in the global debates surrounding 
humanitarian intervention and the use of force. 
Much attention has been paid to the question of the legitimacy of NATO's 
actions in terms of morality and legality. On the other hand, little attention has been 
paid to the relationship between legitimacy and communicative action, otherwise 
termed deliberative legitimacy. Legitimacy is the expression of consensus, free from 
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coercion, on relevant norms of legality, morality and constitutionality. According to 
Clark, legitimacy is not to be thought of as a norm co-equal with the above three norms; 
there is no independent scale of values, as legitimacy can only be understood through 
contestation of these norms within the political sphere. 31 Legitimacy, like moral and 
political norms, does not stand still; it shifts to reflect the spirit and politics of the age. 3- 
Deliberative legitimacy can be no different; however, it offers a particular kind of 
framework within which debates over policy and the conduct of actors may take place. 
With regard to humanitarian intervention, the notion of legitimacy must extend not only 
to the communicative process prior to the decision to intervene, but also to the 
perceived consequences and the potential gap between the ends and the means. Clearly, 
legitimacy cannot reside solely in a consequentialist approach, for otherwise the 
humanitarian argument would be unable ever to override the caution derived from 
national interests or other motives, so a critical understanding of process and 
consequences suggests that a more reflexive approach to decision-making and methods 
of intervention should be adopted. 
Throughout this thesis, reference is made to the legitimate or illegitimate nature 
of decision-making concerning the use of force. Legitimacy may be said to comprise 
two elements: firstly, reasons must be offered to justify actions which may refer to, but 
need not be restricted to, legality, morality, and constitutionality33; secondly, consensus 
on these reasons/actions should be sought through engagement in appropriate, practical, 
dialogue. Consensus should indeed be a requisite element of the decision to use force, 
although it is not, by itself, sufficient. The mere presence of consensus does not 
automatically grant legitimacy to a decision without a consideration of how that 
consensus was arrived at. As Clark reminds us, consensus can be `encouraged, and 
thwarted, by a range of power-political, self-interests, and coercive means. '34 
31 Ian Clark, 2005: Legitimacy in International Society, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 4 
32 ibid. p. 13 
33 Clark defines constitutionality as `the realm neither of legal norms, nor of moral prescriptions. 
Instead, it is the political realm of conventions, informal understandings, and mutual 
expectations. At its core are political sensibilities about what can properly be done, and how 
affairs should be conducted'. ibid. p. 220 
34 Clark, 2005, p. 192 
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Thesis structure 
Chapter 1 expands on the problem represented by Kosovo and sets it up as a 
problem of legitimacy. It explores the situation in Kosovo and the international 
engagement with the conflict before 1999, examining key events prior to NATO's 
decision to intervene from a communicative perspective. In addition, it locates concerns 
over legitimacy in relation to a number of actors and processes, argues that conflict was 
not inevitable, and that communicative actions and omissions played a key role in the 
development of conflict and a military and strategic mindset. 
Chapter 2 sets out the first stage of the theoretical framework, introducing the 
concept of good international citizenship and locating it within the cosmopolitan and 
communitarian literature which echo concerns over the universal and the particular 
reflected in critical theory. It charts the evolution of the concept, demonstrating its 
current responses to the problem of humanitarian intervention, sets out some of its 
limitations and indicates how it might be constructed as a more critical tool. 
Chapter 3 sets out the second stage of the theoretical framework and 
encompasses the shift from international relations to critical theory. It articulates 
Habermas's discourse ethics and builds on recent developments in discourse ethics to 
formulate and ground the critical theoretical framework. It examines recurrent concerns 
relating to the universal and the particular present in discourse ethics and examines the 
extent to which `hidden' content appears in Habermas's formulation of discourse ethics, 
through his principles of (D) and (U). It identifies similar concerns in Linklater's 
discursively constituted cosmopolitanism. In order to mitigate these concerns and 
formulate a conception of dialogue that retains practical critical purchase on current 
practices of exclusion and coercion, we turn to Benhabib's procedural emphasis, 
Shapcott's move towards Gadamerian hermeneutics and feminist critiques of discourse 
ethics. 
Chapter 4 sees the formulation of the theoretical framework which is presented 
as a series of `communicative imperatives'. It raises a number of methodological 
concerns relating to the application of theory to practice. Having interpreted 
Habermas's model of discourse as a principle of legitimacy rather than a concrete 
institutional design, we further examine the relationship between legitimacy and 
communicative practices. It also critically examines existing applications of 
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Habermas's discourse ethics to international relations by Ian Johnstone35 and Corneliu 
Bjola36 
Having formulated and clarified the theoretical framework, the communicative 
imperatives are then tested in Chapter 5 through their application to an empirical 
analysis of the dialogue which took place over Kosovo within the Security Council, 
from March 1998 to June 1999, and at Rambouillet. Through such an application we 
establish the interpretive power of the framework, in other words, the extent of its 
ability to identify different forms of constraints on practical dialogue and some 
preliminary conclusions as to its limits. A variety of documentary sources will be used 
for analysis, foremost of which will be the records of UN Security Council meetings 
between March 1998 and June 1999. This period covers the key Security Council 
discussions and subsequent resolutions concerning Kosovo. In addition, a series of 
available documents from the negotiations at Rambouillet will be examined. There are 
fewer publicly available documents from Rambouillet, as the talks themselves were 
held behind closed doors, however, much secondary literature has been written, 
including some by participants at the talks and, not least, the Rambouillet Accords 
drawn up prior to NATO's intervention in March 1999. This research has not attempted 
to access secret sources, having deliberately chosen to work with documents available 
in the public domain in order to assess the legitimacy of justifications offered publicly. 
Chapter 6 draws together a number of strands concerning the relationship 
between the universal and the particular and clarifies the relationship between good 
international citizenship and the intersubj ective, communicative framework. It offers an 
appraisal of the communicative imperatives and the extent to which evaluative criteria 
formulated in this way can be used to assess practice. It concludes an evaluation of the 
intervention in Kosovo in light of the theoretical framework and indicates several 
implications concerning the use of this framework for agency and legitimacy in 
international relations. In its elaboration of a communicative approach to conflict 
resolution, it seeks to attest to the continuing relevance of Habermasian discourse ethics 
for International Relations. 
35 Ian Johnstone, 2003: `Security Council Deliberations: The Power of the Better Argument', 
European Journal of International Law, 14(3) 
36 Bjola, 2005 
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1. Practice: Kosovo prior to 1999 
1.1 Introduction 
The controversy which arose over military intervention in Kosovo resulted from 
concerns over legality, legitimacy, the ends and the means of diplomacy and the use of 
force for humanitarian ends. These dilemmas, particularly the degree to which 
legitimacy was contested, are relevant to this thesis as they were played out on the 
international stage through a series of dialogues and negotiations. It is not, however, the 
intention of this research to offer a definitive version of the road to intervention. I 
Instead, it will seek to present the story of Kosovo as a problem of legitimacy. 
Legitimacy in this context is not simply a matter of the controversial legal status of 
NATO's intervention, but is grounded in concepts of dialogue, inclusion, participation, 
coercion, recognition and reflexivity. These are all issues which are intrinsic to an 
analysis of the international community's involvement, or indeed its lack of 
involvement, in the situation in Kosovo. A close look at the relationship between 
events in Kosovo and international engagement reveals a number of missed or flawed 
opportunities for dialogue and non-military forms of intervention intended to constitute 
effective conflict prevention. 
To this end, this chapter identifies a number of key processes and actors that 
contributed to the marginalisation of Kosovo between 1989-99 and thus to the 
development of violent conflict. Such processes include the European Community 
Conference on Yugoslavia, the Badinter Arbitration Commission, the London 
Conference and the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia, the side-lining of 
the non-violent resistance movement, the Dayton Accords and the Holbrooke 
Agreement. We are seeking to identify patterns of exclusion, coercion and illegitimacy 
which will then pave the way for a more detailed analysis of the dialogue surrounding 
the intervention. This emphasis on deliberative legitimacy, developed both theoretically 
and empirically in the following chapters, is derived from a communicative ethics 
approach which offers normative grounds for a critique of the morally difficult question 
' For thorough discussions see: Tim Judah, 2002: Kosovo. War and Revenge, New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 2nd edn; Alex J. Bellamy, 2002b: Kosovo and International Society, New 
York, Palgrave Macmillan; John Norris, 2005: Collision Course: NATO, Russia and Kosovo, 
USA, Praeger Publishers; Noel Malcolm, 2002: Kosovo. A Short History, London, Pan; Louis 
Sell. 2002: Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, USA, Duke University Press 
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of military intervention. It also challenges conventional representations of ethnic 
conflict and indicates that the actions and omissions of external actors played a key role 
in the development of conflict and a military and strategic mindset. Whilst most 
analyses focus on the period 1998-99, it may be argued that an understanding of the 
process which led to conflict in March 1999 is crucial and must take in a number of 
factors which are not usually addressed in an assessment of the legitimacy of 
intervention. 
Problems concerning the source of authority for intervention, the need for 
consensus, the threat of the veto and doubts as to appropriate threshold criteria for 
intervention are not the only problems related to intervention or its legitimacy. 2 Apart 
from the social, political and economic rebuilding required post-intervention, the 
solution or outcome of the intervention is often effectively decided by the intervening 
parties rather than by the warring parties themselves. So, it is often outsiders, 
unintentionally or otherwise, who decide whether partition, autonomy or independence 
is appropriate, whether or not communities should be ethnically pure or multi-ethnic. 
This was seen in the Dayton Accord for Bosnia and the earlier Vance-Owen plan in 
1993. The Vance-Owen plan effectively facilitated the establishment of ethnically 
homogenous regions and allowed the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats to keep 
some of the land they had gained through ethnic cleansing. 3 Dayton is similarly argued 
to have rewarded ethnic cleansing, dividing Bosnia into two entities: the Muslim-Croat 
Federation and Republika Srpska. The agreement stipulating Bosnia's constitutional 
structures was drawn up by US government advisors and imposed on the parties 
separately. The fact that `elected representatives from the new state had little input into 
the agreement was to be par for the course for the region, and repeated in the 
2 For a variety of perspectives, see Nicholas Wheeler, 2001: `Legitimating Humanitarian 
Intervention: Principles and Procedures', Melbourne Journal of International Law, vol. 2; The 
Responsibility to Protect, 2001; Holzgrefe, Keohane (eds. ), 2003; Wheeler, 2000: Saving 
Strangers, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; Chandler, 2002; Smith, Light (eds. ) 2001: 
Ethics and Foreign Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; Michael Ignatieff, 2000: 
Virtual War, UK, Vintage; Mary Kaldor, 2001: New and Old Wars, Cambridge, Polity Press; 
Falk, 1999; Chatterjee, Scheid (eds. ) 2003: Ethics and Foreign Intervention, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press 
Karin Von Hippel, 2000: Democracy by Force, Cambridge. Cambridge University Press, 
p. 143 
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Rambouillet, Paris, `talks' on Kosovo'4, raising questions concerning the 
communicative conditions of negotiations intended to deliver peace agreements. 
This chapter demonstrates that the need for intervention in 1999, posed by those 
who argued that there was no alternative, pays little attention to the myriad of 
opportunities to influence events in Kosovo over the previous decade. It attempts, to 
borrow the words of Howard Clark, to `counter the tendency to write non-violence out 
of history. ' 5 The importance of the extended period of civil resistance, or non-violence, 
in Kosovo is that it `demonstrated alternative possibilities to the calamity in Bosnia, 
averting war for eight years and giving those intergovernmental bodies that claim 
responsibility for European security time to develop a preventive peace policy. '6 It is 
this `time', this `space created', by the non-violence movement which will be 
considered here and the way in which it was responded to by the international 
community. 
1.2 The political and social construction of ethnic tension 
In order to understand what happened in 1999, it is necessary to understand 
earlier events in Kosovo. Both Serbian and Kosovar Albanian identities have been 
constructed in part through perceived ties to Kosovo and influential historical myths. 
We need, therefore, to have some understanding of the history of Kosovo and to see 
how political manipulation has created and strengthened ethnic divisions. The 1981 
Yugoslav census indicates that of Kosovo's total population of 1.585.000,77.5% were 
Albanian and 13.3% were Serb. By 1991, despite attempts by Belgrade to increase 
Kosovo's Serbian population, Albanians constituted 90% of the population and Serbs 
only 10%. Kosovo was and remains the poorest region in the former Yugoslavia. 7 it 
will be argued that the wars in the former Yugoslavia in general, and the conflict in 
Kosovo particularly, were due less to the eruption of ancient ethnic hatred and enmity, 
as is often suggested, than the consequence of specific policies. 
8 
4 David Chandler: `Western Intervention and the Disintegration of Yugoslavia, 1989-1999', 
from P. Hammond and E. Herman, 2000: Degraded Capability: The Media and the Kosovo 
Crisis, London, Pluto Press, p. 27 
5 Howard Clark, 2000: Civil Resistance in Kosovo, London, Pluto Press, p. 5 
6 ibid. 
Sell, 2002, p. 67 
8 Clark, 2000, p. 7 
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It is conventional when narrating the events leading up to the conflict in 1999 to 
differentiate between ethnic identities. Although an analysis of the different 
interpretations of what happened in Kosovo and of the region's history is beyond the 
scope of this research, it is, however, fundamental to this thesis and the concept of 
reflexivity that forms a core to the revised notions of good international citizenship and 
dialogue that we recognise that representations of identity and of `ethnic conflict' are 
contested. In doing so, we shall explore some of the events leading to conflict which 
invariably draw on ethnic issues without falling into the trap of asserting a static and 
essentialized conception of identity. 9 We can identify two common strands to 
representations of Kosovo: the `liberal focus on Milosevic and elite manipulation of 
popular sentiment' and `the realist characterisation of the outbreak of suppressed 
hatreds at the end of the Cold War'. 10 As Stavrianakis points out, both accounts 
construct Kosovo and `the Balkans' as the `backward or uncivilized Other of `Europe'; 
a discursive construction pivotal to policies taken in relation to the region. ' 11 Accounts 
which favour the portrayal of the Balkans as a `confused, often violent ethnic 
cauldron' 12 waiting to explode with the revival of ethnic hatred following the end of the 
Cold War do not, for example, explain the non-violent resistance of the Kosovo 
Albanians during the 1990s which had a deep impact on Kosovar politics and identity. 
This is worth noting because Western accounts of the violence in Kosovo would inform 
the consequent and, many argue, inadequate response to it. 13 
9 It is worth noting that fairly static ethnic identities are also at times portrayed by Serbian and 
Albanian writers which aided the entrenchment of particular `truths': `The Serb campaign of 
terror did not begin on March 24,1999, the day NATO began bombing Serbia, nor in March 
1998, when the massacres of Drenica happened, nor in 1988 or 1981. Rather, it has been an 
entire period of hatred and cultivating racism by Serbs pushing the idea that they are superior to 
the Albanians, a period that has lasted at least from 1912 to the present. ' Baton Haxhiu: 
`Kosova: A Place Where the Dead Speak', from William Buckley (ed. ) 2000: Kosovo: 
Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions, Cambridge, Wm. B. Erdmans Publishing Co., 
p. 180 
10 Anna Stavrianakis, 2002: `A Tale of Two Ethnicities? An Analysis of Approaches to `Ethnic 
Conflict': The Case of Kosovo', Global Politics Network, p. 1 
" ibid. See Henry Kissinger, 1999: `Doing Injury to History', Newsweek Magazine, April 5. 
For a critical perspective of this discursive construction, see Elizabeth Dauphinee: 
`Rambouillet: A Critical (Re)Assessment', Florian Bieber, Zidas Daskalovski (eds. ) 2003: 
Understanding the ' zwar in Kosovo, London, Frank Cass Publishers 
12 Robert Kaplan, 2005: Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History, New York, Vintage 
Books, p. xi-xii; Norris, 2005, p. xix 
13 Jasmina Husanovic: ' `Post-Conflict Kosovo': An Anatomy Lesson in the Ethics/Politics of 
Human Rights', Ken Booth (ed. ) 2001: The Kosovo Tragedy, London, Frank Cass, p. 277 
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Campbell's approach to identity has much to offer when trying to understand 
ethnic violence and formulate a response to it. Campbell suggests that conflict on the 
basis of ethnicity is a consequence of the dominance and exclusivity of one identity, 
rather than the inherently violent nature of ethnic identities themselves., 4 It is then, the 
process of `degrading' othering which may take place through language, religion, race 
and other social factors, which leads to violence. 15 When the Other is seen as a threat to 
one's own national identity and feelings of victimhood are created and manipulated, 
then can conflict emerge. Campbell refuses to accept that ethnicity is a stable or static 
factor in the explanation of ethnic conflict, arguing that identity can only be perceived 
in relation to difference and that ethnicity is a term which `signifies relationships of 
power in the problematic of identity/difference rather than being a signifier for which 
there is a stable referent. ' 16 Difference, then, can be translated into otherness through 
exclusivist policies. Campbell's approach suggests: 
identity creation is an ongoing process, that Kosovo Serb and Kosovo 
Albanian identities were/are being (re)created through certain practices, 
using history and tradition in that process. ' 17 
It is with these notions of identity in mind, whilst recognising that narratives of history 
and of demographics are most commonly used to represent difference in Kosovo'8, that 
I shall move on to examine the history behind the conflict. 
Kosovo holds a special place in the history of both Serbians and Albanians. It is 
not what is true that matters, but rather what people believe to be so, and this approach 
pervades any interpretation of Kosovo. 19 Although myths and legends surrounding 
Kosovo have been passed down through the centuries, `it was only in the late nineteenth 
century that they were resurrected as part of the narratives of rival Serb and Albanian 
national movements. '20 Although populated largely by Albanians, there is little 
agreement as to `first possession' of the land. The Serbs viewed Kosovo as the holy 
place of the Serb nation, where the Serbian Army, under Lazar, was defeated by the 
Turks at the Battle of Kosovo Polje in June 1389. Kosovo is also home to the Serbian 
14 David Campbell, 1998a: National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia, 
Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, p. 88-93 
15 Julie Mertus, 1999: How Myths and Truths Started a War, Berkeley, University of California 
Press, p. 4 
16 Campbell, 1998a, p. 92 
17 Stavrianakis, 2002, p. 12 
18 For example, Layne, 1999, p. 4 
19 Mertus, 1999, p. 2-10 
20 The Kosovo Report, 2000, p. 33 
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Orthodox Church. The early 20th century saw continuing conflict in the Balkans and 
between the Serbs and Albanians over Kosovo. Albanians resisted both Serb and 
Yugoslav rule not only because it prevented any union with the newly created Albanian 
state (1912), but also because, in an attempt to address the ethnic balance, the Serbian- 
dominated authorities encouraged Serbs and Montenegrins to settle in Kosovo. 21 In 
addition, all key positions were in the hands of a `largely imported Serbian elite. Every 
effort was made to obstruct the development of Albanian national consciousness. '22 In 
1937, Vaso Cubrilovic drafted a plan calling for the expulsion of Albanians. 
Cubrilovic's suggestions as to how to `persuade' Albanians to leave are instructive as 
they were to be revived later on under Milogevic: 
The law must be enforced to the letter so as to make staying intolerable 
for Albanians: fines, and imprisonments, the ruthless application of all 
police dispositions such as on the prohibition of smuggling, cutting 
forests, damaging agriculture, leaving dogs unchained, compulsory labor 
and any other measure that an experienced police force can contrive. 23 
If this failed to work, then there always remained the practice of `burning down 
Albanian villages and city quarters. '24 Such statements may be seen not as evidence of 
a pre-given identity prioritising ethnic hatred, but as discursive interventions in social 
relations in Kosovo which served to create antagonism and conflict. 
In July 1945, Kosovo became an autonomous province within a federal Serbia 
(which was a constituent part of the new Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia). 25 
Serbs retained their dominant position in Kosovo. However, demonstrations in 1968 by 
Albanian students called for the province to be upgraded to a republic and to be given 
its own Albanian-language university. 26 The demand for republic status was rejected. 
The 1974 Yugoslav Constitution gave Kosovo republic status in all but name, granting 
it economic and political autonomy virtually identical to that of the republics. It was 
represented on the federal presidency, along with Vojvodina, and the six republics 
which granted it an equal vote in all decisions. Serbs saw the autonomy granted to 
Kosovo by the 1974 Constitution as the first step towards secession and unification with 
Albania. However, while Tito had maintained a balance over the simmering discontent 
21 Malcolm, 2002, p. 278-286 
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in Yugoslavia, the system began to unravel following his death in 1980. In 1981 
demonstrations and rioting spread across the province which the Yugoslav authorities 
suppressed harshly. The exact number of dead is unknown, but thousands of Albanians 
were arrested, tried and imprisoned. 27 Many of these protesters who were jailed were 
later instrumental in founding the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Judah argues that it 
is crucially important to remember that until 1989 it was Albanian Communists who 
were ruling Kosovo, not Serbs: 
This fact was to have enormous significance later on, as Western 
diplomats could never understand why it was so hard to bring together a 
Kosovo Albanian negotiating team which would represent a fair spectrum 
of opinion especially since they all agreed on the basic demand of 
independence. The answer often lay in who had done what, in and after 
1981.28 
The events of 1981 were a turning point. Propaganda on both sides played an important 
role in the construction of hostilities and the degeneration of inter-communal relations. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, Kosovo was increasingly Albanianised. The case of the 
Kosovo Serb farmer, Djordje Martinovic, became symbolic of the sentiment being 
nurtured by Serbs concerning their treatment at the hands of Albanians. In May 1985, 
he was rushed to hospital to have a broken bottle removed from his anus. He claimed to 
have been attacked by two Albanians, a claim seized upon by the Belgrade media, but 
some doctors believed the injury to be self-inflicted, which Martinovic himself later 
admitted was the case before then retracting this confession. 29 This incident was an 
example of the way perceptions of social relations in Kosovo were shaped, fuelling 
feelings of Serbian victimization and being portrayed by the Serbian press as an attack 
by Albanian nationalist separatists on Serbs. 
Another important element in the reproduction of hostile ethnic identities 
occurred in January 1986 when 216 Serbian intellectuals presented a petition to the Serb 
and Yugoslav Assemblies declaring that: "The case of Djordje Martinovic has come to 
symbolize the predicament of all Serbs in Kosovo. " Later that year, the Serbian 
Academy of Arts and Sciences published a document which became known as the 
Memorandum. The language of the Memorandum is seen as an important step on the 
road to war, particularly in its discussion of the position of the Serbs in Croatia and 
27 Judah, 2002, p. 40 
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Kosovo. The document spoke of the "physical, political, legal and cultural genocide" of 
Serbs in Kosovo and argued that the "remnants of the Serb nation (... ) faced with a 
physical, moral and psychological reign of terror (... ) seem to be preparing for their 
"3o final exodus. 
Milogevic visited Kosovo on 24 April, 1987 at the request of Stambolic, the 
Serbian President, to listen to the grievances of the Kosovo Serbs. He arrived in 
Kosovo Polje while thousands of Serbs were clashing with the Albanian police. 
Milogevic told Serbs "Yugoslavia does not exist without Kosovo! Yugoslavia would 
disintegrate without Kosovo! Yugoslavia and Serbia are not going to give up 
Kosovo. "31 This attitude matches that described by Kostovicova; citing Gellner, she 
argues that, `Nationalism holds that they [nations and states] were destined for each 
other; that either without the other is incomplete, and constitutes a tragedy. ' Serb and 
Albanian claims to Kosovo were greatly informed by this view. 32 
Between 1987-9, when he assumed the Serbian Presidency, Milosevic 
consolidated and increased his support, primarily through hundreds of rallies, known as 
`Meetings of Truth' held across the country. These populist gatherings served the 
purposes of politicians, nationalist or communist, like Milosevic who manipulated the 
myth of Kosovo to create nationalist ideology, rhetoric and propaganda. 33 On 17 
November, Milosevic achieved the removal of Kosovo's Albanian communist leaders. 
Preparations began to alter the constitutional status of Kosovo, in order to `reunite' it 
with Serbia. To legalise this step, Kosovo's own assembly had to vote to approve it. 
On 23 March 1989, surrounded by tanks and police and with Serbian officials 
monitoring the votes of the Albanian delegates, the Kosovo assembly voted for the 
constitutional amendments which were ratified in the Serbian parliament five days 
later. 34 Those Albanian delegates who stood up to Serbian pressure were expelled from 
the Assembly, dismissed from their jobs, and threatened with criminal prosecution. 35 
The province reverted to its former name of Kosovo and Metohija, and Serbia gained 
control over Kosovo's security, judiciary, finances, and social planning. It is important 
30 The Kosovo Report, p. 40 
31 Judah, 2002, p. 52-3; The Kosovo Report, p. 40-1 
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to understand why the provinces still existed even though they had lost their autonomy. 
Milosevic now controlled Montenegro as well as Kosovo and Vojvodina and therefore 
held four out of the eight votes on the federal presidency. 
When the Serbian Assembly adopted the amendments on 28 March, 1989, the 
Assembly President Borisav Jovic warned that the Constitution would be "used without 
remission" against anyone who dared attack the integrity of Serbia. 36 On 28 June 1989, 
the six hundredth anniversary of the Turkish victory at Kosovo Polje, Milosevic 
celebrated his triumph over Kosovo to a crowd of approximately one million, actively 
drawing on the history and legends surrounding Lazar's defeat. This erosion of 
Kosovo's status was compounded by further deliberate actions by both Albanians and 
Serbs to institute ethnic polarisation and segregation such as the mass sacking of 
Albanian staff throughout all employment sectors from 1990 onwards, police and 
paramilitary presence and intimidation, media control, and the Albanian boycott of the 
December 1990 Serbian elections. 37 
Campbell's argument that ethnic identities on which claims are based are not in 
any sense innate, but rather a discursive practice can be seen in key moments of the run- 
up to conflict in Kosovo as they involve actors `reproducing and rearticulating a 
historical representation and violently deploying it in the present to constitute ... 
(individual and/or collective) subjectivity. ' 38 In other words, identities and actions are 
mutually constitutive. It is not, taking this to Campbell's logical conclusion, that any 
identity may be adopted, as `the pool of resources from which identities can be 
materialized is never infinite, and in Kosovo it became an ethnicized pool', but rather 
recognising discursive practices and the use of dialogue to recreate identities for 
political ends. 39 Identity, then, is not static, but is reflected in its `dynamics with the 
Other, which has a constitutive role in the articulation of identity. '40 This is particularly 
apt in regard to the constitutive role of education policy in forming a wider political 
identity. The increasing segregation of both political and social space in Kosovo, 
particularly after the construction of the Albanian parallel systems in 1992, reflects 
these dynamics. The appeal to non-violence by the Albanians was both a necessity for 
survival in the face of superior Serb military strength, and a choice (a chance to reject 
36 ibid. 
3' Clark, 2000, p. 71-85 
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the Serbian portrayal of Albanian identity and to identify themselves with contemporary 
Europe) 
. 
41 The limited fluidity of identity can be demonstrated in context of Castells' 
definition of legitimizing, resistance and project identities. Castells claims that 
legitimizing identity `is introduced by dominant institutions of society to extend and 
rationalize their domination vis a vis social actors. ' Resistance identity is `generated by 
those actors who are in positions/conditions devalued and/or stigmatized by the logic of 
domination, thus building trenches of resistance and survival on the basis of principles 
different from, or opposed to, those [dominant ones] permeating the institutions of 
society. ' Project identities are those built by collective social actors that not only 
redefine their position in society, but seek to transform the overall social structure. 42 
Kostovicova argues that this model explains the transformative path of Albanian 
national identity in Kosovo: 
Starting off as a resistance identity to the legitimizing identity of the 
Serbian state and social order in the early 1990s, it was premised on the 
project of independent Kosovo throughout the 1990s, only to itself 
become a legitimizing identity after the NATO intervention in 1999, albeit 
with an element of the project identity retained due to the unresolved 
status of Kosovo. 43 
1.3 Missing dialogues and non-violent resistance 
Following Serbia's unconstitutional assumption of control over Kosovo in 1991, 
the province lost its status as a legal entity with rights. The Serb authorities passed a 
series of laws whose effect was to erode Albanian rights. They passed laws which 
prevented Albanians buying land or houses from Serbs. Other measures included 
incentives to encourage Serbs who had left Kosovo to return. Public companies such as 
the electricity organisation were taken over by their Serb counterparts. Workers who 
were not sacked were forced to resign as they were presented with loyalty oaths they 
were expected to sign. Many doctors and medical staff were sacked, leading to the 
closing down of many, particularly rural, medical facilities. The police force was 
purged, making it in essence an all-Serb force. The police then took over television and 
radio buildings and large numbers of Albanian journalists lost their jobs. All cultural 
41 Clark, 2000, p. 67. The campaign to reconcile blood feuds is an example of communicative 
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and other institutions were closed down or merged with their Serbian counterparts. 44 
Education became highly contentious as the Serbian curriculum was imposed on 
Albanian students. The financing of Albanian schools and educational materials ceased 
from March 1991 and the University became a Serb-only institution. 
It was from these social and political conditions that the non-violent resistance 
emerged. Following Milosevic's destruction of Communists in Kosovo, new Albanian 
political groups began to appear, often growing out of existing groups of intellectuals. 
Ibrahim Rugova, head of the Kosovo Association of Writers rapidly rose to prominence 
as did Veton Surroi, a journalist and head of the Kosovo branch of the Association for a 
Yugoslav Democratic Initiative. The Association circulated a petition entitled `For 
Democracy, against Violence. ' Clark argues that this petition, signed by over 400,000 
Kosovo Albanians, played an important role in shaping the strategy of non-violent 
resistance to increasing Serb repression. It was representative of an increasing number 
of symbolic moments of unity and resistance which became part of everyday life for 
Kosovo Albanians. 45 It has been noted that this strategy of non-violence ran counter to 
Kosovar Albanian tradition (for example, the kacak tradition), thus demonstrating the 
shaping of political and cultural identity to be a continual process and not merely a 
retreat to innate ethnic characteristics. The Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), led 
by Rugova, was founded in December 1989 and rapidly became the focal point of 
Kosovar politics; it would remain dominant until 1998. Rugova insisted that Kosovo's 
status should be equal to that of the other Yugoslav republics. Once Yugoslavia had 
disintegrated, Rugova insisted that Kosovo must become independent. 
Clark argues that non-violence is often over-simplified in the case of Kosovo 
and is usually identified with Rugova's position within Kosovar politics. However, the 
civil resistance movement described by Clark goes much further than the stance taken 
by the LDK, who, certainly at first, were the supporters rather than the initiators of such 
a position. The initiatives which made non-violence a viable strategy in this context 
came from a number of other sources. Clark identifies the roots of contemporary civil 
resistance as being in the dignified and non-violent protests of the Trepca miners in 
November 1988. Out of this grew a movement initiated both by local communities and 
44 Judah, 2002, p. 62; Sell, 2002, p. 93-4; Marc Weller, 1999a: The Crisis in Kosovo 1989-1999: 
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workers and the Kosova Alternative, a group of political and intellectual organisations 
intent on ending the cycle of domination in Kosovo. This included the Writers 
Association, the Social Democratic Party, the Youth Parliament, the Parliamentary 
Party (PPK), a Green Party and a feminist group. From 1990, following the 
establishment of the Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms in 
November 1989 (CHDRF), it became the pattern for activists from the CDHRF or the 
new parties to go to the scene of any violent incident. This was partly to document 
what had happened and partly to urge restraint among local populations and to explain 
the idea behind non-violence. 46 
On 2 July 1990,114 out of 123 Albanian members of the provincial government 
voted to declare Kosovo a republic; Kosovo would be independent of Serbia, but would 
remain part of Yugoslavia. Three days later, the Serbian parliament voted to dissolve 
the Kosovar parliament and the Serb Assembly took over all legislative functions. On 7 
September, a secret meeting of Kosovar deputies voted for a constitution for their own 
Republic of Kosovo. It was not until fighting was taking place in Croatia that the 
deputies voted for the Resolution on Independence of Kosovo on 22 September 1991. 
On 19 October 1991, the Kosovar `parliament' voted to confirm the results of a 
referendum and declared Kosovo to be the independent `Republic of Kosova'. 47 The 
Republic of Kosova existed only virtually at this point, as Serbian and Yugoslav 
institutions remained in control. This is where the non-violent strategy began to 
develop, leading to the creation of Kosovo's parallel state: 
Instead of trying to mount a violent insurrection to realise this 
independence, the party began to simulate it in the hope that, by force of 
demographic and other pressures, Kosovo would, one day, simply drop 
into Albanian hands like ripe fruit. 48 
The parallel state was created on two levels. On the one hand, new political 
bodies were created, and on the other, practical measures were put into place in order to 
replace the loss of healthcare and educational provisions. 49 On a political level, the 
LDK created a new government structure. On 24 May 1992, elections were held for a 
new Kosovar parliament and to elect a president. The LDK won the election with 
76.44% of the votes and Rugova was elected by 99.5% of those who voted, granting 
46 Clark, 2000, p. 59 
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Rugova and the LDK a measure of legitimacy and authority. Although more than 
eighteen parties contested the election, none disagreed over the issue of independence. 
Fourteen seats were left empty for the Serbs and Montenegrins. 50 Despite ignoring the 
election, the Serb authorities would not allow parliament to convene. Consequently, 
although parliament never met, thirteen commissions were set up in order to provide 
some policy guidance. Technically, a government comprising six ministers under Prime 
Minister Bujar Bukoshi and based in Slovenia until May 1992, when it moved to Bonn, 
had already been set up on 19 October 1991. Despite its exile, this government was 
more than an exercise in institution building or `gesture politics', its most important role 
having been to collect taxes from the large Kosovar diaspora. 51 According to The 
Kosovo Report, 90% of these taxes were spent on supporting the parallel education 
system while the remainder funded the LDK administration, cultural activities, sports 
and some health care. 52 The parallel education system became an essential part of 
Albanian society, making a significant difference in the teaching of history, geography, 
music and language and further aiding the construction of incompatible notions of 
identity. 53 Other organizations were set up which also supported the parallel system. 
These included, but were not limited to, the Mother Theresa Society which was 
established in 1990 and provided aid and health care to Albanians who were afraid to 
use the Serb-dominated facilities; the Councils for Reconciliation which provided a kind 
of parallel justice system, media outlets, and a number of other NGOs which were 
concerned with culture and sport as well as organisations for young people and women 
such as the Kosovo Karate Association. 54 
The argument that these non-violent political acts offered the international 
community opportunities to pursue alternative strategies does not remove all 
responsibility from the Kosovo Albanians. Clark offers a detailed analysis of ways in 
which the civil resistance movement could have developed in a more profitable and 
fulfilling way, in terms of being more open to the needs and interests of minorities, and 
encouraging active social, political and economic transformation. Instead, there was a 
tendency for the movement to stagnate as Rugova and the LDK assured the population 
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that help would come from outside. 55 In reality, Rugova's strategy to internationalise 
the conflict consistently met with failure and exclusion from decision-making processes. 
Thus, a critical view of external action is not intended to depoliticise the Kosovo 
Albanians, but rather to demonstrate the presence of non-violent resistance and 
dialogue-based activities which were ongoing in Kosovo and the extent to which this 
offered the international community (in the form of both states and non-state/civil 
society actors) possible ways in which to support or influence politics in Serbia and 
Kosovo prior to the outbreak of conflict. 56 Drawing on the example of the successful 
polio immunisation campaigns in 1996 and 1997, Clark supports this position when he 
argues that `internationals wishing to support social development in Kosovo were in a 
strong position to negotiate inter-ethnic cooperation. ' 57 This campaign brought together 
international agencies (WHO, UNICEF), state (Serbian) and parallel health structures 
(Mother Theresa Association). This in turn brought in mosques and churches and the 
media to aid in the mobilisation phase, as well as commitment from the Serbian police 
not to intervene. Such communicative opportunities were passed over in favour of a 
later, strategic approach in the form of military intervention. 
The parallel state system allowed the LDK to deny the legitimacy of Belgrade 
institutions and to call for support from the international community. This brings us to 
the issue of the engagement of the international community prior to 1998, or as Sell 
remarks, the `pattern of Western neglect that prevailed for most of the decade. ' 58 This 
was a pattern of neglect expressed, in part, through a series of exclusionary practices. 
Having declared independence, Kosovo struggled for recognition by the 
international community. Rugova was not invited to the July 1991 European 
Community Conference on Yugoslavia which ended the fighting in Slovenia and 
marked the beginning of Europe's efforts to broaden the search for a Yugoslav 
settlement. According to the Brioni Joint Declaration, the Kosovo Albanians had no 
choice but to remain within Serbia, given that it established that the principle of the 
right to self-determination was limited to Yugoslav "peoples". A request for 
55 Clark, 2000, p. 128-141 
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recognition by the ECCY in 1991 was refused, as were requests to the OSCE to be 
allowed to express their views. 59 At the same conference the EC chief negotiator 
excluded the issue of Kosovo altogether in his attempt to keep Milosevic on board. 
Despite Kosovo's status as a constitutional entity under the 1974 Constitution, it was 
not invited to participate in the peace process. 60 In a move which firmly established the 
exclusion of Kosovo from the international agenda the conference defined Kosovo as an 
`internal' problem for Yugoslavia, thus preventing it from facing further international 
scrutiny and involvement. 61 
At the London Conference of August 1992, the Kosovar delegation was not 
permitted to enter the chamber or to represent themselves. 62 Rugova was invited to 
attend, but was not allowed to speak or participate in the proceedings in any way, 
having to watch the conference on closed-circuit television from an adjoining room. 63 
Ironically, in the letter of invitation, Carrington remarks that `We are thus making 
strenuous efforts to ensure that the views of the Kosovo Albanians are heard' . This 
64 
raises concerns over dubiously justified exclusions. At the conference a working group 
on Kosovo was established, but, at Milogevic's insistence, it would only deal with 
issues on minority rights. The group produced a `joint Serb-Albanian statement aimed 
at normalising the divided Kosovo educational system, but the agreement collapsed 
after the Serbs arrested the rector of the Albanian underground university. '65 
According to Weller, `[w]orse than the lack of progress on the education issue may have 
been that the mere existence of the Special Group gave the impression that the Kosovo 
problem was now being addressed in some way by an international forum'. No 
59 Letter from Dr Rugova to Lord Carrington, Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, 22 December 
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agreement was actually reached until 1996 and nothing concrete ever emerged 
afterwards. 66 Mertus concurs that despite overwhelming evidence presented over a 
number of years from reliable sources that conflict in Kosovo was looming, 
international policymakers failed to treat Kosovo seriously. 67 The price of the working 
group on minority rights was the dismissal of the issue of Kosovo's legal status and any 
hope of inclusion for the Kosovo Albanians in the peace process. 68 
Late 1991 saw the creation of the Badinter commission, created to resolve legal 
issues related to the collapse of Yugoslavia. Here, too, the issue of Kosovo was 
avoided: this time on questionable legal grounds. 69 Badinter limited the right of self- 
determination to the six Yugoslav republics on the grounds that they were sovereign, 
founding members of the federation. Eager to avoid possible consequences for further 
ethnic unrest in the USSR or in other European states, Badinter rejected: 
pleas by Albanians that Kosovo's position as one of the eight federal units 
in Yugoslavia, as demonstrated by Kosovo's separate membership on the 
collective presidency and other Yugoslav institutions, entitled it to be 
considered for independence on the same basis as the six republics. 70 
Given the opinion of the Badinter Commission, it is clear that the Kosovars in fact had a 
convincing case both for independence and, according to Bellamy, for inclusion in the 
peace process. 7' It had been a federal entity under the 1974 constitution and had been 
directly represented in the federal institutions. Consequently, given the dissolution of 
the Federation, it should also emerge as an entity entitled to constitute itself as a state. 72 
66 St Egidio Education Agreement, 1 September 1996, Weller, 1999a, p. 93 
67 Mertus, 2000: `Reconsidering the Legality of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from 
Kosovo', William and Mary Law Review, 41, p. 1743-4 
68 Bellamy, 2002b, p. 31 
69 ibid. p. 26-8; Bellamy, 2000, p. 104; ICG report, Intermediate Sovereignty as a Basis for 
Resolving the Kosovo Crisis, 1998, p. 25-35. This states that uti possidetis `generally provides 
that an entity in legitimate possession of territory at the time of a dispute over ownership or at 
the time of the decolonization or dissolution of a state be entitled to retain and be granted 
permanent legal right to such territory and that in such circumstances the borders of the territory 
as they exist at such time should not be modified. In particular, the doctrine provides a valid 
basis for declaring that the borders of a Kosovo holding international status would be exactly 
the same as the internal borders established by the 1946 and 1974 constitutions. ' 
70 Sell, 2002, p. 109 
71 Bellamy, 2002b, p. 28 
72 Weller, 1999a, p. 76; see Opinion No. 1 of the Arbitration Commission on the former 
Yugoslavia, 11 January 1992, Weller, p. 81; ICG Balkans Report No. 46,9 November 1998, 
p. 28-9; Richard Caplan, 1998: `International Diplomacy and the crisis in Kosovo', International 
Affairs, 74 (4), p. 748. The main reason for Kosovo's lack of republic status was the Yugoslav 
constitutional distinction which determined that nations, not nationalities, should have republic 
34 
However, many leading politicians maintained their insistence on the integrity of 
Yugoslavia, a theme which was to remain constant during the 1990s and which further 
confused matters in the face of their continuing support for Rugova and non-violent 
resistance. 
73 
Sell argues that a crucial mistake made by Rugova and the Kosovo Albanians, 
lay in believing that the support of the international community for the policy of non- 
violent resistance would transform into material results: `since the Serbs would never 
voluntarily relinquish control of Kosovo, Rugova's strategy only made sense if the 
international community were willing to force the Serbs to reach an agreement on 
Kosovo acceptable to its majority Albanian inhabitants. ' 74 If the international 
community's assessment indicated that non-violence by itself was unlikely to achieve 
anything - certainly not the Kosovar aim of independence - and if they were thus aware 
of the pointlessness of their own encouragement of the non-violent resistance strategy 
without substantive support, it is arguable that this encouragement of false hope played 
a role in the eventual shift from non-violence to violent resistance with the emergence 
of the KLA in 1998 as well as foreclosing possible alternative responses by the 
international community at a later date as the conflict developed. In the context of good 
international citizenship, support for the non-violent approach should not have been a 
matter of convenience, but required concrete support and dialogue in order to maintain 
alternatives and avoid the slide into violence. 75 
The Albanian conviction that eventually the justice of their cause as a result of 
their non-violent resistance would be recognised was aided by the inconsistency of 
signals from the international community. The US Secretary of State, James Baker, 
came to Belgrade on 21 June 1991 to tell the leaders of the six republics, specifically 
Slovenia and Croatia, that the US would not recognise them if they tried to secede from 
Yugoslavia. He also told them, specifically Serbia, that the US would oppose any 
status. This was a distinction which the EC and the international community used to its 
advantage to enable it to draw the line between legitimate statehood and secession. 
73 `No one should misunderstand our position on the core issue involved. We support neither 
independence nor the maintenance of the status quo. [... ] We support an enhanced status for 
Kosovo within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which a substantially greater degree of 
autonomy would bring and recognize that this must include meaningful self-administration. ' 
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attempt to prevent secession by force. The EC concurred; seven months later, however, 
this policy was worthless, and the EC/EU led the world in recognising Croatia and 
Slovenia. Judah emphasises that we should not underestimate the importance of this 
radical policy reversal. From then on, Kosovars never believed that US or European 
policy was unchangeable when it declared that Kosovo did not have the right to 
independence because of its provincial status. 76 
The acknowledgment of The Kosovo Report that had more attention and 
commitment been paid to Kosovo prior to the rise of the KLA then the war might have 
been avoided demonstrates the need for normatively justified critique relating to 
practices of exclusion and coercion. 77 In August 1992, CSCE Missions of Long 
Duration were sent to Kosovo and Vojvodina, however, Milosevic refused to renew 
their visas and they were forced to leave in July 1993. Human rights violations were 
purportedly lower when the Missions were present and opportunities for dialogue 
existed and were recognised by the Mission in Kosovo. 
The Dayton Conference in 1995 is perceived by many to be a key turning point 
in the run up to the conflict. 78 Intransigence emanating from Belgrade prevented any 
deal being arrived at regarding Kosovo, although the international community did little 
to counter this intransigence until 1998. In fact, Kosovo was `deliberately sidelined' as 
a result of the desperation to stop the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 79 Milosevic was seen 
as a key player, necessary to ensure the agreement of the Bosnian Serbs, and the 
negotiations would have been jeopardised by Kosovo's inclusion. This assumption was 
not seriously tested by Lord Carrington, Lord Owen or Richard Holbrooke. 80 The result 
of this exclusion was to `indirectly legitimate Milosevic's role in Kosovo, and to send a 
clear signal to both Milosevic and the Kosovar Albanians that Kosovo was definitely off 
the current international agenda. ' 81 This message had three serious consequences which 
ratcheted up the tension and the likelihood of war: 
it gave the FRY a free hand in Kosovo; it demoralized and weakened the 
non-violent movement in Kosovo, which felt betrayed by the international 
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community and began to doubt the effectiveness of its own tactics; and it 
led directly to a decisive surge of support among Kosovars for the path of 
violent resistance as the only politically realistic path to independence. 82 
The continuing prevalent perception within the EU and the wider international 
community that Kosovo was an internal Yugoslav problem entrenched the lack of active 
international support for the non-violent strategy, compounding Rugova's 
marginalisation and arguably resulting in the increase of state violence against the 
Kosovar community. 83 Post-Dayton, it became clearer that the consensus that non- 
violence was the best way forward was beginning to fall apart. Factions advocating 
violence were emerging more strongly as Rugova began to be undermined. 84 
Holbrooke is defensive about the failure to discuss it at Dayton: `Kosovo would have 
happened anyway, and it is part of the mythology that Dayton was responsible and I 
don't believe it. What really drove this thing was Rugova's failure to produce results 
and the Serb crackdown. '85 Others such as Hashim Thaci and Judah disagree, arguing 
that: 
unrecognised in the West at the time, Dayton was an extraordinary trauma 
for the Kosovo Albanians. And it was a trauma because it confirmed to 
them in the most dramatic and humiliating way that Rugova's policy of 
passive resistance had failed. And not only that, but that his idea that they 
would be rewarded for their `good behaviour' by Western countries had 
been just plain wrong. While they had had an entity, which had played its 
part as a federal unit in the old Yugoslavia, they were now without rights 
while, in their view, the campaign of genocide led by Bosnian Serb 
leaders was being rewarded. '86 
According to The Kosovo Report, it was unlikely that the Dayton process would 
have arrived at a solution for Kosovo, although `the earlier "hands off Kosovo" message 
of President Bush could have been reiterated; or Dayton could have been used as a 
forum to encourage FRY acceptance of an NGO presence in Kosovo - and even in the 
rest of Serbia. '87 An additional problem not recognised by the international community 
while it continued to encourage the non-violent resistance movement was the continuing 
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strain and difficulties of sustaining the parallel system in the long-term as a viable 
alternative functioning system. In November 1997, a State Department official told 
NGOs lobbying for support and aid that the US government "cannot support civil 
society because it would lead to secession. "88 Once again the paradox of the 
international community's approach is revealed. They preferred resistance to remain 
non-violent as this meant that they could encourage it without being required to act 
positively, despite the fact that the purpose of such non-violent resistance contravenes 
international law and could therefore never receive the approval of the international 
community. 
The international community continued to give out mixed signals. While 
Milosevic had been warned to stay away from Kosovo, he received repeated assurances 
that the integrity of Yugoslavia was paramount and that the status of Kosovo within the 
FRY was an internal matter. In December 1995, after Dayton, Rugova was told by the 
US administration that the US would insist Milosevic begin a dialogue with the 
Albanians after the deployment of NATO troops to Bosnia. Furthermore, they would 
maintain sanctions until Kosovo's autonomy was restored. 89 Once more nothing 
happened. In early 1996, the EU resumed political and economic relations with the 
FRY, which meant that it acknowledged Kosovo as part of Serbia. Those few voices 
calling for further international engagement in Kosovo were essentially ignored. 90 
Although the leaders remained firmly attached to their demands, there were enough 
`signs of moderation on both sides of the ethnic divide to suggest that if Dayton had 
been promptly followed by a major, U. S. -led diplomatic offensive, it might not have 
been too late to broker a compromise settlement in Kosovo. '91 None of these ideas 
were taken up: for example, one option being considered by some Serb intellectuals 
suggested the partition of Kosovo with the predominantly Serb-populated northern part, 
together with areas around Serb monasteries and other historical sites, remaining part of 
Serbia, and the rest of Kosovo being allowed to go its own way. 
92 Other alternatives 
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negotiated transition under a UN Protectorate. 93 The Transnational Foundation for 
Peace and Future Research proposed the United Nations Temporary Authority for a 
Negotiated Settlement (UNTANS) in 1996, which listed a number of imaginative 
procedural and dialogic suggestions as did the European Action Council for Peace in the 
Balkans. 94 
The Kosovo Report highlights the failure to respond adequately at each stage of 
the developing conflict and discusses a number of moves that the international 
community might have made in order to try and prevent conflict. In an 
acknowledgement that at `each stage in the conflict, the diplomatic options narrowed', 
the report comes to a similar empirical conclusion as will be suggested theoretically: 
The decision not to deal seriously with the Kosovo issue in 1991 created 
obstacles to action in 1992-3. The decision not to confront the 
intransigence of Milosevic in 1993, and above all the neglect of Kosovo 
during the Dayton negotiations, contributed to the developments that were 
to escalate the conflict in 1996-7. The inadequacy of diplomatic efforts in 
the period 1997-8 was to culminate eventually with Rambouillet where 
the space for maneuver was extremely limited. 95 
The report suggests that conflict prevention should have focused on establishing a 
presence on the ground to provide protection against human rights abuses, to support 
and facilitate parallel institutions, and to encourage dialogue. More effort should have 
been aimed at ensuring a strong international presence in Kosovo, improving conditions 
of everyday life and `fostering communication among Serbs and Albanians inside 
Kosovo' and elsewhere. More could also have been done to support the initiatives of 
the parallel society. Universities, for example, in other nations did little to support the 
alternative educational system developed in the early 1990s. 96 The LDK was a willing 
diplomatic partner and open to forms of non-forceful pressure that might have been 
applied. Their commitment to non-violence provided `potential avenues of civilian 
international involvement that were less intrusive, and not as threatening to the 
sovereignty and security concerns of the FRY as an armed presence. '97 While this does 
not deny that the LDK became increasingly inflexible and uncompromising in their 
demands for independence, by failing to take the demands of the non-violent movement 
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seriously at an early stage the international community sent out the signal that `violence 
produces results and is a more effective political strategy. '98 
Violence did not break out immediately after the shock of Dayton for the 
Kosovo Albanians, nor was Rugova undermined straight away. This was in part 
because the LDK controlled either directly or indirectly, most of the Albanian-language 
media. 99 Founded in 1993, the KLA was the armed wing of the LPK -a small political 
party called the Popular Movement for Kosovo. Support came from several sources: 
from those who were jailed after the 1981 demonstrations, former Albanian police 
officers who had been fired or arrested as the Serbs took over Kosovo and local elders 
and clan leaders - although initially firm supporters of the LDK, they became more 
sympathetic to armed resistance as discontent grew. '°° 
The political and social collapse of Albania in 1997 also helped to move the 
Kosovo Albanians closer to an armed resistance, leaving many arsenals unprotected 
which provided a supply of weapons to the KLA. The first significant armed actions 
did not take place until early 1996.101 On 14 February 1996, the KLA, still only 
consisting of approximately 150 men, issued communique 18 which stated that: 
We let the occupiers from Belgrade know that our actions up until now are 
just first warnings ... Dialogue about withdrawing the military and police from the Republic of Kosova should start immediately. We call on 
powerful international centres such as the USA to recognise the 
independence of Kosova for which the Albanians have declared 
themselves in a referendum otherwise war is Kosova is inevitable. '02 
In August 1997, events indicated a move away from non-violent resistance. Students in 
Pristina began protesting at the failure of the authorities to implement the 1996 Rome 
agreement on education. In December 1998, the KLA issued their first public 
statement, which warned that the `Serb "occupiers" would face increasing resistance 
and - warning against continued Western reluctance to deal with the KLA - said the 
movement would accept no agreement on Kosovo's status that it had not been a party 
to. ' 1 03 Husanovic links the radicalization of Kosovar Albanian politics and the resultant 
marginalization of alternative forms of community directly to the failure of the 
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international community to take any notice of the non-violent strategy of Kosovar 
Albanians. 1 04 
Reports by International Crisis Group indicate awareness that the KLA should 
have been recognised as one of the actors in Kosovo from mid-1998 onwards: 
The only lasting solution is a political settlement reconciling legitimate Serb 
and ethnic Albanian interests in the province. [... ] For a fruitful dialogue, it 
is critical to choose the right interlocutors. Whereas before the conflict had 
escalated into a war, most Kosovo Albanians were united behind Rugova's 
pacifism, the fighting is creating new political realities. Despite recent 
setbacks, the UCK [KLA] is gaining credibility and that credibility is likely 
to grow the longer the fighting drags on. Meanwhile, Rugova's position is 
increasingly weak. The time when international mediators could have 
looked to Rugova alone to deliver a solution on behalf of Kosovo's 
Albanians has passed. '°5 
The reality was increasingly that although Rugova's pacifist message was one which the 
international community wished to hear, he was becoming alienated from ordinary 
Kosovo Albanians. 
Finally, diplomats were beginning to realise that, after years of warning about 
the imminence of conflict, this time it might be true. On 23 February 1998, Robert 
Gelbard, US special envoy to the region, visited Pristina, criticising the violence of the 
Serbian police and then attacking the KLA: `We condemn very strongly terrorist actions 
in Kosovo. The UQK is, without any questions, a terrorist group. ' l06 This was, Judah 
argues, a turning point: `If the KLA were a terrorist group and the representative of the 
most powerful nation on earth said so, then there could be no objection to the Serbian 
police moving in to finish it off. No doubt unintentionally, the US had appeared to give 
Milogevic a green light to act. ' 107 The naming of the KLA as terrorists in this fashion 
was a mistake on the part of the international community and demonstrated a lack of 
understanding. Troebst argues that: 
The international community's stereotypical repetition of the view that 
any solution to the Kosovo problem is thinkable only within the borders of 
the FRY - even of Serbia - was (and still is) an indirect support for 
Milosevic's interpretation of the conflict as an internal affair. Moreover, 
by excluding a priori the option of independence for Kosovo and by 
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following Milosevic in labelling violent Albanian resistance to Belgrade's 
policy of oppression explicitly as `terrorism', the West - primarily the US 
and the Contact Group - legitimised Serbian police brutality and thus 
paved the way to Drenica. '°8 
On 5 March 1998, the police attacked the Jashari compound in Donji Prekaz in 
the Drenica valley, killing 58 people, securing a martyr, Adem Jashari, for the KLA and 
serving as a catalyst for further violence. ' 09 Washington's response to the escalating 
crisis in Kosovo was `complicated by an unwillingness to back its diplomatic efforts 
with armed force and by a lingering nostalgia that the conflict in Kosovo, like Bosnia, 
could be resolved by dealing with Milosevic. ' l lo Diplomatic efforts were also crucially 
delayed by ongoing power struggles within the US administration. "' In March, Rugova 
requested Holbrooke to take over from Gelbard and become a mediator `without 
preconditions. ' Eventually, in May, in the face of the deteriorating situation, Albright 
was persuaded to accept Holbrooke. Holbrooke's approach was to deal directly with 
Milosevic in order to secure a deal. Holbrooke persuaded Milosevic and Rugova to 
meet. However: 
as a reward to Milosevic for meeting Rugova the United States prevailed 
on the Contact Group to relax the sanctions on foreign investment that it 
had painfully agreed to only a few days earlier. The U. S. move weakened 
Rugova's already crumbling position in Kosovo and also confused allies, 
with its apparent flip-flops between threats and rewards to Milosevic. 112 
On 11-12 June, NATO defence ministers ordered the organisation's military 
chiefs to prepare a range of options, should the use of force become necessary. On 12 
June 1998, the Contact Group called for an immediate ceasefire and the `withdrawal of 
security units used for civilian repression' from the province and demanded that the 
Kosovo Albanian leadership `make clear its rejection of violence and acts of 
terrorism'. 113 On 15 June 1998, NATO began an aerial exercise, Determined Falcon, 
which involved military flights over Albania and Macedonia in a show of force. 
According to Sell, `General Naumann later assessed that Milogevic "rightly concluded 
that the NATO threat was a bluff ... and 
finished his summer offensive. "' 114 On 16 
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June 1998, Milosevic went to Moscow to meet President Yeltsin who used the visit to 
obtain Milosevic's agreement to allow Russian, US and EU diplomatic observer 
missions in Kosovo (this was to become KDOM in July115). For Milosevic this was all 
part of the game: `Accepting the small missions with vague guidelines and no 
enforcement powers bought time and deflected the threat of more serious outside 
involvement. ' 116 
During the summer of 1998, Ambassador Chris Hill, Holbrooke's deputy, tried 
to put together negotiations between the Serbs and Albanians. While Milosevic 
continued to reject foreign mediation, the Albanians were divided amongst themselves 
both about objectives and who should represent them. The US began to meet discreetly 
with KLA representatives in June 1998, but continued to see Rugova as the chief 
negotiating partner, and, of vital importance, resisted including the KLA in the 
negotiating process. 117 It has been argued that Western governments held back from 
condemning the Serbian attack in July because they wanted to `see the UCK weakened 
vis-a-vis Rugova in any negotiations that took place with Milosevic'. 118 Blerim Shala 
claims that it `became apparent that Western civilization was siding with the Albanian 
position on the expulsion of the Serb regime from Kosova. ' 119 For the KLA and most 
Albanians this indicated support for independence. Not so for the US who considered 
the KLA `guerrillas' and terrorists, and whose aim for Kosovo was limited to autonomy 
and security within the FRY. 120 As the humanitarian situation worsened, it became 
harder for the West to do nothing. Backing down was not an option without appearing 
humiliated after its hardline rhetoric. On 24 September 1998, the NAC approved the 
issuing of an `Activation Warning' (Actwarn). 
1.4 Legitimacy and Inclusiveness of the Holbrooke Agreement 
The Holbrooke agreement offered another key opportunity for dialogue and for 
the initiation of negotiations between Serbs and Albanians. Once again, the focus on 
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reaching agreement with Milogevic led to the rapid exclusion of the Kosovo Albanians, 
precluding the possibility of full acceptance by the Kosovars of any terms agreed to by 
the Serbs. Holbrooke returned to Belgrade in October 1998 with two aims: to put in 
place a verification system on the ground in Kosovo to monitor Serb behaviour and to 
draw up an interim agreement between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians based on Hill's 
approach the previous month. The first draft was presented to Serbs and Albanians on 1 
October. It attempted to avoid the issue of the status of Kosovo and focus on the 
assignment of powers to different levels of administration. Both sides reacted uneasily 
but did not reject it outright. For Kosovo, however, there was a significant problem. 
The draft allowed for power to be located not in Kosovan public institutions but in the 
individual communes or local districts. Consequently, Kosovo `as an entity would not 
enjoy any significant element of legal personality [... ] In deference to Serbia, the draft 
also contained very detailed provisions which, it was feared, would subject Kosovo to 
devisive [sic] ethnic politics. ' 121 The communes would retain significant powers of 
self-administration and could unite to form `self administering regions comprising 
multiple communes'; this technically enabled those few Serb majority communes to 
form an ethnic Serb entity within Kosovo. 122 Furthermore, another layer of authority 
was added in the form of `national communities', in other words, all ethnic groups 
would enjoy additional rights regardless of whether or not they constituted an ethnic 
majority in a particular commune and would be granted additional institutions for self- 
administration and even courts. Kosovo was opposed to this concept, which was based 
on ethnic division rather than a multicultural society with equal rights for all. Serbs, 
however, saw it as a means to secure a separate status for themselves. Although the 
Assembly in Kosovo would enjoy fairly wide legislative competence, voting could be 
blocked by any national community. The FRY would retain power in relation to 
territorial integrity, a common market, monetary policy, defence and foreign policy and 
a federal police presence. 123 
While Kosovo formulated its response to the first draft, however, the Holbrooke 
agreements were concluded without consultation with the Albanians. The unilateral 11- 
point statement issued by Serbia claiming to present the basis for a political settlement 
to be completed by 2 November, unlike the Hill draft, strengthened the element of 
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territorial integrity and sovereignty of the FRY, thus suggesting the continued 
subordination of Kosovo within the FRY. 124 Faced with the Holbrooke agreement, 
Kosovo issued its own fundamental principles for a settlement, by which time a more 
detailed Hill draft had emerged. 125 This draft `enhanced the status of Kosovo as a legal 
entity in its own right somewhat. [... ] On the other hand, the provisions on communes 
and national communities, of essential concern to the FRY/Serbia, had also been further 
entrenched. ' 126 Serbia reneged on its agreement to commit to the Hill plan on 2 
November, thus throwing away an opportunity to achieve a settlement that might have 
been accepted by all parties. ' 27 
To back up his diplomatic efforts, Holbrooke went with the threat that if 
Milosevic did not end Serb forces' offensive, then the West would respond with a 
phased air campaign. 128 The NAC approved a plan for phased air operations called 
`Allied Force'. General Short, who was with Holbrooke, sheds light on the structure 
and quality of the dialogue in such a way as to raise significant concerns relating to 
coercion, exclusion and inequality of participation. When the negotiations were at an 
impasse, Milosevic and Holbrooke would `withdraw to a separate room': `The rest of us 
would hear raised voices, occasionally a hand slapping the table, and they'd come back 
out with some level of agreement and we'd press on. ' 129 On 12 October 1998, the NAC 
approved "activation orders" that allowed air strikes to begin in ninety-six hours, should 
there be no agreement. Holbrooke and Short believe that it was the threat of imminent 
force that persuaded Milosevic to come to a deal on 12 October. An ultimatum of this 
kind was unprecedented as there was no Security Council resolution mandating military 
enforcement of its decisions. '30 The Holbrooke agreement consisted of Serbian 
agreement to scale down Serbian military and police presence to their pre-war levels 
and to begin serious negotiations with the Albanians. Two thousand monitors (the 
Kosovo Verification Mission) would come to Kosovo under the auspices of the OSCE, 
encouraging Albanian refugees to return home, and NATO would have the right to 
make aerial surveillance flights above the province to verify whether the authorities 
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were carrying out their commitments. 131 It also began assembling a NATO `Extraction 
Force' based in Macedonia. These troops acted as a safeguard for members of the 
KVM and as a covert threat. This does not mean, however, that anyone was seriously 
considering a NATO-led ground force for Kosovo. 132 
Nonetheless, the October agreement contained serious flaws: 
It was vague on the terms of the withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo, 
ambiguous about the verification authority of the monitors, and lacked 
any means of enforcement. The absence of any requirement for reciprocal 
actions by the KLA was a problem as well. Albanians did not participate 
in the October talks and the agreement included nothing on Kosovo's 
political status - although U. S. officials told that media during the talks 
that Milosevic was ready to agree to a unilateral statement granting 
limited autonomy to ethnic Albanians in the areas of local government, 
schools, and policing, and promising a full review of the province's status 
in three years' time. 133 
While the failure of the agreement may have improved the case for intervention later on 
as the available options were narrowed down, this was yet another missed opportunity 
to prevent the conflict escalating and the slide into a military and strategic mindset. 
In addition to the lack of an enforcement mechanism, the other serious flaw in 
the Holbrooke Agreement was the absence of the KLA or the LDK. The exclusion of 
the Kosovo Albanians raises questions concerning the legitimacy of the agreement. As 
Weller notes, it is curious that no representative of Kosovo, elected or otherwise, was 
consulted about the terms of the agreement or invited to accede to it considering that the 
KVM was intended to support the establishment of a political settlement and therefore 
would assist in the building of political institutions in Kosovo. 134 Consequently, the 
KLA did not, unsurprisingly, consider themselves to be bound by it. For a deployment 
like the KVM to contribute towards preventing war, its arrival must be timely: `This 
mission was at least a year late and it was hastily assembled. Even upon its withdrawal 
after five months, it had reached only 67 per cent of its intended complement. ' 135 
Belgrade was entitled to retain control over the main roads and highways through 
permanent observation posts and special patrols. As the use of force was, to a degree, 
permitted, it seemed naive of the international community to imagine that the FRY/Serb 
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forces would adhere strictly to the limits imposed on them and not use this to their 
advantage, quite possibly to provoke the KLA to retaliate against them in order to 
provide a pretext to react with force. 
In January 1999, it was clear that the Holbrooke Agreement was disintegrating. 
On 15 January fighting broke out around the village of Racak and Serbian police 
entered the village. The final death toll in Racak was forty-five. Nine KLA soldiers 
were also found dead. The next day, William Walker, head of the KVM, immediately 
accused the Yugoslav authorities of responsibility. '36 Many argue that Racak was the 
trigger factor for the next stage - the use of force; although not the only atrocity, it was 
picked up by the international media. After Racak, Albright put together a new strategy 
`under which both sides would be presented with an ultimatum to accept by a certain 
date an interim deal that would establish Kosovo as an international protectorate with a 
NATO force on the ground to implement it. ' 137 Albright felt that the situation was 
`emerging as a key test of American leadership and of the relevance and effectiveness of 
NATO. ' 138 This was later to become a point of contention as critics argued that concern 
for a future role for NATO dictated the pace and direction of the talks rather than a 
desire to come to terms through dialogue. ' 39 Albright went on to say that alongside the 
celebrations for NATO's fiftieth birthday, the Alliance would `look like fools 
proclaiming the Alliance's readiness for the twenty-first century when we were unable 
to cope with a conflict that began in the fourteenth. ' 140 This indicates a willingness to 
subscribe to certain representations of identity which was unhelpful in fully 
understanding the dynamics of the current conflict. 
Serbs and Albanians were summoned to talk peace at a chateau in Rambouillet, 
southeast of Paris on 6 February 1999. The diplomatic half of Albright's strategy 
required them to negotiate Kosovo's future on the basis of draft proposals already 
worked out by Chris Hill. The other half of the strategy, supplied by the credible use of 
force, was supported by the threats announced by the NAC on 30 January 1999. The 
Serbs were told to conform to the commitments agreed with Holbrooke in October and 
to end their `excessive and disproportionate use of force'. In the absence of these steps 
being taken, `NATO is ready to take whatever measures are necessary [... ] The 
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Council has therefore agreed today that the NATO Secretary General may authorise air 
strikes against targets on FRY territory. ' 141 Western leaders had decided that a peace 
deal without a NATO-led force would never be implemented. Russia did not object to a 
peacekeeping force, in which it was certain to participate, as long as it was invited into 
Kosovo by the Yugoslav authorities. 142 This was to become a matter of contention 
during the negotiations and was to impede agreement once more. 
1.5 Conclusion 
The divisive nature of Kosovo Albanian politics is rarely discussed at an 
international level, indicating either a lack of knowledge about the political realities or a 
desire not to have to address that which might change the understanding of the problem 
faced. Rugova also contributed to obstacles facing the possibilities of a genuine 
dialogue through failing to put together a negotiating team which was representative or 
to which he would listen and share power with. 143 The continuing preference of the 
international community for negotiating exclusively with Rugova exacerbated the 
situation as it meant that any likelihood of reaching a lasting political settlement was 
becoming more difficult, since any settlement reached by Rugova would not be 
acceptable on the ground in Kosovo. Isa Blumi makes a similar point when she argues 
that `Kosova's problem grew out of control because Western policies relied on 
individuals who were alienated from their own populations, rather than engage the 
components of conflict. ' 144 Although US mediators increasingly understood the power 
of the KLA, it was not until 1999 at the Rambouillet talks that they were drawn into any 
kind of multilateral dialogue. Meetings between the KLA and US mediators prior to 
Rambouillet were largely carried out with the aim of persuading the KLA to accept 
Rugova's leadership in return for participation in talks. 145 This failure to recognise the 
realities on the ground, combined with a persistent labelling of the KLA as `terrorists' 
did nothing to facilitate the construction of genuine talks. 
Concerns over the structure of the talks between Milosevic and Rugova in May 
1998 were raised by the International Crisis Group who recognised that key to any 
Judah, 2002, p. 195 
ibid. p. 196 
143 ICG Report No. 41, p. 11-12 
144 Blumi, 2002: `A Story of Mitigated Ambitions: Kosova's Tortuous Path to Its Postwar 
Future', Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, 1(4) p. 3 
145 ICG Report No. 41, p. 13 
48 
success is the framework in which talks take place. 146 The concessions granted to 
Milosevic in order for these talks to take place served to jeopardise the future of 
negotiations over Kosovo's future. By agreeing to talk to Rugova, Milosevic diverted 
the possibility of further economic sanctions being imposed by the Contact Group; such 
sanctions might have pressured him to enter into more serious negotiations over 
Kosovo. Furthermore, international pressure on Rugova to agree to the meeting which 
led him to drop the key Albanian demand for foreign mediation created more rifts 
among the Albanian leadership and thus weakened the Albanian negotiating position. 
So, despite the grand claims made for these talks between Milosevic and Rugova, they 
were constructed on grounds that, having effectively reassured Milosevic that further 
steps would not be taken against him and weakened the Albanians, made it almost 
certain that they would fail to be `a step towards peace'. The role of US diplomats also 
further established divisions within domestic Kosovar politics as `Holbrooke reportedly 
promised Rugova that the US government would lend him strong personal political 
support and would take steps to curtail the financial support his rivals in the KLA are 
receiving from Albanians living abroad. ' 147 Rugova placed himself in the position, with 
the aid of the international community, where he had to distinguish himself from the 
KLA in some way, despite the similarity of their political aims: independence for 
Kosovo. Consequently, between Milosevic's manoeuvrings and the international 
community, Rugova would either have had to abandon his call for independence, or 
openly support the KLA. Internal politics would not allow him to do either, so any 
attempt to create an effeective negotiating team was, to all intents and purposes, being 
blocked by the actions of both internal and external actors. 
It is clear that Kosovo Albanians were treated differently from other national 
groups in the former Yugoslavia and this approach ensured that they would not become 
a major international concern until 1998. It is the contention of this thesis that the 
international community's lack of recognition of the complexity of the conflict, 
reluctant engagement and frequent exclusionary practices, were not only a cause of the 
conflict which broke out in 1998, but also significantly narrowed the scope for more 
moderate solutions; fewer Albanians were prepared to accept anything less than full 
146 Inventory of a Windfall: Milosevic's Gains from the Kosovo Dialogue, ICG Yugoslavia 
report, no. 3, executive summary 
147 ibid. p. 2 
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independence from 1998 onwards than might have been the case earlier. 148 The 
tendency of the international community was to `prescribe' solutions and, unfortunately, 
`after the sabotage of the Carrington Plan, this degenerated further into an inconsistent 
series of deals according to who was willing to make war, with what strength and for 
what purposes. ' 149 Although there were different emphases at times, the EU and the 
USA were agreed on their prescribed solution - autonomy within the FRY. Russia and 
the West decided that the Kosovo Albanians did not have the right to secede in self- 
defence in the face of state persecution, consequently, excluding: 
what could have been the toughest sanction against the Milosevic regime, 
a political rather than an economic sanction: to suspend FRY's claim to 
Kosovo. If FRY was unfit to govern Kosovo, then its claim to 
sovereignty could be suspended. Instead, the USA and the EU insisted on 
exactly the reverse - that Kosovo Albanians had to abandon their declared 
'independence'. 1so 
Judah argues that the conflict became perceived by Westerners as one of human 
rights, yet in reality it was a struggle between two peoples for control of the same piece 
of land. The incompatible claims of the Serbs and Albanians to the territory of Kosovo 
were grounded in `symbolic constructions of Kosovo as a homeland. ' 51 However, 
human rights have become a key factor in shaping contemporary international politics 
and the level of human rights abuses in Kosovo carried out by the Serbian authorities 
not only became a weapon for the Kosovars, but also the discourse around which the 
case for war against the Serbs was built. This preference for the human rights discourse 
hid the fact that the real issue at stake for many Kosovars was self-determination - an 
issue which NATO's intervention did nothing to resolve and which the international 
community considered illegitimate. 
In denying the possibility of internationalisation of the conflict, accepting 
Serbia's claim to Kosovo, and refusing the Kosovo Albanians a place in the peace 
process, the international community directly contributed to Rugova's marginalisation 
and the rise of the KLA. Bellamy indicates clearly that the conflict which broke out in 
148 This interpretation is also made by Caplan, 1998, p. 746 
149 Clark, 2000, p. 160 
150 ibid 
151 Kostovicova, 2005, p. 14. A look at Albanian literature and poetry indicates that the `natural 
features of the terrain became `poetic spaces' when imbued with historical memories, myths and 
legends, as well as with the heroic deeds of brave ancestors, all of which were told and retold in 
the nationalist language. ' (p. 15) For example, see All Podrimja, 2006: A Split Stone: An 
Anthology of Albanian Poets, for Kosova, Prishtina, DQJ Rozafa 
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1998 was not despite international efforts in Kosovo but because of them. ' 52 In a 
similar argument, Stefan Troebst argues that: 
The international community proved unable to develop a promising 
strategy of preventing the Kosovo conflict from escalating. To make 
things worse, it naively, yet unintentionally, contributed to such an 
escalation by prejudicing the outcome of Kosovo Albanian-Serbian 
negotiations on the future status of Kosovo, and by a rash condemnation 
of counter-violence to Belgrade's state terrorist-like oppression. ' 53 
Moreover, in addition to a lack of coherence to the international community's policy, 
engagement, when it came, was often declaratory and after an escalation in the conflict. 
Booth argues that there was: 
ample opportunity to employ conflict prevention techniques: increased 
recognition and support could have been given to the Rugova approach; 
opposition groups to Milosevic in Belgrade could have been helped; much 
greater resources could have been allocated to the Organisation for 
Security and Development in Europe to help support and monitor the 
maintenance of minority rights; the Kosovo situation could have been 
placed high on the agenda at Dayton; a comprehensive stabilisation plan 
for the Balkans could have been attempted, and backed by serious 
economic resources (yet probably less than the eventual bill for the war 
and its long-term costs); and the Russians could have been consulted, used 
and integrated in the process of Balkan stabilisation fully and from the 
beginning. 1 54 
Having indicated a number of areas of concern over the management of the 
Kosovo conflict by the international community, the question then arises, where might 
we look for alternative approaches which address issues such as exclusion, coercion and 
illegitimacy, which were identified in many of the major moments of international 
engagement. It is with these issues in mind that we now turn to concepts in 
international relations and critical theory in an attempt to develop a communicative 
framework which, on the one hand, offers justified grounds for critique and, on the 
other, a normative approach to dialogue. 
'52 Bellamy, 2002b, p. 66 
153 Troebst, 1998, p. 104 
15' Ken Booth, 1999: NATO's Republic Warnings from Kosovo', Civil Wars, 3(2), p. 90 
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2. Evaluating Good International Citizenship 
2.1 Introduction 
As we have seen, Kosovo clearly represented a problem for the international 
community and that is, how should we act when faced with violence and ethnic conflict 
within states? There are a number of existing approaches, including good international 
citizenship, which have tried to offer possible solutions. The different notions of good 
international citizenship reflect, to a large degree, the varying normative positions 
adopted by states in relation to the issues raised by the concept of humanitarian 
intervention. These positions are informed by the debates surrounding cosmopolitanism 
and ' communitarianism. It will be suggested, however, that such approaches do not 
adequately address the concerns raised in Chapter 1 relating to the structure and quality 
of dialogue and subsequent legitimacy. 
Defining and justifying inclusion and exclusion has always been a dominant 
theme within international studies and critical theory. The discussions between 
cosmopolitans and communitarians demonstrate how the related debates in philosophy, 
critical theory and international relations are united by their struggles with the tension 
between them. Torn between the desire for the critical power of universalism, yet 
hedged in by the grounded claims of the particular, neither approach, by itself, is 
sufficient to surmount this tension. This chapter will briefly explore the cosmopolitan 
and communitarian literatures which inform and locate the debates concerning good 
international citizenship. Existing understandings of good international citizenship 
focus on ways in which states can behave in a more ethical manner and be held 
accountable for their behaviour in international politics. This discussion will seek to 
evaluate existing notions of good international citizenship, setting out some of its 
limitations and indicating how the concept might be constructed as a more critical tool. 
Having raised many of the problems which obstructed constructive engagement by the 
international community in Kosovo in Chapter 1, this chapter marks the beginning of 
the theoretical framework at the core of this research which indicates ways in which 
theory underpinning contemporary practice acts to exacerbate repression in the forms of 
exclusion and coercion. 
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Through an engagement with cosmopolitan and communitarian approaches, this 
and the following chapters seek to develop a cosmopolitan-oriented concept of good 
international citizenship. This refers to neither institutional design/top-down' nor 
bottom-up approaches to cosmopolitanism, but rather an approach which recognises the 
particular, refuses to abstract beyond the realms of imaginable capacity and so looks for 
the universal in instances of particular dialogue through which moral norms may be 
justified and legitimated. 
2.2 The Cosmopolitan and Communitarian debate 
The tension between citizenship and humanity, particular and universal norms, 
is a thematic feature within the critical theory and international relations literature, 
suggesting a need for rethinking our approach to these issues. The cosmopolitan and 
communitarian literatures are both large and diverse, crossing a number of disciplines 
such as international relations, international law, sociology and political theory. It is, 
therefore, only possible here to sketch a brief outline of important issues and pathways 
directly relevant to this research. The starting point for this exploration is 
cosmopolitanism in international relations as a result of the focus on humanitarian 
intervention and state sovereignty indicated in the Introduction, but elements of 
cosmopolitanism in political theory and sociology have been drawn in to develop a 
more fluid understanding of cosmopolitan possibilities relating to ethics, identity, 
recognition and intersubjectivity. Cosmopolitans focus on the importance of individuals 
and a community of humankind, often seeking to establish some universally applicable 
principles and bypass or reduce the role of the state through a move to global 
institutions and a re-negotiation of sovereignty. Fine's definition of cosmopolitanism is 
a useful one with which to understand a critique of the concept: 
[it] aims to reconstruct political life on the basis of an enlightened vision 
of peaceful relations between nation states, human rights shared by all 
world citizens, and a global legal order buttressed by a global civil society. 
It is at once a theoretical approach towards understanding the world, a 
diagnosis of the age in which we live, and a normative stance in favour of 
universalistic standards of moral judgement, international law and political 
action. ` 
1 For example, Daniele Archibugi: `Cosmopolitical Democracy', `Demos and Cosmopolis', 
Archibugi (ed. ) 2003, London, Verso; David Held and Daniele Archbugi, 1995: Cosmopolitan 
Democracy, Cambridge, Polity Press 
2 Robert Fine, 2003a: `Taking the `Ism' out of Cosmopolitanism: An Essay in Reconstruction', 
European Journal of Social Theory, 6(4) p. 452 
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Communitarians, however, are unwilling to relinquish control of their own 
communities, and are not prepared to commit themselves to universal notions of 
morality, justice and law, arguing that such beliefs are culturally relative and can only 
be decided within a community. Consequently, communitarians such as Frost insist that 
the state is still morally, and normatively, relevant. 3 Universal concepts of justice 
inevitably crash into this barrier, being asked where such external criteria derive their 
authority. Walzer argues strongly for the relativity of justice, claiming that `[j]ustice is 
rooted in the distinct understanding of places, honors, jobs, things of all sorts, that 
constitute a shared way of life. To override those understandings is (always) to act 
unjustly' .4 Human identity and socialisation processes are informed and constrained by 
the bounded nature of communities and so there are some loyalties which remain 
paramount and prevent us from becoming `fully-fledged' citizens of the world. 5 
While most communitarians do not deny that societies have obligations towards 
one another, they remain convinced that most human beings are not as moved by 
notions of a `common humanity' as they are by loyalties to their own communities. 
Those who argue that there are no special moral obligations to fellow-citizens that are 
not shared by the rest of humanity due to the arbitrary nature of the territorial 
construction of political communities fail to understand that territory itself may be 
arbitrary as may membership of a particular community, but, once established, that 
community forms a significant part of individual and collective identities. 6 Parekh, 
therefore, looks to a global or cosmopolitan orientation, which recognises the value and 
reality of particular political commuities, but also that we belong to a wider community 
of humankind, subsequently recognising both certain universal values and ethical 
diversity. 7 There are some who might recognise communitarian attachments but who 
are not necessarily relativists when it comes to universal values; those, like Booth and 
Brown, who seek, albeit in different ways, to offer non-foundationalist justifications for 
3 Mervyn Frost, 1996: Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press 
4 Michael Walzer, 1983: Spheres of Justice, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, p. 314 
5 Robyn Eckersley: `Communitarianism', from Andrew Dobson and Robyn Eckersley, (eds. ) 
2006: Political Theory and the Ecological Challenge, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
p. 93 
6 Bhikhu Parekh, 2003: `Cosmopolitanism and global citizenship', Review of International 
Studies, 29, p. 9 
ibid. p. 12 
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a form of minimal universalism. 8 Brown seeks to hold on to human rights whilst 
dispensing with their universal philosophical or foundational roots. He argues that 
rights only make sense in a particular community - an `ethical community'. 
9 He argues 
that it is `implausible to think that rights can be extracted from liberal polities, 
decontextualised and applied as a package worldwide. ' 10 In an attempt to transcend the 
relativist and the universal debates and to move away from the liberal fiction of 
universal human rights, he argues that: 
Rights have no separate ontological status; they are a by-product of a 
particular kind of society, one in which the `state' operates constitutionally 
under the rule of law, is separated from `civil society' and the `family', 
and in which private and public realms are, in principle, clearly 
demarcated. Societies in which human rights are respected are more 
civilised and secure than those in which they are not, but rights are a 
symptom of this civilisation and security, not a cause. ' 
Although far from dismissing human rights or the valuable role they play in securing 
freedoms for people, Brown argues that they must be understood in a historical context 
and should not be granted an ontological status they do not have and that ignores the 
standpoint of those from other cultures. Recognising this arguably offers a greater 
credibility to the protection offered by rights than that offered by universal claims. 
Benhabib argues that the challenge suggested by Hegel, also drawn on by Brown, is to 
`envisage a universalistic moral point of view as situated within an ethical 
community. ' 12 This has significant implications for a dialogically informed approach to 
the debate between the universal and the particular and draws in Brown's concerns. 
Etzioni offers an alternative solution to the tension between the universal and the 
particular: `A societal design that accords priority to universal rights over communal 
bonds and particularistic values but legitimates these bonds and values in areas not 
governed by rights provides such a synthesis'. 
13 Etzioni argues that increasingly basic 
normative positions are emerging transnationally as East and West learn from each 
8 Ken Booth, (ed. ) 2005: Critical Security Studies and World Politics, London, Lynne Rienner 
Publishers; Tim Dunne and Nicholas Wheeler, (eds. ) 1999: Human Rights in Global Politics, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
9 Chris Brown: `Universal human rights: a critique', from Dunne, Wheeler, (eds. ) 1999 p. 104 
'o ibid. p. 111 
" ibid. p. 120 
'2 Seyla Benhabib, 1992: Situating the Self, Cambridge, Polity Press, p. 11 
13 Amitai Etzioni, 2004: From Empire to Community: _4 : 
Vc'iv Approach to International 
Relations, New York, Palgrave, Macmillan, p. 44 
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other, leading to a `level of normative commitment that might be called "a moral 
minimum"'. 14 
It is important to recognise that both universalism and relativism can become a 
tool of the powerful. Consequently, while there is a need to recognise the exclusionary 
nature of universal moral precepts as well as of the sovereign state, there is also a need 
for some sense of the cosmopolitan moral imperative, intended to protect individuals' 
rights rather than national interests, to resonate in international practice. Here we begin 
to see certain principles intrinsic to good international citizenship emerging. In the case 
of national measures to ban hazardous work conditions, for example, Shue argues 
compellingly that: 
national legislation to outlaw such practices does not go far enough unless 
it is accompanied by efforts to prohibit the export of `unsafe jobs to 
foreign parts'. To fail to bring the moral principle which is at issue within 
the state to bear upon the conduct of foreign policy is to allow one form of 
exploitation and unjustified exclusion to survive. 15 
Continuing exploitation and unjustified exclusion strengthens the argument that the 
principles of dialogue and the procedural ethics which inform them are key to good 
international citizenship; without this, outsiders are prevented from expressing or 
withholding their consent to such policies. 
Communitarians are critical of the liberal (cosmopolitan) understanding of the 
relationship between the individual and the community. This critique is both 
ontological and normative. The liberal ontology of the self as: 
asocial, detached and radically autonomous is seen as incoherent. 
Moreover, many of the normative prescriptions that flow from this 
framing of the self are seen as undesirable insofar as they neglect or 
undermine the importance of community belonging and communal 
responsibilities by emphasising `arms-length', impersonal contractual 
obligations over familial and communal ones. '6 
Another, related, way of framing the cosmopolitan/communitarian debate which is 
pertinent to the theoretical construction of good international citizenship is to look at the 
ways in which each views the `other'. While cosmopolitans tend to privilege the 
abstract or `generalized' other, communitarians tend to privilege the `concrete' other. 17 
The generalized other focuses on the development of one of the pivotal ideas in Western 
14 ibid. p. 129 
15 Linklater, 1992b, p. 33 
16 Eckersley. 2006, p. 92 
17 These terms are taken from Benhabib, 1992 
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political thought where each individual is a rational being entitled to the same rights and 
duties that we want to ascribe to ourselves. This effectively assumes that the `other' has 
the same needs and desires as us, consequently removing the individual from his or her 
particular social and cultural context: `Our relation to the other is governed by the 
norms of formal equality and reciprocity' 18 It is our commonality which is emphasised, 
not our differences. The standpoint of the concrete other, however, is concerned with 
the norms of `equity and complementary reciprocity: each is entitled to expect and to 
assume from the other forms of behaviour through which the other feels recognized and 
confirmed as a concrete, individual being with specific needs, talents and capacities. ' 19 
This affirms individuality and perceives differences to be complementary rather than 
exclusive. Both have their purposes; without the generalized other we cannot define a 
moral point of view or lay claim to a theory of justice. Without the perspective of the 
concrete other, we cannot locate or contextualise such a theory. The two may interact to 
offer a more sophisticated space for dialogue on these issues, addressing issues raised in 
other terms by Etzioni, Booth and Brown. 
While cosmopolitanism retains the potential to be assimilative in that preferring 
the `generalized' other, it attempts to reduce all `concrete' others to the same identity, 
the communitarian position seems to suggest that an `ethic of coexistence' is all that is 
possible in international relations as far any conception of the `good life' is concerned. 20 
Shapcott usefully lists four categories, adapted from Todorov's Conquest of America, 
which address the possibilities for self-other relations; a necessary factor when 
searching for justice. He argues that these categories can be used to critically assess 
different accounts of community and justice in international relations. The categories 
comprise annihilation, which involves the `complete physical or ideational destruction 
of the other'; assimilation, which `involves the other's incorporation into one's own 
world, but not as an equal, for it also involves the destruction or denial of important 
difference in the name of a greater similarity'; coexistence, which `involves toleration 
and neutrality but suggests no genuine engagement with the other', and lastly, 
communication, which `suggests that it is possible to understand the other and to move 
towards an exchange of knowledge. It also suggests the possibility of agreement and a 
18 ibid. p. 159 
19 ibid. 
Richard Shapcott, 2001: Justice, Communitty and Dialogue in International Relations, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 34-5 
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reciprocity of subjectivity'. '' It is the last of these which will be the focus of the 
theoretical framework presented in this and following chapters. 
Cosmopolitanism challenges the traditional divisions (political and legal), 
instituted at Westphalia, between the national and the international which permeates the 
realist paradigm in international relations. It refuses to accept that the international 
sphere is devoid of ethical values or that it must remain perpetually stuck in the 
anarchical void of realism. Similarly to Brown's argument which recognises the 
historical contingency of the human rights discourse, cosmopolitanism acknowledges 
that the notion of the sovereign state is `itself a product of history and not a permanent 
feature of the human condition, that its origins are to be explained rather than its 
ontological status assumed'. 22 Consequently, in its bid to address the global, it argues 
that nationalism is no longer normatively desirable as a means of social organization 
and that cosmopolitanism is thus the new logic for social integration. 23 This might 
assume the form of a postnational, transnational or global democracy. 24 It insists that 
national frameworks are no longer sufficient for addressing global risks that have no 
respect for sovereign, national boundaries, and that social networks now extend far 
beyond the boundaries of national societies. Cosmopolitans point towards 
developments in international law which began with the establishment of the 
Nuremberg Charter in 1945, later encompassed the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the Genocide Conventions of 1947 and 1948 and, more recently, the 
International Tribunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia and the International 
Criminal Court. Without entering into a detailed discussion of the possible 
shortcomings of these developments, cosmopolitans argue that these moves towards 
global justice offer normative political implications and possibilities. They believe that 
`these reforms are neither short-term nor merely contingent but visible expressions of 
deeper social processes and historical trends. '25 
Despite the variety of ways which have emerged in the attempt to reconcile the 
universal and the particular, to reconstruct cosmopolitanism in a way that does not 
'' ibid. p. 15 
22 Fine, 2003a, p. 453 
23 Robert Fine and Will Smith, 2003: `Jürgen Habermas's Theory of Cosmopolitanism', 
Constellations, 10(4), p. 469 
24 J. Habermas, 2001: Why Europe Needs a Constitution', New Left Review, 11, 
(September/October); The Postnational Constellation: Political Essaus, Cambridge, Polity 
Press, 2001 
25 Fine, 2003a, p. 456 
58 
allow it to become vulnerable to further homogenizing claims, 26 cosmopolitanism runs 
the risk of being perceived in the same light as it portrays internationalism. While 
internationalism is criticized in the language of Carr's `harmony of interests' as a 
politics that allows some national interests to masquerade as universal whilst 
suppressing other interests, cosmopolitanism sets itself up as a genuinely universalistic 
outlook, capable of overcoming the narrow particularisms and abstract universalisms 
characteristic of political modernity. This raises the question of whether or not any 
form of cosmopolitanism can `achieve neutrality between rival ethical traditions. '27 
The danger is that cosmopolitanism simply sets up a new set of interests and cultural 
assumptions claiming to be universal and capable of transcending previous dichotomies 
between the particular and the universal. Fine highlights the criticism raised by Hardt 
and Negri in Empire where they perceive the creation of a single, overwhelming Empire 
in the place of rival nations or empires. In this context, cosmopolitanism is criticized, 
not for its own criticism of nations becoming obsolete, but `for its failure to see that that 
social transformation only intensifies the abstract, universal character of domination. '28 
Poststructuralists such as Devetak and Campbell argue that the notion of sovereignty 
and the modern sovereign state is problematic because it `arbitrarily and contingently 
sets the limits of ethical responsibility and political action. ' 29 The danger of 
universalism has been duly recognised by many who wish to retain a cosmopolitan 
orientation but yet, like Kant and Arendt, do not advocate a world government and are 
sensitive to the objections raised to a `top-down' universalism, `objections having to do 
mainly with a perceived neglect of situated differences, as well as of motivational 
resources. ' 30 
Recent writings on cosmopolitanism and communitarianism have indicated 
greater sensitivity towards the `other', leading to a more nuanced and interrelated 
understanding of the debate which seeks to better understand how communities and 
individuals can relate to each other and bear responsibility for actions which negatively 
26 ibid. p. 462; Cohen, J. (ed. ) 1996: For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism - 
Martha C. Nussbaum with Respondents, Boston, Beacon Press; Linklater, 1998 
2' Linklater, 2007: `Distant Suffering and Cosmopolitan Obligations', International Politics. 44, 
p. 20 
28 Fine, 2003a, p. 464 
29 Shapcott, 2001, p. 66 
30 Fred Dallmayr, 2003: `Cosmopolitanism: Moral and Political', Political Theory, 31(3), p. 422; 
Fine, 2006: `Cosmopolitanism and violence: difficulties of judgement', The British Journal of 
Sociology, 57(1), p. 56; Craig Calhoun, 2002: 'Imagining Solidarity: Cosmopolitanism, 
Constitutional Patriotism, and the Public Sphere', Public Culture, 14(1), p. 157 
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affect others. Recent various attempts to negotiate these relationships have focused on 
the possibilities of harm and empathy as a source of `wider consciousness'. 31 Neither 
cosmopolitanism nor communitarianism is sufficient to address issues of justice or 
difference in a world constituted by the dynamic of the universal and the particular. The 
universalism offered by a redefined version of good international citizenship is, 
significantly, not an abstract universalism, but rather one located in the universal 
practice of dialogue, in the acts of participation, inclusion, and reflexivity. It does not 
imply universal consensus on all issues. The concept of communication is at the heart 
of a refined understanding of good international citizenship, aiding in the construction 
of a process rather than an absolute standard or a final endpoint. It may be impossible 
and, arguably, undesirable to transcend this constant conflict between balancing the 
inclusive and the exclusive, the universal and the particular, requiring as it does 
continuous reassessment and contestation. 
Butler's approach to universalism expresses the caution articulated by Fine in 
relation to cosmopolitanism as she reminds us that the: 
universal begins to become articulated precisely through challenges to its 
existing formulation, and this challenge emerges from those who are not 
covered by it, who have no entitlement to occupy the place of the "who, " 
but who nevertheless demand that the universal as such ought to be 
inclusive of them. 32 
Far from being distinctly articulated, the universal is an open-ended ideal which has not 
been `adequately encoded by any given set of legal conventions. ' 33 Adopting Bjola's 
term, it is arguable that cosmopolitan claims are strengthened when adopted through 
practices of deliberative legitimacy. It is important briefly to set out the existing 
positions within the cosmopolitan and communitarian debate because good international 
citizenship assumes a particular place within these debates and is subject to related 
concerns. It highlights the reality of the state, yet offers tools with which to question its 
role; it represents certain kinds of relationships between communities and the practices 
and traditions that bind them. In its conservative form, it will be shown that it may 
preserve and privilege traditional interests while if conceived as a more innovative 
concept it can serve to challenge the status quo. 
31 Dobson, Eckersley (eds. ), 2006; Rorty: `On Human Rights: Rationality and Sentimentality', 
Shute, Hurley (eds. ) 1993, On Human Rights, New York, Basic Books; Linklater, 2006 
32 Judith Butler: `Universality in Culture', Cohen (ed. ) 1996, p. 49 
3; ibid. This articulation of universality fits with the distancing from Habermas's (U) seen in 
Chapter 3. 
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Both cosmopolitans and communitarians will argue that issues of inclusion and 
exclusion are fundamental to our understanding of the construction of societies. For 
communitarians this is because not only do societies have to determine the rules 
governing membership, but the same issues reappear on the micro-level of everyday 
interaction within social institutions, `local and occupational groupings', familial and 
other relations. 34 Although essentially grounded in the perspective of the nation-state as 
a major actor, the framework that will be constructed and presented in the following 
chapters seeks to foster a cosmopolitan and critical understanding of the notions of 
inclusion and exclusion and the implications of the nation-state for these issues. It 
seeks, therefore, to redefine the state as one actor among others. As Beck argues, `these 
oppositions - either "us" or "them, " either "in" or "out" - do not capture the reality of 
blurring boundaries between political, moral, and social communities and thus fail the 
ongoing experiment to create post-Westphalian transnational public spaces and 
citizens'. 35 It urges a move away from the system of inclusion and exclusion inherent in 
the ideology of the modern state. Adapting Beck's argument concerning the 
legitimation of global inequalities, it can be argued that existing structural inequalities, 
characterized by `non-reflexivity and non-reciprocity', within the institutions of the 
international community `preclude the acceptance of those whose acceptance is most 
needed: the poor, the humiliated, and the excluded'. 36 
The following pages present a critical review of existing research concerning the 
concept of good international citizenship, noting how it has evolved and identifying 
some problems. Whilst good international citizenship is, ultimately, accepting of the 
state as a key actor, it should, it will be argued, challenge existing notions of inclusion 
and exclusion. Conventional notions of good international citizenship are already 
embedded in the cosmopolitan and communitarian literature, concerned as it is with 
mediating relations between different communities. However, it assumes, implicitly, 
that communities are state-based. As such, it reifies a particular set of relations and 
practices (both theoretically and empirically) which offers a means to perpetuate the 
interests of the most powerful communities/states. Having revisited the cosmopolitan 
and communitarian debates therefore, we can place good international citizenship 
34 Linklater, 1992b, p. 82 
35 Ulrich Beck, 2003: `Toward a New Critical Theory with a Cosmopolitan Intent', 
Constellations, 10 (4), p. 454 
36 ibid. p. 460 
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within a particular context and re-examine how these relations might be constructed 
more explicitly in context of critical theory and a dialogical approach. 
2.3 The nature of Good International Citizenship 
Good international citizenship originated with Gareth Evans, former Australian 
Foreign Minister37 and has much to do with developing understandings of political 
community. In the existing international relations literature, it focuses on furthering 
normative ethical criteria for state interaction in a variety of areas. Although originally 
intended as a prescription for Australian foreign policy, the concept has been adopted by 
contemporary international relations scholars as offering a potential model for state 
behaviour within the international community. Senator Evans proposed that foreign 
policy should concern itself with and be motivated by issues such as preserving world 
order, encouraging global reform and honouring responsibilities and duties to aid the 
flourishing of mankind. 38 It is premised on the fundamental principle, originating with 
Vattel, that the state is required to place the `welfare of international society ahead of 
the relentless pursuit of its own national interests. '39 Although Vattel did not see the 
same necessity for a society of states as he did for civil society, he nevertheless believed 
that an agreement between those of the same state did not mean that they could 
relinquish their duties towards the rest of the human race. What civil society does mean 
is that the state, and its rulers, must `fulfil the duties of humanity towards outsiders in 
all matters in which individuals are no longer at liberty to act'. 40 Whilst states are not 
expected to compromise their vital national and security interests in order to do so, 
Vattel goes on to say: 
We know that, in general, duties toward self prevail over duties towards 
others; but this is only to be understood of duties which bear some 
proportion to one another ... What 
idea should we have of a prince, or of 
a Nation, who would refuse to yield the smallest advantage in order to gain 
for the world the inestimable blessing of peace? 41 
Evans described good international citizenship not as the `foreign policy 
equivalent of boy scout good deeds', but rather as a reflection of the `reality of 
37 Evans, 1989 
38 Linklater, 1992b, p. 21 
39 ibid. p. 28 
4o Andrew Linklater, 1990: Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations, 2°d edn. 
UK, Macmillan Press, p. 82 (citing Vattel's The Law of Nations) 
41 ibid. p. 85 
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international interdependence' and emerging global problems. 42 Reflecting a theme that 
has been developed, challenged and built upon in later definitions of good international 
citizenship, Evans placed special emphasis on the importance of human rights which: 
reflects a national - and a philosophical - interest in defending and 
extending international standards of human rights and the observance of 
international law. We are active in making responsible bilateral 
representations on human rights violations because we recognise that a 
right not defended is a right easily lost. In doing so we do not seek to 
prescribe cultural conformity or a specific form of government. We 
recognise that the advance of human rights and democracy will in some 
societies involve a creative blend of universal values and deeply rooted 
national traditions. Our objective is to affirm values which, in the United 
Nations Charter and elsewhere, have been recognised as genuinely 
universal, and which are at the core of our sense of human dignity. 43 
For Evans, good international citizenship is an `exercise in enlightened self-interest', an 
attempt to balance idealism and pragmatism, although he acknowledges that this 
balance will vary from issue to issue. This balance between idealism and pragmatism 
can also be seen as a blend of realism and idealism. Evans suggests that the `dichotomy 
between realism and idealism is a false one. The issue is one of means and ends; 
tempering what we want with what we can deliver and at what cost - social, economic 
and political. '44 For Evans it seems impossible to avoid being influenced by the harsh 
realities of Machiavellian realism whilst simultaneously suggesting that it is the `nature 
of men and women who live by the precepts of democracy to believe that they can 
change the world for the better. '45 For Evans, this policy of enlightened self-interest is 
best served through strengthening multilateralism and he acknowledges the importance 
of acting in ways that do not undermine the credibility of the language of good 
international citizenship - both at home and abroad. In a move that will be repeated at a 
theoretical level by Linklater, Evans does not distinguish between internal and external 
policies, arguing that the rules governing behaviour in the international sphere are no 
different from the rules governing other human behaviour. He also indicates a 
preference for consultation and cooperation as a means of resolving problems rather 
than resorting to confrontation. This proposition is one which will be developed both 
theoretically and practically in the discussion of the theoretical framework. 
42 Evans, 1989, p. 42 
4; ibid. p. 43. emphasis added 
'4 ibid. p. 44 
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The interpretation of good international citizenship developed in response to 
existing understandings of the concept does not seek to provide a definitive answer to 
the question of how states should behave. Instead, focusing on situations of conflict, it 
provides a normative framework against which state behaviour can be analysed. 
Moving beyond existing understandings of the concept, such as those offered by 
international relations scholars Dunne, Wheeler and Linklater46, it will be argued that 
they provide neither a sufficiently critical interpretation of legitimacy or agency, nor an 
analysis of the processes by which outcomes (i. e. military intervention) occur. It is 
important to note that the power of good international citizenship is primarily the 
criteria it provides with which to judge states at those times when they claim they are 
acting responsibly. It is clear that states will not always, if ever, implement ideal 
standards, therefore, good international citizenship should not be seen as a manifesto, 
but as means of supporting and guiding those who wish to hold states and their 
behaviour to account. 
2.4 Good International Citizenship: Linklater's Evolution 
A brief overview of good international citizenship indicates the degree of 
evolution it has undergone. It can be understood as an attempt in international relations 
to shift the debate beyond the stale arguments between realism and idealism. What 
began as a fairly conservative concept articulated by Linklater and influenced by Vattel, 
has emerged as a concept embracing largely solidarist values as reflected in the work of 
Wheeler47 and Dunne. Although Linklater's early work focuses on cooperation between 
states and the importance of strengthening the rules and norms of the international 
order, it has evolved much further to challenge the international status quo in certain 
situations, engaging with critical theory to offer alternative paths along which to 
develop. 
Linklater clearly addresses issues of inclusion and exclusion in his discussion of 
citizenship and his argument that analogous concepts of citizenship might be adopted in 
international relations. The increasing focus on and critique of different forms of 
exclusion occurring in debates over citizenship have significant implications for good 
international citizenship. Citizenship has challenged exclusion in domestic societies on 
46 Dunne, Wheeler, 1998; Linklater, 1992b 
47 Wheeler, 2000 
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a number of issues, such as class-based, ethnic and gender forms of exclusion, reflecting 
increased and better protected civil, political and social rights. The question raised then, 
is how far `does the development of citizenship within the state create the need for the 
development of new rights and duties in international relations? '48 Some suggest that 
conditions within domestic politics are better suited than those found in international 
politics to a dialogical approach, due to the established institutions and legitimate 
procedures that ground authority as well as a clear lifeworld. International relations 
supposedly take place in the context of anarchy, with no established enforcement 
capabilities and are characterized by inequality and different lifeworlds. Refuting the 
conditions of anarchy opens up possibilities reflected in international institutions and 
international law which offer established procedures and the potential for legitimacy, 
even if this is markedly absent in many peoples' eyes. Moreover, contemporary 
international politics relies progressively more on the process and content of arguments 
as much as on coercion and military power. 
Evans' policy contends that the advantaged have a responsibility to assist and 
provide aid towards those more vulnerable members of society. This duty towards 
society comes from the belief that human beings are inherently equal and therefore 
deserve equal respect and equal claims to the basic requirements of the good life. As 
Parekh argues: 
our assistance is a response to their claims as human beings and is a matter 
of justice, not charity. We have no duty to sacrifice our lives or vital 
interests for the sake of others, though we may do so if we feel so inclined, 
but we do have a duty to make sacrifices of what is not vitally necessary to 
our well-being in order to help others secure the basic conditions of 
49 theirs. 
Although Parekh is referring to citizenship at the domestic level, his argument sums up 
the starting point for good international citizenship. However, to what extent 
citizenship can be extrapolated to an international level in order to embrace all 
humankind is highly debatable, not least because citizenship usually refers to a 
`national' identity, a bounded territory, a particularist and coherent community. 
Although it is not always based on nationality, it does indicate membership of a 
particular community which holds particular values and beliefs. Communitarians would 
argue that citizenship and its concomitant notions of rights and democracy are only 
48 Linklater, 1992b, p. 25 
"' Parekh, 2003, p. 6 
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possible at the level of the nation-state. Parekh tries to bridge this dilemma by arguing 
that when those countries which have a greater ability to cause harm and offer help 
respond appropriately, expectations also rise proportionately, acquiring `moral 
legitimacy, set[ting] new moral and political norms, and giv[ing] rise to a new 
awareness of global obligations. As a result humankind is acquiring some of the broad 
features of a political community. ' 50 
Issues of inclusion and exclusion are important to analysing problems in good 
international citizenship which concern the way in which citizenship and boundaries are 
considered. The communicative framework that will be introduced allows us to 
examine more openly the construction of ideas of inclusion and exclusion from society, 
communities and dialogue, which is important in any consideration of justice and 
citizenship. Recognising the importance of national identity, as constructed through 
citizenship, it also allows us to recognise those who are excluded from common 
identities. 51 Once again, cosmopolitan approaches highlight the tension between the 
universal and the particular: a universal community, by definition, suggests that despite 
apparent differences of identity, there `exists an essential unity. Such a statement itself 
denies the possibility of truly radical difference'. 52 Building an ethic of communication 
into practice at all levels in the international community is an attempt to accommodate 
this tension more effectively. Zygmunt Bauman underlines the need for this approach 
when he argues that `[i]t is exclusion, rather than the exploitation suggested a century 
and a half ago by Marx, that today underlies the most conspicuous cases of social 
polarization, of deepening inequality, and of rising volumes of human poverty, misery 
and humiliation. ' 53 Linklater takes up this challenge, arguing that removing various 
modes of exclusion; political, economic or social, is central to his exposition of good 
international citizenship. 
Modern ideas of citizenship have to some extent entrenched this division 
between citizenship and humanity as citizenship laws are `linked with the objective of 
improving the arrangements of a specific society and with the goal of promoting its 
interests, often to the detriment of other societies. '54 For some, it helps to articulate and 
50 ibid. p. 1 l Reflecting communitarian/cosmopolitan concerns, Parekh distinguishes between 
globally oriented citizenship and cosmopolitan citizenship, p. 12 
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protect difference, imparting moral significance to national boundaries. However, 
conversely, modem citizenship has also lowered many barriers to the outside world, 
encouraging people to develop and feel comfortable with multiple layers of identity and 
citizenship as well as familiarising them with their rights. While some have argued that 
it is not possible to reconcile citizenship and humanity, others have argued that the state 
does not constitute the outer boundary of our moral and political obligations, and that 
`citizenship simply concretises the imprecise duties which all human beings owe one 
another'. 55 
It is, then, arguably the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention which 
have become self-imposed limitations on our ability to implement these duties and 
responsibilities on an international scale. Overcoming this tension is crucial, Linklater 
argues, because although citizenship has served to dismantle many barriers, helping 
those more vulnerable to benefit and participate in society, `it has always been, as aliens 
and refugees well know, one of the principal forms of exclusion in social and political 
life' 
. 
56 In this context, Linklater sees the need to develop the concept further, and, in 
our search for citizenship, to go `[h]igher to the world, lower to the locality'. 57 This is 
echoed by recent political theory which, in responding to recent critiques of exclusion, 
has referred to the `disaggregation of citizenship' and has highlighted the need to look 
to `subnational as well as supranational spaces for democratic attachment and agency'. 58 
Thus, Linklater's argument is that good international citizenship offers the 
means to weaken the `exclusionary character of the modern state' and to overcome `an 
ancient tension between the rights of citizens and duties to the rest of humanity'. 59 
Aristotle, who was aware that `man' and `citizen' were potentially conflicting concepts: 
regarded the failure to be `ashamed of behaving to others in ways which 
they would refuse to acknowledge as just, or even expedient, among 
themselves' as evidence of moral deficiency. By claiming that foreign 
policy should be governed not simply by prudence and expediency, but by 
regard for what was `lawful', Aristotle defended the sentiments peculiar to 
the good international citizen. 60 
55 ibid. p. 25 
56 ibid. p. 26 
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Good international citizenship must also concern itself with the economic sphere as, left 
unregulated, free trade policies can exacerbate disparities of wealth internally and 
between the rich and poor worlds: `They overwhelm and often destroy community life 
in traditional societies by prescribing only one path to economic development. ' 61 
Concomitantly, Raymond Murphy has argued that `citizenship laws in the industrialised 
societies prevent the dilution of the benefits of industrialisation. . . through the exclusion 
of people born elsewhere. '62 
What, then, are the criteria that form Linklater's definition of good international 
citizenship? First, he finds similarities with Bull's analysis of international society in 
The Anarchical Society. These principles include upholding international law, the 
respecting of equal sovereignty of other states, diplomacy, trying to extend the level of 
consensus between states and the role of major powers assuming special obligations in 
relation to maintaining international order - in other words, great power responsibility. 
Linklater draws parallels between these rights and duties of states and the rights 
contingent upon national citizenship in the domestic sphere. 63 These principles imply 
that states have a duty to act as good citizens of international society and Linklater 
defines this by drawing on Vattel for whom the good international citizen is not 
required to `sacrifice its own national independence in the process, nor is it legally 
obliged to act in ways which will jeopardise its survival or endanger its vital national 
interests, but it is beholden to other states to place the survival of order before the 
satisfaction of minimal national advantages. '64 More recent notions of multilateralism 
again highlight the belief that states, particularly great powers, `possess the international 
equivalent of civic obligations to advance the more general good. '65 Consequently, one 
of Linklater's key criteria is the preservation of the society of states. 
Although realists provide one of the strongest critiques of good international 
citizenship, their influence is not unnoticeable. Drawing on Evans, Linklater, in his 
second criterion, argues that some realist themes form a legitimate element of any 
61 Scott Burchill, from Burchill et al. Theories of International Relations, 2nd edn., USA, 
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account of good international citizenship. For example, despite his criticisms of 
utopianism in The Twenty Years' Crisis, Carr recognised that the concept of community 
might be extended outwards. 66 Morgenthau and Kissenger suggested that international 
order is best achieved by replacing adversarial relations with developing equal levels of 
security and insecurity between themselves, indicating the importance of collective 
responsibility for the maintenance of international order. However, Carr also 
recognised that the notion of collective responsibility may simply be a rhetorical device 
which allows powerful states to design policies intended to protect the status quo and 
further the interests of the powerful. 67 
The third of Linklater's criteria is that states should `permit the growth of sub- 
national and cosmopolitan loyalties which have been previously foreclosed'68. This 
brings us back to the issue of redefining the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, 
implying that states should allow, and indeed encourage, multiple forms of citizenship 
or identity. This relates to the varying dimensions of citizenship which exist in social 
and political life: `in the relations between individuals and the state, in the bonds which 
link states together in an international society, and in the much looser realm consisting 
of ties between the individual and the rest of humanity. '69 
The fourth dimension of Linklater's definition draws heavily on the tradition of 
the English School. 70 English School theory focuses on rationalism as a via media 
between the extremes of realism and revolutionism and emphasises the interdependence 
of all three traditions in order to understand international relations . 
71 One of the 
precepts of rationalism is its attempt to control the use of force by states through the 
development of international law and international society, thus restraining states from 
acting solely to promote their own political interests through encouraging increasing 
cooperation between states. Wight contributed to the development of our understanding 
of the rationalist tradition through his historical and political analysis of what he called 
the `Three Traditions' : Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism. The essence of 
Wight's work is that any truth about international politics had to be sought not in any 
66 E. H. Carr, 1941: The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939, London, Macmillan, p. 306 
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single tradition, but in the debate between them. He argues that elements of all three 
traditions are present and active in international society, and that any attempt to describe 
international politics solely in terms of one tradition to the exclusion of the others is 
bound to fall down. 
Wight developed the rationalist view in light of his interpretation of the work of 
Francisco Suarez who said that `although every state is a perfect community, yet it is 
none the less a member of a universal body or whole; this membership is the basis of 
international law. '72 This notion of being separate yet part of a greater whole is echoed 
by Vattel, an international lawyer, who, it is argued, rejected the actions of egocentric 
sovereign states, preferring instead the `principle of a natural society of free and 
independent states which each community is obliged to preserve and enhance. ' 73 
At an international level, Wight identifies three key tenets of the rationalist 
tradition: firstly, that `Every state has the right to regulate its own affairs freely, without 
intervention. '; secondly, that `No state has the right to establish government on 
principles of hostility to other governments and intervention is permissible against such 
a state. '; thirdly, that `Every state has the duty of accommodating its national interests, 
so far as possible, to those of other states. ' 74 These precepts can find their parallels in 
the concept of good international citizenship. The rationalist position does not base its 
stance on an absolute moral standard as is done by utopians, instead remaining aware of 
the need for compromise in political action. Wight concludes his analysis of the three 
traditions by suggesting that `Rationalism was a civilizing factor, Revolutionism a 
vitalizing factor, and Realism a controlling disciplinary factor in international 
politics. ' 75 
Wight demonstrates where the distinction can be drawn between the Rationalist 
and the Revolutionist traditions by citing Vattel's reaction to the notion of `civitas 
maxima'. Developed by Wolff, `civitas maxima' was the idea that there was `a great 
society or super-state, of which individual states were citizens, and which could exercise 
authority over them. ' 76 This provoked much debate, and Vattel, himself a Rationalist, 
distanced himself from this idea saying: 
72 ibid. p. 39 
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I find the fiction of such a (great) republic neither reasonable nor well 
enough founded ... I recognize no other natural society among 
Nations 
than that which nature has set up among men in general. It is essential to 
every civil society that each member should yield certain of his rights to 
the general body, and that there should be some authority capable of 
giving commands, prescribing laws, and compelling those who refuse to 
obey. Such an idea is not to be thought of as between independent 
Nations. 77 
The notion of a `civitas maxima' suggests a concept of world justice which seeks to 
determine what is good or bad for world society as a whole, as it suggests a society to 
which all individuals belong and to which their interests should be subordinate. 78 This 
introduces problems with universal notions of justice, of how to address the issue of 
privileging dominant forms of justice and of how the common good can be codified. 
The idea that analogies can be drawn between conditions at the international 
level and conditions at the domestic level as suggested by `civitas maxima' is, 
according to Wight, an essential tenet of Revolutionist thought, and is one which is key 
to Linklater's definition of good international citizenship. Linklater argues that realism, 
rationalism, and cosmopolitanism all contribute towards the definition of good 
international citizenship. However, there is, as noted by Wight, a distinction between 
the rationalist defence of the international society of states and the cosmopolitan ideal of 
a global community of humankind. Rationalists have, generally, rejected the 
cosmopolitan argument, suggesting, in common with realists, that alternative visions of 
world order would be frustrated by the perpetual struggle for power and security. They 
also claimed that `all cosmopolitan perspectives display culturally-specific moral 
priorities and falter when faced with the charge that all moral concepts are essentially 
contested ones. '79 By highlighting the many critiques of ethical universalism and 
cosmopolitanism, Linklater walks a fine line between the pluralism of the rationalist 
tradition and the possibilities offered by a reflexive cosmopolitanism. It is important to 
note the influence of cosomopolitan thought on his definition of good international 
citizenship, arguing as he does that the: 
cosmopolitan theme which is exhibited here adds force to the ideals of 
contract and discourse which stand at the centre of current arguments for 
ethical universalism. Exporting hazards conflicts with the principle of 
7' ibid, citing Vattel's The Law of Nations 
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self-determination which is common to liberalism and Marxism. It fails to 
give outsiders the opportunity either to express or to withhold their 
consent and it refuses to allow them the right (in Marx's words) to make 
their own history under conditions of their own choosing. 80 
This argument is very important for the later evolution of good international citizenship, 
highlighting as it does, the concepts of discourse, consent, communication and 
legitimacy. Taking a step that will prove pivotal to later interpretations of good 
international citizenship, although he does not develop this theoretically within the 
current interpretation, Linklater argues that `the legitimacy of practices of exclusion (in 
domestic politics and also in international relations) should be decided in the same way: 
by measures which seek the consent of the included and excluded alike. ' 81 In this way 
he seeks to transcend the dichotomy between order and justice; he refuses to forsake the 
importance of order, but grants justice a far more significant role than the rationalists 
do. 
However, once again caught between rationalist pluralism and cosmopolitanism, 
he acknowledges the criticism that `because states have competing definitions of who is 
excluded, the attempt to broaden good international citizenship so that it encompasses 
cosmopolitan aspirations is more likely to endanger rather than to promote international 
order. '82 With growing consensus, however, that human rights and justice should 
feature more prominently on the agenda, collective action to promote universal moral 
ideals becomes a means to enhance rather than threaten international order. These 
trends towards addressing concerns over justice and inclusion reflect what Habermas 
calls moral learning; `the development of the understanding that various constraints on 
the life-chances of human beings are indefensible and must be lifted. '83 
In conclusion, Linklater states that: 
advocacy of good international citizenship commits governments, at least 
in principle, to act in ways which will preserve the society of states and 
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strengthen the community of humankind. Taken seriously, and invoked 
frequently over time, the concept sets out some basic moral criteria which 
can be used to judge and criticise the state's conduct of foreign policy. 84 
Good international citizenship, as perceived by Linklater, embodies contrasting and yet 
complementary notions of great power responsibility and the need to move towards a 
less rigid, less hierarchical and power laden notion of responsibility and participation. 
Sovereignty becomes more flexible, different international norms may emerge, and we 
can detect moves towards discourse and consensus. This explains the rationalist 
preference for pluralism and the maintenance of international society, albeit with 
evolving arguments for the role and duties of those states who form a part of the society 
of states. 
2.5 Good International Citizenship: defined and applied by Dunne and 
Wheeler 
Dunne and Wheeler's interpretation of good international citizenship has 
developed Linklater's definition and has focused on specific strands within the original 
concept, namely, human rights and the consequent `solidarist' or cosmopolitan shift. 
The definition offered here challenges the principles of sovereignty and non- 
intervention through the perspective of responsibility and human rights protection. 
Focusing on the pragmatism offered by the concept, they apply it to New Labour's 
foreign policy from 1997. 
Dunne and Wheeler define good international citizenship as a viewpoint which 
`argues for a mutual interdependence between the provision of national security, the 
strengthening of international order and the promotion of human rights'. 85 When these 
goals clash, Linklater argued that good international citizens are required "`to put the 
welfare of international society ahead of the relentless pursuit of [their] own national 
interests ... to place the survival of order 
before the satisfaction of minimal national 
advantage"'. 86 Developing Linklater's argument further, they define the `welfare' of 
international society as including respect for human rights. Thus, law-abiding `good 
international citizens not only have to place order before the pursuit of narrow 
commercial and political advantage but are also required to forsake these advantages 
84 ibid. p. 39 
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where they conflict with human rights'. 87 Linklater locates this willingness to place 
constraints on self-interest as a result of the duty to promote the more general good 
within recent literature on citizenship which has firmly anchored notions of welfare 
rights as a pivotal aspect of contemporary citizenship and which has begun to explore 
the concept in context of international relations, and in Evans' original defence of good 
international citizenship. 88 
It is the contention of this thesis that the argument that good international 
citizenship will transcend the realist/idealist divide by `mapping out a third way which 
tames the element of brute power, and looks to the reconciliation of order and justice in 
world politics' sets out a position which does not critically analyse the definitions of 
order and justice or the power inequalities inherent in these ideas. 89 This is underlined 
when looking at the problems raised when major powers believe that a certain situation 
requires the use of force in order to maintain international peace and security, but are 
unable to secure a consensus for such action; a good international citizen, after all, is 
supposed to act multilaterally and to ensure that all actions to uphold the rules of 
international order are legitimized by the UN. Dunne and Wheeler's answer is that `in 
exceptional cases good international citizens have a duty to use force even if this 
weakens the rule of law in the society of states'. 90 Dunne and Wheeler claim that in 
order to be judged a `good international citizen', states and their leaders must recognize 
that they are `burdened with the guardianship of human rights everywhere'. 91 By 
advocating a solidarist interpretation of international society, they establish a 
perspective that not only no longer precludes, but actively advocates intervention in the 
affairs of other states on the grounds of human rights. 
Dunne and Wheeler argue that the late Robin Cook, former British Foreign 
Secretary, drew on many of the ideas that Evans advocated a decade earlier concerning 
the role of foreign policy and its objectives in his 1997 Mission Statement setting out 
`an ethical dimension' to New Labour's foreign policy. 92 They suggest that Labour's 
ethical foreign policy is a departure from foreign policies of the past. However, what is 
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new about Labour's foreign policy is not the fact that it relies upon ethical or moral 
justifications, but that it explicitly states that it is acting within such an ethical 
framework and therefore asks to be judged accordingly. They rightly point out that 
those who use the language of good international citizenship abroad without practising 
it at home and in their foreign policy will be mistrusted and unable to maintain their 
influence within the international community. Clearly, this indicates that the language 
or discourse which is used is significant in and of itself, not least because it often 
provides governments with the legitimacy to act. If we assume that the power to act is 
`fundamentally dependent on providing ethical justification [by virtue of the legitimacy 
and popular support it provides], then exposing a discrepancy between promise or 
justification and practice can provide an important incentive for states to align their 
practices with their words'. 93 It is this explicit recognition of the power of discourse 
and the justifications to act that it contains that lend good international citizenship in 
conjunction with an ethic of communication its critical power. Indeed, when analysing 
British foreign policy, Dunne and Wheeler reveal considerable discrepancies between 
Britain's claim to behave ethically abroad and its actions which are often more 
reminiscent of traditional realism. 
More debatably, they conclude that those states `who practice good governance 
at home are likely to behave in the same way abroad'. 94 One of the key challenges to 
liberal democratic peace theory is that states who behave peacefully and cooperate 
amongst themselves do not necessarily interact with non-liberal democratic states in the 
same way, often behaving in, a more hostile, unilateral or aggressive fashion. 95 By 
making a state's place (its legitimacy and sovereignty) within the international 
community contingent upon its acceptance of human rights, Cook's policy focuses on 
the need for international scrutiny or censure of those states who fail to meet the 
requisite standards, without reflecting on our own historical role in creating inequalities 
and unstable situations. 
Cook introduces the issue of dialogue to ethical foreign policy; particularly 
regarding the need to balance the competing values of security and human rights. An 
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example of this is China, where Cook argued that `more will be achieved through 
`dialogue' than through public confrontation. A genuine `dialogue' is not an occasion 
for lecturing or hectoring, as realist critics have contended; rather, it is an opportunity 
for an `open exchange of views' '. 96 Although dialogue is introduced, it is neither 
situated in a specific theoretical framework, nor is it indicated what kind of procedural 
ethics should inform dialogue. Dunne and Wheeler note that: 
Cook requested the release of twelve dissidents, but only raised these cases 
at a junior level within the government. During a four-hour meeting with 
the Chinese foreign minister, Cook decided not to bring up any of the 
individual cases on his list, choosing instead to discuss human rights in 
general terms. Moreover, having said that he would provide a platform for 
the victims of human rights abuses, the Foreign Secretary declined to meet 
Wei Jingsheng [a human rights campaigner, imprisoned for 18 years] 
during his visit. 97 
Clearly, Cook's actions did not match expectations when he talked of dialogue. 
Arguably bowing to strategic and economic/trade interests, Cook did not make full use 
of the dialogical forum to make his views known on the human rights record of the 
Chinese government. This was justified in a number of ways, not least by suggesting 
that `China's growing entanglement in the diplomacy of human rights provides 
important arguments for Western states seeking to hold China accountable to 
internationally agreed standards'. 98 Thus, failure to get tough now might lead to a more 
fruitful, if slower, process in the long-term. However, it is possible to read alternative 
agendas into Cook's failure to live up to his promise. Not only does Britain consider 
itself to have vital security interests related to Asia-Pacific stability and a `duty of care 
to the six million residents of Hong Kong', but China is also a permanent member of the 
United Nations Security Council. 99 
Cook's actions can be located within the broader debate about the moral 
responsibilities of good international citizens. Rather than rehearsing the familiar realist 
arguments, suffice to ask how far should states go to balance the claims between the 
security and welfare of their own citizens and those of humanity? Just as there is 
generally agreement that it is no longer acceptable for states to claim that it is of no 
96 Dunne, Wheeler, 1998, p. 863 
97 ibid. p. 864 
98 ibid. p. 865 
99 Cook, Robin: `Foreign policy and human rights', Foreign Affairs Committee, 6 January, 
1998, p. 53 
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concern to others how they treat their own citizens, '0° so there is little consensus as to 
what this implies in reality for the international community. Good international 
citizens, no matter how good their intentions, are faced by the dilemma that `the West 
needs China if there is to be any enforcement of international rules on the outside, but 
this precludes any possibility of enforcing the rules against China for its violation of 
human rights on the inside'. lol As Linklater indicated, this suggests that good 
international citizenship is grounded in power politics, recognising that power wielded 
irresponsibly can undermine order and that order is a precondition of other values such 
as justice and dialogue. However, the question that this pluralist perspective raises is 
whose order is it and whose preferences does it privilege? Despite the normative 
innovations of Linklater, Dunne and Wheeler, good international citizenship does not, 
by itself, have the tools which allow us to surmount this tension and it is for this reason 
that further dialogical innovations are necessary. 
We have seen that good international citizenship places emphasis on cooperation 
and the importance of strengthening the rules and norms of the international order. 
However, while this perspective offers some potential for change through developing 
international institutions, notions of community and the human rights regime, it remains 
the perspective of the powerful as it allows dominant states to define what constitutes 
order and justice. It does not address the problem of selectivity, inherent in any 
conception of international society where power, bargaining influences, and national 
interest will always be important in deciding the agenda. This is demonstrated by the 
fact that Chinese human rights are not high on the agenda because they clash with the 
interests of great powers. Wheeler responds to the criticism of selectivity by citing the 
need for prudence which dictates different responses in different cases. 102 Prudence, 
however, appears to be a double-edged sword; while indeed necessary to conducting 
affairs (it suggests that we recognise the limits of our capabilities and adopt a more 
long-term vision), it may also serve to provide a cloak to hide other strategic or national 
interests. Although this interpretation of good international citizenship considers 
strategic issues, it does not sufficiently consider the role which states might have played 
in the development of complex situations: for example, the perpetuation of inequalities 
100 The Responsibilily to Protect, 2001 
101 Dunne, Wheeler, 1998, p. 865 
102 Wheeler, 2000, p. 48 
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through strategic, political or economic policies. Herring makes this point when he 
suggests that the problem of foreign policy ethics is one of `putting the world to rights': 
In other words, the problem is how to stop others doing things which 
violate our sense of right and wrong. Invisible is the way that Britain is a 
vigorous and systematic violator of the ethics professed in [Cook's 1997] 
Mission Statement. [... T]he British government's adoption of explicit 
ethical criteria should not blind us to the significance of its failure in many 
cases to live up to those criteria. '03 
Wheeler has made a compelling case for good international citizens to be able to 
resort to unilateral force in the case of a `supreme humanitarian emergency', perhaps 
when collective armed force is being blocked by the `unreasonable veto' or self-interest 
of a major power within the Security Council. 104 However, a solidarist interpretation of 
good international citizenship which supports an emergent norm of humanitarian 
intervention does not indicate what kind of process legitimates the moral or legal values 
which offer justification for the use of force. Nor do the threshold criteria Wheeler lists 
meet the kind of procedural demands required of such a legitimating process by 
Habermasian discourse ethics. 105 
Existing perspectives of good international citizenship assume universal 
standards and aspirations but fail to address ways in which those involved might have a 
say in the dialogue that constructs their lives. Dunne and Wheeler note the importance 
of dialogue, assuming that participants are prepared to engage in conversation and thus 
potentially alter their position, but when dialogue breaks down, they argue that good 
international citizenship requires alternative approaches, including force, to be 
considered rather than reflect upon the construction and nature of the process which led 
to the break down of dialogue. Human rights, often at the heart of justifications for 
intervention, offer a powerful means to enter into dialogue, but the construction of such 
dialogue is important. Habermasian ideas suggest that universal interests cannot be 
expressed without dialogue because such a consensus would be an expression of 
asymmetric power relations. 106 The human rights discourse throws up another problem 
when a more inclusive and culturally sensitive approach is advocated, simply because, 
by definition, it requires universalism. While, admittedly, dialogue is also a move 
103 Eric Herring, 1999: `Response to Mervyn Frost: The Systematic Violation of Ethical Norms 
in British Foreign Policy', Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 12(2), p. 81 
'04 Wheeler, 2000 
105 ibid. p. 33-51 
'06 See Chapter 4 
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towards a form of universalism, it offers an alternative approach to negotiating 
boundaries and identities. 
The argument here is not that the support for human rights offered by good 
international citizenship is undesirable, but rather that the advocacy of such policies 
requires a deeper level of reflexivity and a greater awareness of inclusive and exclusive 
practices inherent in current structures. 107 Linklater begins to address this when he 
argues that states not only have to abide by international law and organisations but that 
they have to challenge the exclusionary aspects of it. Thus, he argues, good 
international citizens should challenge the legitimacy of the UN Security Council veto, 
particularly when it is used irresponsibly. However, the danger here is that this 
challenge becomes a means to justify intervention in support of human rights rather than 
a reassessment of the international system. 
2.6 Diverging conceptions and recurrent problems 
In order to see how another interpretation of good international citizenship might 
be constructed, it is important to clarify two current and opposing conceptions of 
international society which maintain differing views as to how good international 
citizens should act. It should be noted that although both of these positions contain 
valid concerns and aspirations, they will be rejected as offering too little concern for the 
deliberative process by which such decisions are made and the consequent legitimacy 
that these decisions may lack. Although the latter position intends to discriminate 
between reasons for action offered from self-interest or from some higher cosmopolitan 
purpose, there is not enough theoretical clarity inherent in such a position to analyse 
such claims and to reflect upon possible communicative distortion. 
Bull's identification of two different forms of solidarism in international society 
reflects existing theoretical conceptions of good international citizenship. The first 
concerns what he calls `police action', `where states exhibit solidarity in their response 
to law-breaking states which violate the cardinal rules and norms of the society of 
states. ' 108 Bull suggests, in a move adopted by Linklater, that solidarist ideology calls 
107 For an example of what this might look like see Shapcott, 2001, p. 224-232: Instead of asking 
are human rights universal in the abstract, we should ask (how) can we achieve universal human 
rights and which human rights might be capable of such a consensus? See also Parekh, from 
Dunne, Wheeler (eds. ), 1999, p. 139 
108 Wheeler, Dunne, 1996: `Hedley Bull's pluralism of the intellect and solidarism of the will', 
International Affairs, 72, (1), p. 95 
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for the needs of justice in a particular case to override alliances and political factions. 109 
This is the collective security conception of solidarism which underpins the UN Charter 
and arises from the rationalist tradition in its focus on the concept of rights and duties 
among states and within a society of states. The second concerns a deeper level of 
responsibility and greater demands upon the collective will which is closer to the form 
of solidarism advocated by Wheeler and Dunne. Bull recognised that solidarism `might 
require a challenge to the non-intervention principle. On this reading of solidarism, 
state leaders are `burdened with the guardianship of human rights everywhere. ' '110 
This type of solidarism places the rights and duties of individuals at its heart, as 
opposed to the pluralist preference for the limited rights and duties of states alone. This 
latter conception has its roots in cosmopolitanism and sees individuals as having rights 
and duties in a world society of humankind. 
The first interpretation referred to above has also been called 'statism'. ' 11 This 
conception of international society draws on the pluralist tradition of the English School 
and is keen to protect the traditional principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, 
warning of the dangers inherent in humanitarian intervention. It argues that the needs of 
international order in the face of ideological conflict require states to respect such 
principles. Its advocates remind us of the difficulties in constructing an agreed set of 
conditions, the violation of which might permit humanitarian intervention, suggesting 
that what constitutes sufficiently serious human rights violations is still uncertain. They 
also argue that there is no consensus over where the boundary between humanitarian 
war and military aggression lies. More importantly, they highlight the fact that 
intervention in the affairs of other states on humanitarian grounds sets dangerous 
precedents for those states who might wish to abuse this idea in order to extend their 
own power, premising their actions on humanitarian principles. Consequently, 
Linklater argues that from a statist perspective, aspiring good international citizens: 
[including] emerging post-national and post-sovereign states [..., ] should 
respect the sovereignty of other powers even when they are committed to 
totalizing politics. Regard for sovereignty does not preclude diplomatic 
109 Hedley Bull: `The Grotian Conception of International Society', from Butterfield and Wight 
(eds. ) 1966: Diplomatic Investigations, Essays in the Theory of International Relations, London, 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd. p. 63 
"0 ibid. 
"' Linklater: `The good international citizen and the crisis in Kosovo' from Schnabel, Thakur 
(eds. ) 2000: Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention, New York, United 
Nations University Press, p. 485 
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efforts to persuade societies to behave differently, or economic sanctions 
and embargoes in extreme cases, but it does rule out military force for 
humanitarian ends. 112 
In more recent work, Linklater has incorporated and developed the principle of harm 
into the concept of good international citizenship. He has clarified the principles for 
good international citizenship in a pluralist international society'' , arguing that they are 
concerned `with creating and preserving international harm conventions which work to 
the advantage of the great powers. ' 114 These do not, however, protect non-sovereign 
communities such as indigenous peoples, protect individuals from harm in the case of 
human rights abuses which do not become a matter for the international society as a 
whole, nor protect smaller states from the vagaries of the balance of power aimed at 
preventing harm to the great powers. 
Alternatively, there exists a more solidarist conception of international society 
which has been discussed earlier. "5 This definition of a good international citizen 
112 ibid. 
113 A comprehensive list of these principles includes, although is not limited to: `(1) states are 
the basic members of international society; (2) all societies have a right to a separate existence 
subject to the need to maintain the balance of power; (3) intervention in the internal affairs of 
member states to promote some vision of human decency or human justice is prohibited; (4) 
states should relinquish the goal of acquiring preponderant power in the international system; 
(5) the duty to cooperate to maintain an equilibrium of power is incumbent on all states; (6) 
diplomatic efforts to reconcile competing interests should proceed from the assumption that 
each state is the best judge of its own interests; (7) an `inclusive' as opposed to `exclusive' 
conception of the national interest should be pursued so that other states, and the society to 
which they belong, are not harmed for the sake of trivial national advantages; (8) because of 
their unique military capabilities the great powers should assume special responsibilities which 
are determined by mutual consent for preserving international order; (9) an essential purpose of 
an `inclusive' foreign policy is to make changes to international society which will satisfy the 
legitimate interests of rising powers and new member states; (10) force is justified in self- 
defence and in response to states that seek preponderant power; and (11) proportionality in war 
should be respected along with the principle that defeated powers should be readmitted as 
equals into international society. ' Linklater, Suganami, 2006: The English School of 
International Relations: A Contemporary Reassessment, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, p. 237-240 
114 ibid. p. 240 
"s A list of principles for a solidarist understanding of good international citizenship includes: 
`(1) individuals and the various communities and associations to which they belong are the 
fundamental members of international society; (2) unnecessary suffering and cruelty to 
individuals and their immediate associations should be avoided in the conduct of war; (3) 
pluralist commitments to sovereignty and sovereign immunity should be replaced by the notion 
of personal responsibility for infringements of the laws of war; (4) superior orders do not justify 
violations of humanitarian international law; (5) breaches of the laws of war should be 
punishable in domestic and international courts; (6) the sovereignty of the state is conditional on 
compliance with the international law of human rights; (7) sovereignty does not entitle states to 
be free from `the legitimate appraisal of their peers' with respect to human rights; (8) states have 
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differs significantly, moving towards a sense of cosmopolitan justice. Solidarists claim 
that states have an obligation to protect the rights and interests of individuals who are 
seen as members of international society in their own right. While this challenges the 
traditional notion of state sovereignty, there appears to be increasingly less resistance to 
the idea that states are answerable to the world community for the treatment of 
individuals. Both interpretations of good international citizenship were articulated in 
the dialogue surrounding the conflict in Kosovo. NATO's argument, at least in part, 
borrowed from a cosmopolitan interpretation, seeking to protect the rights of 
individuals. However, given the problems encountered within this dialogue which shall 
be discussed in Chapter 5, good international citizenship, as a normative concept 
intended to hold states to account, is, in this interpretation, unable to move beyond 
existing power relations. 
For some, the solidarist approach requires that good international citizens should 
consider that serious human rights violations should take precedence over state 
sovereignty, necessitating, under certain conditions, the use of force. From this 
standpoint, Linklater argues that as: 
custodians of the global human rights culture they should take action to 
ensure that war criminals are prosecuted, and they should be prepared to 
reconfigure political systems that violate fundamental moral principles. 
Establishing international protectorates, partitioning societies, and 
promoting the establishment of federal or confederal arrangements are 
three possibilities available to the good international citizen. 116 
For many, this approach raises justifiable concerns, suggesting that some states may set 
themselves up as judge, jury and executioner, without having granted due respect or 
consultation to all parties involved. The debate between the pluralist and solidarist 
conceptions of good international citizenship turns on the differing value or priority 
placed on national, international or humanitarian responsibilities. Both positions reflect 
a lack of consensus over what it means to be a good international citizen when other 
societies, near or far, are being consumed by ethnic violence and human rights 
abuses. 117 The simple fact that other societies may not conform to Western standards of 
responsibilities as custodians of human rights everywhere; (9) individuals have the legal right of 
appeal to international courts of law when violations of human rights occur; and (10) regard for 
human rights requires respect for non-sovereign communities and requires the society of states 
to protect minority nations and indigenous peoples from unnecessary suffering. ' Ibid. p. 243-44 
16 Linklater, 2000, p. 485 
117 ibid. p. 487 
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political legitimacy is not an authorization for any particular course of action. One 
solution offered is that of modified statism. This includes measures such as the 
suspension of commerce, economic sanctions, and other forms of `non-violent pressure 
deigned to change the behaviour of unacceptable regimes. ' 118 Whilst this promotes 
collective action to support human rights, it does not go so far as to advocate military 
action, thus appearing attractive to many solidarists for whom the conundrum of this 
tension between human rights, sovereignty and humanitarian intervention rests 
uncomfortably and remains unresolved. However, modified statism is not 
unproblematic as it `may have the effect of supporting regime security at the cost of 
human security', favouring the conventions of international society over the needs of 
people. 119 
In a move that responds to criticisms of good international citizenship Linklater 
concludes that: 
although it is essential that good international citizens should respect 
existing international legal principles, it is also right that they should apply 
pressure to them in the name of cosmopolitan conventions whose time 
may have come. Good international citizens must challenge the status quo 
while avoiding recklessness, arbitrariness, and opportunism, but they must 
convince others of their case, their competence, and their motives. 120 
The resolution of the tension that permeates the legal order and affects the balance 
between order and justice, citizenship and humanity, and sovereignty and human rights 
is one that Linklater regards as crucial for the good international citizen. He indicates 
that in order to arrive at such a new legal order, the burden of justifying change should 
rest on the shoulders of good international citizens while they argue for new decision- 
making procedures. As concerns the moral decision to intervene on the grounds of 
human rights atrocities, it is implied that not only are the moral credentials of the 
intervening powers at stake, but that the force of world opinion should play a role. 
There has previously been, however, no explicit suggestion as to the theoretical 
implications of these proposals, nor how this process might be constructed. In a later 
work, which draws on the critical approach developed in The Transformation of 
Political Community, Linklater elaborates on what such a process might entail. 
ibid. p. 488 
19 ibid. 
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Focusing on the harm principle as central to a cosmopolitan understanding of good 
intematonal citizenship, he puts forward these conditions: 
(1) to create transnational democratic legal and political institutions which 
give individuals and their associations the capacity to influence all 
decisions which may adversely affect them; (2) to devolve political power 
to ensure advances in the public recognition of cultural and linguistic 
differences; and (3) to reduce material inequalities and unequal life 
chances in order to create meaningful forms of citizenship in a regional 
polity' . 
121 
This moves substantially further towards cosmopolitanism than the rationalist approach 
elucidated earlier. 
The concept has met with criticism from many quarters, including accusations of 
conservatism, suggesting that it offers little potential for introducing radical 
developments in the ways in which international agreements are reached, implemented 
and policed, raising the question of `whether or not Good International Citizenship can 
develop and react quickly enough to emerging global crises. ' 122 It broaches the issue of 
the state system as a `global gangster' 123, `perpetuating the dominance of the leading 
powers in the world and allowing them to avoid their responsibilities to the real citizens 
of the world - individual human beings. ' 
124 Early incarnations of good international 
citizenship face the charge of offering `the appeal of a pragmatic politician's half-way 
house, rather than a radical challenge to our conceptualisations of international 
relations. ' 125 Can argues that `[t]he accepted standard of international morality in 
regard to the altruistic virtues appears to be that a state should indulge in them in so far 
as this is not seriously incompatible with its more important interests. ' 126 Consequently, 
those nations which are more secure and wealthy can afford to behave more 
altruistically than those concerned over their security. This, therefore, provides the 
basis, such as it is, for the assumption of some major powers that their policies are 
morally more enlightened than those of other countries. Echoing Brown's critique of 
human rights, Bertrand Russell once said that `[e]thical notions are very seldom a cause, 
121 Linklater, 2006, p. 246. These points refer to the conduct of relations within Europe, but can 
also be considered within international politics. 
122ibid. p. 46 
123 ibid. p. 47. The term `global gangster' was coined by Ken Booth. 
124 ibid. 
John Williams: `Good International Citizenship' from Nigel Dower, John Williams (eds. ) 
2002: Global Citi. -cnship: A Critical Reader, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, p. 50 
126 Can, 1939, p. 202 
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but almost always an effect, a means of claiming universal legislative authority for our 
own preferences, not, as we fondly imagine, the actual ground of those preferences. ' 127 
However, good international citizenship places individuals on the international stage, 
emphasising their importance, their rights and their duties, consequently indicating a 
move away from the realist prioritising of state pre-eminence and the blatant disguise of 
vested interests. The conservative accusation is particularly relevant in cases where 
governments of developed countries are evidently unwilling to restrain the activities of 
transnational corporations, suggesting that the concept is actually about entrenching and 
legitimising existing locations and distributions of power. 128 Williams argues that: 
the need, rooted in English School theory, to protect order-generating 
aspects of states-systemic practice out of fear of descending into the 
Hobbesian abyss of chaos may well hamstring Good International 
Citizenship in the face of non-state based challenges such as the 
environment and, perhaps to a lesser extent, development. 129 
Williams also considers that the ability of the concept to provide direction and purpose 
to foreign policy `in a way which protects order but without ruling out justice or 
condemning it to an inevitable second place remains too restricted by the corset of 
established understandings of the states system to adequately address the global 
challenges we face. ' 130 These two points focus on a potential weakness in the concept, 
particularly if it remains rooted in the conventional understanding of the states system. 
This raises the important question of how good international citizenship might be 
defined in terms of agency. The framework being developed here applies it on a state to 
state level as it will analyse the responses of the international community to conflict, 
and also because Habermas implicitly refers to a state model, but its core dialogic 
principles can be applied more broadly to other collective actors such as transnational 
communities, global civil society actors, and international governance organisations. 
131 
Indeed, one of the criticisms of Dunne and Wheeler's concept is that it does not 
critically question the role of the state. 
'Z' ibid. p. 87 
128 Williams, 2002, p. 47 
129 ibid. 
130 ibid. 
131 I would argue that Linklater's advocacy of multiple layers and types of political community 
and association supports such a wider definition of good international citizenship. See Chapter 
6 for further discussion. 
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It is an attractive concept to many who endorse the society of states, because it 
seemingly allows emerging global issues such as the environment, human rights, 
terrorism and political freedom to be addressed in a more normative manner, but 
without requiring the prior dismantling of the states system. Although capable of 
responding in cases of extreme need or emergency, good international citizenship, 
perforce, sets the threshold high for any action taken, thus allowing the continuation of 
low-level, although possible wide-spread, abuses to continue `subject only to diplomatic 
appeals and commercial inconvenience. ' 132 However, good international citizenship 
can be interpreted in a much more radical fashion, so that it is not just about entrenching 
the established power of developed countries, but rather demanding new standards to be 
set where previously there were none, or extending existing inadequate provisions and 
involving developing countries. In conjunction with discourse ethics, it can be 
envisaged as the starting point for more radical interpretations of sovereignty, 
intervention and citizenship, despite the lack of a central authoritative governing 
institution or `Leviathan' at the international level, transforming notions of identity, 
policy-making and consultation processes. 
Unsurprisingly, good international citizenship has also met with criticism from 
realists. Power and security concerns must and will always remain paramount for states 
that exist in an anarchical system, so any attempt to inculcate good international 
citizenship into foreign policy is, in their opinion, likely to fail. Realism relies upon a 
state-centric approach based on national interest and expediency. They remain cynical 
about the values of multilateralism offered by good international citizenship, casting 
doubts as to the effectiveness of multilateral institutions when faced with powerful 
states pursuing perceived national interests regardless of international law or the 
resolutions of such institutions. 
Mick Cox suggests that realists can be criticised for their failure to recognise 
how realism's contribution to international stability preserves social and economic 
inequalities within and between societies. 133 Can argues that consistent realism falls 
down because it fails to provide any grounds for purpose or meaningful action; `pure 
realism can offer us nothing but a naked struggle for power which makes any kind of 
international society impossible. ' 134 For realists, states will always manipulate the 
132 Williams, 2002, p. 49 
133 Burchill, 2001, p. 85 
134 Carr, 1939, p. 118 
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language of human rights and internationalism to disguise selfish ends. International 
order is thus sought by achieving a balance of power and assigning certain 
responsibilities to great powers. In the same vein, we can suggest that both realists and 
those good international citizens grounded in the pluralist tradition reify the state and its 
practices, institutions, and mechanisms, making it that much harder for alternatives to 
be put into operation. It assumes that the state is the dominant actor within international 
relations and consequently supposes the state to represent a coherent and unified 
community. Increasingly, the state attempts to retain within its borders many different 
communities, identities, and interests. Alongside this, it establishes the contingent need 
for security and survival making it much harder to alter or escape such a mind-set. 
Jenny Edkins and Maja Zehfuss indicate how the `illusion of the sovereign state in an 
insecure and anarchic international system is sustained and how it might be 
challenged. ' 135 They propose an alternative analysis of world politics; `one that did not 
replace politics with security or justice with order. ' 136 In this light then, it becomes the 
separation of the domestic from the international that would require explanation rather 
than vice versa. 
Can himself was unable to surmount what Morgenthau calls the `immanence of 
power', due to his own relativist and instrumental conception of morals' 37 which stated 
that there was no independent validity to moral argument, but that international law and 
morality were simply tools of the ruling group and thus susceptible to manipulation in 
order to serve their own interests. However, this does not mean that the necessary 
moral starting-point cannot be arrived at. As Bull argues, `[t]he fact that moral 
principles may serve as the instrument of a dominant group within a society does not 
mean that they cannot also function so as to fulfil purposes recognized by the society as 
a whole. "38 By acknowledging Bull's point, we can then move on to expand this idea, 
linking such moral dilemmas and the increasing need for human security with the 
potential offered by discourse ethics. Dialogue and communicative action do not 
provide independent validity to moral argument, but they can, however, provide an 
intersubjective framework with which to assess the moral arguments offered. 
135 Edkins, Zehfuss, 2005: `Generalising the International', Review of International Studies, 
31(3), p. 454 
136 ibid. p. 455 
137 Hedley Bull: The Twenty Years Crisis' Thirty Years On', from Alderson, Hurrell (eds. ) 
2000: Hedley Bull and International Society, UK, Macmillan Press, p. 129 
138 ibid. p. 130 
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2.7 Conclusion 
Although good international citizenship as defined by Dunne and Wheeler 
means well by its aim to emancipate individuals who face repression by states, the 
process of emancipation may be corrupted by the very concept of statehood. Discourse 
theory allows us to recognise the centrality of power to international practice as `from 
colonialism to the Western domination of international institutions, structural power 
shapes the very possibility of meaningful dialogue'. 139 It is crucial that the process of 
legitimation is scrutinised; this is an essential part of the theoretical task for developing 
the criteria for good international citizenship. 140 This is acknowledged in Linklater's 
recent additional criteria for good international citizens who are concerned to minimize 
harm done to members of vulnerable communities: 
the good international citizen may believe there is a strong case for 
unilateral intervention, but doubts about legality require a global dialogue 
to ascertain whether states can agree that supreme humanitarian 
emergencies justify new principles of humanitarian intervention. 141 
Dialogue of this nature may, of course, result in consensus against institutionalising 
humanitarian intervention which solidarists would be bound to accept. Such a move 
would also be likely to indicate other ways, short of the use of force, in which good 
international citizenship could be implemented in order to reduce the presence of harm 
done to those most vulnerable. This paves the way for a closer consideration of the 
kind of dialogue capable of addressing not only the dilemma presented by humanitarian 
intervention but also which offers potential for the prevention of harm or conflict prior 
to its escalation to the point where the use of force becomes pertinent. 
The `good' in good international citizenship is currently, for Dunne and 
Wheeler, linked to the idea of protection for human rights and accepts that these operate 
within a framework that perpetuates a society of states. This is, I have argued, 
insufficient, in that it fails to consult those in whose name foreign policy is conducted, 
or in the case of humanitarian intervention, those it presupposes it will help. The 
emphasis upon human rights adds weight to the claims of `goodness', yet it brings with 
it, largely undebated, the baggage of the human rights discourse. 
'39 Marc Lynch, 2000: `The Dialogue of Civilisations and International Public Spheres', 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 29(2), p. 322-3 
140 Linklater, 1992b, p. 34 
141 Linklater, 2006, p. 254 
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Good international citizenship does not require altruistic sacrifice on the part of 
states, but it does advocate a move towards reassessing the relationship between self 
and other. It indicates a level of responsibility and interdependence that is not 
sufficiently acknowledged by realist paradigms whilst not requiring the universal moral 
imperatives preferred by cosmopolitans. `Good' is, in today's modern/post-modern 
political world, a loaded term, resplendent with political, imperial and cultural 
connotations. It is one, therefore, that should be used with care. Part of an already 
existing concept, it is offered here with caution and a desire to reflect upon what the 
`good' might be and for whom. It does not assume that there is only one `good'. 
Rather than suggest a teleological approach or an absolute standard of `goodness', 
`good' in this context is offered as an open-ended process. It refers to the dialogical 
criteria explained in the next chapter concerning process rather than substantive, explicit 
content or policy. It also raises the question, hinted at earlier, of the `deterritorialisation 
of responsibility'. Although Linklater does not share many of Campbell's post- 
structuralist leanings, he would surely agree with Campbell's argument that `notions of 
ethics and responsibility should not necessarily be linked to those who happen to share 
the arbitrarily demarcated boundaries of the territory of the sovereign state. ' 142 The 
theoretical implications for alterity, contestation and re-negotiation of boundaries, 
identity and inclusion will be addressed in the following chapter. 
'', Shapcott, 2001, p. 66 
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3. Theory: Dialogue as Normative Grounds and Object of Critique 
3.1 Introduction 
A number of problems have been highlighted in Chapters 1 and 2 in relation to 
the intervention in Kosovo which focus on practical issues of exclusion, illegitimate 
behaviour and coercion. Having discussed several approaches emerging from 
international relations paradigms and identified some limitations as regards their critical 
power and normative grounding, we now turn to critical theory in an attempt to develop 
evaluative criteria to identify and analyse problems in international practice such as 
those mentioned above. Habermas's critical theory, notably his discourse ethics, is 
particularly relevant for the attempt to operationalise a communicative approach to the 
difficulties encountered in the intervention debates for several reasons. Not only is 
communication and dialogue central to his theory, but he provides a philosophical 
grounding for it which secures it both a critical and normative orientation. Having 
developed strong normative justifications for the primacy of communication, Habermas 
also locates this firmly within the traditions of critical theory which seeks to retain a 
practical intent; in other words, a recognition of the importance of the relationship 
between theory and practice. Discourse ethics offers regulative criteria for dialogue, yet 
simultaneously encounters a number of difficulties. Following a discussion of discourse 
ethics this chapter reviews several critiques and debates surrounding discourse ethics, 
looking for ways to adapt or adjust the theory in ways which allow it to contribute 
towards the analysis of communicative practices in international relations. 
The central argument advanced in this chapter is that dialogic principles can be 
developed to embrace alterity and difference to a greater extent than is allowed for by 
Habermas. By adopting Benhabib's preference for procedure, and Shapcott's emphasis 
on hermeneutics, it is intended to demonstrate that discourse ethics can be a more 
sensitive and reflexive practice, still with cosmopolitan intentions, than the Kantian 
universalism advocated by Habermas and Linklater. Drawing on a more critical 
awareness of the limitations of the cosmopolitan project as discussed in Chapter 2, it is 
less of a universal requirement than a cosmopolitan intent. Although Linklater 
advocates a `thin cosmopolitanism' and highlights problems with the cosmopolitan 
project as it is currently conceived, focusing particularly on the problems of inclusion 
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and exclusion, his cooption of Habermas's discourse ethics and its implications needs to 
be analysed in more detail, given that it retains the tension apparent in discourse ethics 
between the goal of universal inclusion and a limitation on the forms of both legitimate 
speech and agency. Arguably, this in turn leads towards a thicker conception of 
cosmopolitanism than Linklater suggests. 
There exist important links between the current cosmopolitan and 
communitarian debate within international relations and the debate over Habermas's 
distinction between the right and the good which tie these literatures together closely 
and more explicitly than is sometimes acknowledged. Critics of Habermas have drawn 
on the Hegelian-inspired communitarian position which claims that it is not possible to 
separate conceptions of justice from conceptions of the good life. Contrary to this 
position, cosmopolitans have found intellectual solace in Habermas's preference for a 
universal, often abstract, notion of justice. While these positions rightly raise a number 
of concerns, such groupings are often unhelpful in attempting to address pertinent 
problems in international politics such as inclusion and exclusion. 
This chapter will lay out the key precepts of the Habermasian project necessary 
for the development of this research with its understanding of dialogue as both 
normative grounds and object of critique. It will address the distinction between the 
lifeworld and the system and the consequent distinction between communicative and 
strategic action; the presuppositions of argumentation; the ideal speech situation and 
discourse ethics, and the distinction between the moral and the ethical (the right and the 
good). We will then examine Linklater's application of Habermas and, in particular, 
discourse ethics, to his cosmopolitan project, identifying some areas of concern which 
will lead us to address some of the more significant critiques of Habermas, and 
Linklater's use of his work, providing a shift in focus towards a discourse ethics 
informed by a variety of `other-sensitive' critiques and concentrating on hermeneutics, 
feminisim, and the politics of alterity. 
3.2 Ideal Speech as Normative Grounds 
Forester suggests that the question underlying Habermas's project is how can we 
`understand the social construction and management of political consent? " He argues 
' J. Forester (ed. ) 1985: Critical Theory and Public Life, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 
p. xi 
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that Habermas perceives this question to be related to two key spheres of action: 
technical-instrumental (dealing with problems of control and the ordering of the object 
world) and moral-practical (dealing with problems of legitimacy and the solidarity of 
social relations)'. 2 This distinction is to inform all applications of Habermas's theory. 
Forester's definition of colonization of the lifeworld signals a preoccupation with the 
quality of communication in different spheres of interaction: 
Habermas's notion of colonization is not a matter of voluntaristic action; it 
reflects the structural effects on people's ordinary lives of systemic 
developments: the increasing penetration of economic markets into 
previously nonmarket spheres and increasing concentrations of power in 
the form of private capital or within the bureaucratic labyrinth of the state. 
The catch-phrase systematically distorted communication has long 
suggested Habermas's dual concern with social structure and social 
action. 3 
The lifeworld, then, is concerned with communicative action; it is discursively 
coordinated, whereas the emergence of the system indicates a different kind of 
rationality operating through instrumental or strategic reason (derived from 
Enlightenment reason, scientific/logical positivism). The lifeworld is concerned with 
the symbolic reproduction of cultures, values, social relations and lived experiences: 
`Everyday communicative practice is, as we have seen, embedded in a lifeworld context 
defined by cultural tradition, legitimate orders, and socialized individuals. '4 The system 
encompasses mechanisms such as the economy, the market and bureaucracy. The 
distinction between them is clear: the lifeworld is based on action oriented towards 
understanding, whereas the system is based on action oriented towards success. 5 
The relationship between the system and the lifeworld is developed in 
Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action, where the vulnerability of the lifeworid 
to encroachment by the system and the consequent rationalisation process is discussed. 6 
Habermas argues that when the system encroaches too far into areas of the lifeworld, 
then politics becomes distorted. Colonisation of the lifeworld means the 
systematization of the lifeworld. This recognition of power relations intrinsic to the 
concept of colonization broadens the range of lifeworld sites which can be analysed 
2 ibid. 
3 ibid. p. xiii 
4 Habermas, 1987: Theory of Communicative 
Cambridge, Polity Press, p. 182 
s ibid. p. 183-5 
6 ibid. p. 187 
Action, Vol. 2, (trans. Thomas McCarthy), 
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accordingly. Unlike earlier Frankfurt School theorists, Habermas does not pursue the 
path of pessimism. He believed that by developing communicative structures, the 
instrumentalisation of the lifeworld, and in particular, the public sphere, could be 
reversed, and instrumental rationality would be restricted to the domain of the system. 
Consequently, our main concern here will be that of communicative rationality. The 
distinction he draws between communicative action and strategic action is crucial in 
order to give discourse normative force. 7 The reformulation of rationality along 
communicative lines is seen most clearly in the construction of his ideal speech 
situation. Although it would be a mistake to consider Habermas's notion of an ideal 
speech situation to be a concrete reality, it is, nonetheless, intended to serve as a critical 
tool. Without such a normative ideal, Habermas argues, it is impossible to critique 
current standards of communicative action or recognise distorted communication. 
Grounding communicative action on the fundamental notion of language and our 
intrinsic ability to form consensus through language, the telos of communicative 
rationality, Habermas develops his ideal speech situation in order to be able to 
distinguish genuine communication from false or pseudo-communication. He engages 
in a rational reconstruction of empirical communicative competences. 8 To achieve this, 
it is necessary to consider what linguistic competences are possessed by ordinary 
speakers in order to communicate verbally with other participants. According to 
Bernstein, Habermas believes that `communicative competence is not something we 
possess over and above our ability to speak a language; on the contrary, to understand 
language as such requires a theoretical comprehension of the kinds of understanding 
available through language. '9 Not all forms of language use are aimed towards mutual 
understanding (Habermas's definition of genuine communication), and these other, 
strategic, forms of language use, Habermas considers as `parasitic upon speech oriented 
toward achieving genuine understanding. "o 
This leads us to the question of what constitutes a `consensual speech act'? 
What presuppositions exist which rely upon a background of meaning within the 
lifeworld? Habermas argues, similarly to Kant, that for morals to be universalisable 
they must express a `general will'. Those norms which cannot be expressed as 
'Rasmussen, 1990, p. 38 
8 Universal/formal pragmatics 
9 J. Bernstein, 1995: Recovering Ethical Life: Jurgen Habermas and the future of Critical 
Theory, New York, Routledge, p. 48 
10 ibid. 
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universal laws are invalid. There is an important divergence between Kant and 
Habermas in relation to the manner in which the justification and consequent 
legitimation of norms is arrived at. For Kant, the procedural test for universal 
applicability was decided monologically, through a private reasoning process which the 
individual engaged in with himself. So, whereas Kant's categorical imperative requires 
that an individual should not act in any way but that he or she could will such a maxim 
to become a universal law, Habermas's principle of discourse ethics (D) reflects his 
communicative turn, requiring that his principle of universalization, (U), cannot be 
answered satisfactorily by a single individual, but must take place within an 
intersubjective dialogue. This shift from a monological to a dialogical exercise is 
fundamental in order to continue to justify any notion of the normative cosmopolitan 
project in the face of challenges to it posed by poststructuralists, postmodernists, realists 
and communitarians (among others). Habermas adopts McCarthy's formulation of this 
shift which states that: 
Rather than ascribing as valid to all others any maxim that I can will to be 
a universal law, I must submit my maxim to all others for purposes of 
discursively testing its claim to universality. The emphasis shifts from 
what each can will without contradiction to be a general law, to what all 
can will in agreement to be a universal norm. 11 
This shift means that universalizability is now defined as an intersubjective procedure 
of argumentation; the aim is communicative agreement rather than the Kantian version 
which looked at what each individual rational moral agent could will to be a universal 
maxim for all without contradiction. l' 
For speech to be considered genuine communication, Habermas stipulates four 
validity claims linked to understanding and justifying a norm of action. These are: 
comprehensibility, truth, rightness and sincerity. 13 The background consensus to which 
Habermas refers implies that the speaker implicitly makes these claims and that they 
can be justified if this were required. If, therefore, the validity of any of these claims 
were to be questioned, we could engage in a discourse which would allow us to reach 
11 Habermas, 1990: Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (trans. by Christian 
Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen), Cambridge, Polity Press, p. 67 
12 Benhabib: `Communicative Ethics and Current Controversies in Practical Philosophy', from 
Benhabib, Dallmayr (eds. ) 1995: The Communicative Ethics Controversy, Massachusetts, MIT 
Press, p. 336; Stephen White, 1988: The recent work of Jürgen Habermas, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, p. 49 
13 William Outhwaite, 1994: Habermas: A Critical Introduction, Cambridge, Polity Press, p. 40 
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consensus as to their validity. While we have already mentioned that Habermas does 
not suggest that the ideal speech situation should be realised, it is still more than just an 
ideal as we have to assume its possibility: 
The very act of participating in a discourse, or attempting discursively to 
come to an agreement about the truth of a problematic statement or the 
correctness of a problematic norm, carries with it the supposition that a 
genuine agreement is possible. If we did not suppose that a justified 
consensus were possible and could in some way be distinguished from a 
false consensus, then the very meaning of discourse, indeed of speech, 
would be called into question. 14 
We should now return to look briefly at the validity claims in more detail. 
Comprehensibility requires that what is said is actually intelligible and understandable. 
The claim to sincerity requires that the speaker be honest in what he or she says and that 
we believe the speaker is being honest with us. Truth, according to Habermas, cannot 
be discursively redeemed by a direct comparison between statements and reality as 
advocated by correspondence theories of truth and Enlightenment reason. Rather, truth 
must be `defined in terms of a projected consensus': 
I am entitled to ascribe a predicate to an object if and only if any other 
person who could enter a discussion with me would ascribe the same 
predicate to the same object. ... The condition for the truth of statements is 
the potential agreement of everyone else. '5 
In a similar fashion to rightness, truth claims can only be redeemed by means of 
argumentation and a rational consensus. Rightness requires that what the speaker says, 
and consequently does, is right or appropriate in the light of existing values and norms; 
that there is a normative basis for the utterance. 16 The claim to rightness, therefore, 
places us firmly on the grounds of normatively justified consensus. If challenged, this 
can only be achieved through communicative action oriented towards understanding and 
consensus. What happens when we cannot reach an agreement? Either we can shift 
towards a strategic or instrumental attitude, or we can break off communication 
altogether and resort to force. Habermas, however, offers an alternative to these 
scenarios, suggesting that we can enter into a different type of communicative 
interaction, where contested truth and rightness claims are `treated as hypotheses in 
need of thoroughgoing justification and defence. ' This opens up a new form of 
14 Forester, 1985, p. xvi, citing Thomas McCarthy 
15 Outhwaite, p. 41, citing Habermas 
1" Bernstein, 1995, p. 49 
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reflective communication called 'discourse': `As opposed to ordinary communication 
('interaction'), the goal of discourse is systematically to examine and test problematic 
truth and normative claims in their own right. ' 17 It is intended to allow participants to 
reach a `rationally motivated consensus' concerning controversial claims. '8 Habermas's 
argument concerning the presuppositions involved in speech acts - truth, sincerity, 
meaningful and right/justified - are compelling when one considers, for example, the 
concept of lying. ' 9 Lying, as a social concept, would be meaningless if we did not 
assume that certain validity-claims were intrinsic to speech acts. 
There are certain pragmatic rules which constitute an ideal speech situation or a 
discourse free from distorted communication which derive from Habermas's principle 
of Universalization (U) and his principle of discourse ethics (D). Norms and values 
which are manifested in particular societies must, for Habermas, conform to (U) which 
states that: 
Every valid norm has to fulfil the following condition: All affected can 
accept the consequences and the side-effects its general observance can be 
anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone 's interests (and these 
consequences are preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for 
regulation). 20 
(U) cannot operate alone however, and requires the intersubjectivity afforded by 
principle (D) which states that: 
Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the 
approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical 
discourse. 21 
These principles can be broken down further into procedural elements. There are two 
conditions of ideal speech which Benhabib calls the symmetry condition and the 
reciprocity condition. The symmetry condition concerns speech acts while the 
reciprocity condition refers to existing action contexts. 22 The symmetry condition refers 
to two rules for practical discourse: 
first, each participant must have an equal chance to initiate and to continue 
communication; second, each must have an equal chance to make 
17 ibid. p. 50 
18 Benhabib, 1986: Critique, Norm and Utopia, New York, Colombia University Press, p. 284 
19 Wyn Jones: On Emancipation: Necessity, Capacity, and Concrete Utopias', Booth, (ed. ) 
2005, p. 224. See also Richard Bernstein, 1995,52 
20 Habermas, 1990, p. 65 
21 ibid. p. 66 
22 Benhabib, 1986, p. 285 
96 
assertions, recommendations, and explanations, and to challenge 
23 justifications. 
The reciprocity condition refers to a set of relations that should exist between 
participants24: 
all must have equal chances as actors to express their wishes, feelings, and 
intentions; and fourth, the speakers must act as if in contexts of action 
there is an equal distribution of chances "to order and resist orders, to 
promise and to refuse, to be accountable for one's conduct and to demand 
"25 accountability from others. 
These `procedural rules express (D) and are those whereby (U) is achieved. '26 
Bernstein adds that `if argument is not to be constrained by the existing assumptions of 
any particular linguistic framework, then each must have the freedom to radicalize the 
discourse by moving it to higher levels of abstraction and reflection, which in turn may 
require the modification of the originally accepted conceptual framework. 27 All 
participants must be motivated by the desire to reach a consensus about the truth of 
statements and the validity of norms and discourse should be free from coercion or 
constraint. The ideal speech situation also requires that the `force of the better argument 
prevails'. Habermas argues that these criteria are anticipated in every act of 
argumentation. The ideal speech situation effectively forms an ideal of fair 
communication, offering a position from which to evaluate social practices, and in 
particular, to assess the legitimacy of norms. In response to critics who argue that it is 
not possible to communicatively ground moral principles, Habermas responds 
compellingly that the `ethical skeptic' will involve himself in a performative 
contradiction: 
The proponent asserts the universal validity of the principle of 
universalization. [ ... T]he opponent concludes that attempts to ground the 
universal validity of principles are meaningless. This the opponent calls 
the principle of fallibilism. But the opponent will have involved himself 
in a performative contradiction if the proponent can show that in making 
his argument, he has to make assumptions that are inevitable in any 
argumentation game aiming at critical examination and that the 
propositional content of those assumptions contradicts the principle of 
fallibilism. This is in fact the case, since in putting forward his objection, 
'3 ibid. 
24 Blaug, 1999, p. 11 
25 Benhabib, 1986, p. 285 
' Blaug, 1999, p. 11 
27 Bernstein, 1995, p. 49 
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the opponent necessarily assumes the validity of at least those logical rules 
that are irreplaceable if we are to understand his argument as a refutation. 28 
Despite discourse ethics being a universalistic moral theory, Habermas still accepts the 
fallibility of discursive practices. In other words, any agreement reached today 
concerning the validity of a claim does not mean that in the light of further information, 
reinterpreted needs or changing social conditions, agreement will still hold tomorrow. 
It may well be necessary to enter into discourse again. 29 In this sense, it is important to 
highlight once more that what Habermas is offering here is a set of `universally valid 
procedural criteria appropriate to judging the justness of proposed norms', not the 
substantive content of those norms. 30 
The emphasis in discourse ethics, which encapsulates the ideal speech situation, 
is on procedure. Habermas claims that the processes that constitute discourse ethics, as 
identified earlier, do not determine or ascertain any particular outcome. The outcome 
can only be determined by the participants themselves. Habermas argues that discourse 
ethics is concerned with both needs and wants, and the respective problems of inclusion 
and exclusion. As the `revision of values used to interpret needs and wants' draws on 
intersubjectively shared traditions, this cannot be a decision taken monologically. 31 
Practical discourse is conceived as: 
the public practice of a shared, reciprocal taking over of perspectives: 
everyone finds him- or herself required to take over the perspective of 
each other person, in order to test whether a ruling is also acceptable from 
the perspective of everyone else's understanding of the world and of 
themselves. 2 
For Habermas, the dialogical engagement is a process of both `making and finding'. 33 
As new forms of suppression are revealed and stripped away, then new understandings 
can develop, based on the concepts of moral or normative learning and the discourse 
criterion that no-one may enter discourse with preconceptions as to what they might 
learn or from whom. 
28 Habermas, 1990, p. 80-1 
29 Kenneth Baynes, 1992: The Normative Grounds of Social Criticism: Kant, Rawls and 
Habermas, Albany, State University of New York Press, p. 114 
30 White, 1988, p. 50 
3' Habermas, 1990, p. 68 
3' Habermas in Peter Dews, 1992: Autonomy and Solidarity: Interviews it'ith Jürgen Habermas, 
London, Verso (2°d end), p. 251 
33 Bernstein, 1995, p. 55 
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Interaction and learning are both important parts of Habermas's theory of 
communicative action. However, the reproduction of certain interactions does not 
necessarily constitute `learning'. Forester suggests that if `a policy encouraging oil 
exploration reproduces consumer-monopolist interactions on the market, consumers and 
suppliers may exchange signals, but little learning will take place. '34 The information 
offered by the market is likely to be distorted and misrepresentative of "`true costs of 
production" -a fact that the consumer will never learn as a participant in a monopoly- 
dominated interaction. ' 35 The kinds of `imperfect communication' that might be 
considered as interactions include bargaining, negotiation and arbitration. Ordinary 
communicative action concerns the `recreation in everyday life of particular relations of 
belief-construction, consent-granting, trust-giving, and attention investment 36 ; 
consequently whilst interactions can reproduce particular patterns of knowledge, 
awareness, trust and consent, they do not guarantee learning nor can they step outside of 
these interactions in order to challenge them. The question Forester raises here 
demonstrates the relevance of Habermas's theory of communicative action to everyday 
practice; how are we able to distinguish between true social, political and economic 
learning and manipulation and deliberate distortion? While ordinary communicative 
action is also based on the aforementioned validity claims, discourse ethics provides the 
theoretical tools with which to test these claims without the threat of coercion or 
constraint. The ability to identify social, political or economic constraints on discourse 
offers access to a powerful account of political legitimacy. 
Habermas's distinction between the `right' and the `good' is particularly evident 
in his theory of communicative action. The subject of much debate, it is necessary to 
refer briefly to this distinction in order to place the following arguments and 
reconstruction of discourse ethics in context. This clarification is required because 
discourse ethics is primarily concerned with justice rather than addressing questions of 
the good or happiness. Ferrara's explanation of Habermas's tripartite model of 
discourse is helpful in untangling the distinction between the right and the good. These 
three types relate to Habermas's notion of the three different types of world: objective, 
social, and subjective. Respective types of discourse are pragmatic, ethical and moral, 
34 Forester: `The Policy Analysis - Critical Theory Affair: Wildavsky and Habermas as 
Bedfellows? ', Forester (ed. ), 1985, p. 265 
35 ibid. 
36 ibid. p. 267 
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and they `address different understandings of the same paradigmatic practical question: 
`What should I do? "37 Pragmatic discourses approach the question from the 
perspective of strategic or instrumental action, so seeks to find the `best way of attaining 
what is useful. '38 Ethical discourses approach the question from the `perspective of a 
life-project oriented to one's own good. '39 Moral discourses are those which take place 
when the actions of an individual begin to `violate the interests of others and to lead to 
conflicts which stand in need of a consensual regulation. 40 The individual now has to 
determine whether everyone else would also agree on the choice of a particular course 
of action. 
Habermas adheres to this distinction despite criticisms because he intends his 
theory to be limited; he does not wish it to become the means of dictating how people 
should live their lives in concrete situations. The `good' refers to subjective and 
identity-forming issues. It refers to aesthetics, tastes and preferences. Religion is a 
pertinent example; it belongs to the `good' because it is based on faith and not grounded 
in reason. For Habermas, the `good' lays out a sphere of autonomy where individuals 
cannot be told how to live or what to believe. The `moral' however, is based on 
normative claims of rightness. It deals with `moral questions, which can in principle be 
decided rationally in terms of criteria of justice or the universalizability of interests. '41 
Such questions are those which have a greater impact on the social intersubjective world 
and are those which result in binding decisions. Redeemed in `discourse' through 
reasons, such issues are subject to the `force of the better argument'. In response to 
critics such as Gilligan who argues that this distinction privileges certain orientations 
over others (e. g. formalism and justice over the ethics of care and responsibility), 
Habermas acknowledges that it is problematic. However, he argues that the question of 
the: 
context-specific application of universal norms should not be confused 
with the question of their justification. Since moral norms do not contain 
their own rules of application, acting on the basis of moral insight requires 
the additional competence of hermeneutic prudence, or in Kantian 
terminology, reflective judgement. 42 
37 Alessandro Ferrara, 1999: Justice and Judgement, London, Sage Publications, p. 43 
38 ibid. 
39 ibid. 
40 ibid. 
41 Habermas, 1990, p. 178 
42 ibid. p. 179-80 
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The distinction Habermas draws between justification and application, allows, for him 
at any rate, the satisfaction of both types of demands. Effectively, this distinction states 
that we cannot apply the same kind of judgement to individual ways of life as we can to 
a specific norm. 43 We cannot, Habermas argues, expect a generally valid answer when 
we ask what is good for me, or good for them. Instead, only the question `what is 
equally good for all? ' can be impartially assessed, referring to those `action-related 
conflicts which can be resolved with reference to a generalizable interest; those which 
are questions of justice. '44 Fishkin implies a question to Rawls that we might well 
imply to Habermas: if `we were each to import our own particular conceptions of the 
good into the original position, the basis for any unanimous agreement would have been 
lost. '45 It is not that ethical questions are less important, simply that they can only be 
judged from the perspective of the particular. Such a distinction erects certain 
limitations around Habermas's theory, limitations which are both useful, as in the 
retention of self-determination and autonomy46, and problematic, as with Gilligan's 
argument that it privileges certain ways of thinkingibeing over others, or the idea that 
we can ever know what is `moral' or `equally good for all'. 
Benhabib draws a distinction between universalizability as a procedure for 
testing maxims and for generating them. In so doing, she argues that communicative 
ethics is a powerful tool when considered as a `procedure for testing the intersubjective 
validity of moral principles and norms of action', however, as `a procedure for 
generating valid principles of action, the model of moral conversation is a necessary but 
insufficient test case that requires, in any given instance, adequate contextualization'. 47 
Habermas's work on discourse and communicative action seeks to locate 
emancipation in processes of argumentation and consensus. It is an appropriate means 
with which to both challenge and contribute to the concept of good international 
citizenship because it offers the conditions under which agents can address the key 
question in international relations: how should we respond to a variety of intersocietal, 
43 Habermas also argues that `in modernity, the plurality of individual life-projects and 
collective life forms cannot be prejudged philosophically, because ways of living are handed 
over to the responsibility of socialized individuals themselves, and can only be assessed from 
the standpoint of a participant, the element which can convince everyone is narrowed down to 
the procedure of rational will-formation itself. ' Dews (ed. ), 1992, p. 248 
44Habermas in Dews, 1992, p. 248-9; Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1, p. 73 
45 James Fishkin, 1992: The Dialogue of Justice: Towards A Self-Reflective Society, New 
Haven, Yale University Press, p. 84 
46 Robert Wolff, 1970: In Defense ofAnarchism, New York, Harper & Row Publishers, p23-7 
47 Benhabib, from Benhabib, Dallmayr (eds. ) 1995, p. 341 
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interethnic or interstate conflicts? A dialogical approach encourages individuals/groups 
as members of societies to negotiate their needs and interests without harming each 
other by granting everyone equal access to and equal voice in decision-making 
procedures that may affect them. I concur with Forester's argument which, like 
Habermas more recently, steps back from the concept of an `ideal speech situation'. 
Although acknowledging that communication is always imperfect and not a goal to be 
realized concretely, `deviations from the formal idealization might still be usefully 
identified and assessed'. 48 By understanding and acknowledging the power of 
discourse, and by adopting Habermas's distinction between communicative and 
strategic action, we are able to use this to analyse how dialogue plays a role in conflict 
and inequality. 
Habermas offers us a powerful critical and evaluative tool with his ideal speech 
situation. Such an ideal of complete participation allows us to examine the legitimacy 
of real moments of participation. In addition, because the validity claims transcend any 
particular context, justifications are less easily distorted in order to legitimise certain 
particular interests. Habermas's distinction between the moral and the ethical ensures 
that the theory is self-limiting, preventing discourse from regulating the sphere of the 
ethical as well. Discourse ethics offer regulative criteria which allow us to separate the 
procedural from the substantive, suggesting that it is more concerned with `the method 
of justifying moral principles than with the substantive content of those principles'. 49 
3.3 Discourse Ethics and International Relations 
Linklater provides one of the most comprehensive attempts to elaborate a form 
of cosmopolitanism deeply influenced by Habermasian discourse ethics. Linklater's 
project is unapologetically cosmopolitan and universalist; however, he engages in a 
rethinking of the cosmopolitan project in order address the problem of `difference' in 
international relations. He talks of a triple transformation of political community which 
is concerned with creating and enhancing social relations which are more 
`universalistic, less unequal and more sensitive to cultural difference. '50 His vision of a 
cosmopolitan community which is sensitive to the construction of communities and how 
this may systematize problems of inclusion and exclusion is not blind to the totalising 
48 Forester, 1985, p. xv 
49 Richard Devetak: `Critical Theory', Burchill et al. 2001, p. 173 
50 Linldater, 1998, p. 7 
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potential of universalism. Rebuilding the critical project in the light of Kant and Marx, 
recognising and reworking the weaknesses in their respective theories, requires a shift 
towards more inclusive communication communities which creates space for dialogue 
between radically different individuals and communities. Thus, he is concerned to 
make the case for a `thin cosmopolitanism', a cosmopolitanism which is accepting of 
difference, and argues that Habermas's discourse ethics offers the potential to address 
problems raised by both the cosmopolitan and communitarian literatures. Linklater's 
critical theory-inspired notion of emancipation requires that the cosmopolitan 
community be constituted discursively. He attempts to expand the values of the polis 
into the international sphere, whilst simultaneously striking a balance between 
universalism and particularism principally through the discursive dimension drawn from 
Habermas. 
Linklater identifies two versions of the discourse position. The thick version 
holds that all individuals are equally entitled to live in societies which recognise an 
equal right to representation. This effectively implies that all societies should evolve 
towards liberal democracies. 51 The thin version, the version being developed in this 
thesis, takes the position that all individuals have a right to be consulted about decisions 
made outside their society which have adverse effects on them. 52 This raises a number 
of problems: how do we know in advance who will be affected, what the specific 
consequences of a norm might be, or how we can include the all-affected into processes 
of practical discourse. The inclusion of all who may be affected is related to the notion 
of competence. Who may be considered a competent actor? Dahl addresses both the 
issue of `all those who may be affected' and competence as two sides of the same coin 
when he discusses the idea of contingent citizenship, whether it be based on history or 
competence. Dahl argues that `all adults should be included, subject only to such 
exceptions as may fail to satisfy the presumption of personal autonomy. [Thus, ] The 
demos must include all adult members of the association except transients and persons 
proved to be mentally defective. ' 53 This argument pays insufficient attention to the 
power relations implied by this conceptualisation as the issue is surely not precisely 
51 Linklater, 2005: `Dialogic Politics and the Civilising Process', Review of International 
Studies, 31(1), p. 144 
52 ibid. 
53 Robert Dahl, 1989: Democracy and Its Critics, New Haven, Yale University Press, p. 120- 
131. 
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who is able to participate as Dahl indicates54, but rather how the notion of `affected 
interests' is defined and by whom. 55 
The `thin' version preferred by Linklater does not require that principles of 
liberal democracy be imposed upon unwilling communities, thus avoiding accusations 
of ignoring cultural differences and unwarranted interference. Linklater acknowledges 
that `the discourse theory of morality does not have universal validity. Efforts to 
globalise the perspective may withhold recognition from ethical points of view found in 
non-liberal societies. '56 The more minimalist position requires that members of a 
society `should be less concerned with passing normative judgement on domestic 
practices elsewhere than with investigating the ways in which their actions destroy, 
frustrate, demean or in other ways harm other peoples. '57 In a move that is similar to 
Benhabib's concept of `democratic iterations', Linklater argues that dialogic 
frameworks offer the means to allow those who have been excluded from discourse or 
the decision-making processes to be included or to influence the discourse. 58 His 
concern lies in engaging those who may have been systematically excluded from 
dialogue and therefore have been unable to voice their own interests or how they may 
have been harmed by particular social policies or practices. He argues that this 
requirement to engage with those who have been excluded is implicit in the ideals of 
citizenship. 
Linklater suggests that Habermas: 
universalise[s] ideas about consent and dialogue which are intrinsic to 
citizenship in the domestic domain, enlarge the meaning of citizenship by 
conferring rights of participation on every member of the species, and 
maintain that every individual is obliged to widen the sphere of moral 
responsibility to embrace the entire species. 59 
Criticism that good international citizenship is simply yet another attempt to impose 
Western ideas of governance is ameliorated by developing it in concert with the notion 
sa ibid. p. 129 
55 Parekh, 2003, p. 5 
56 Linklater, 2005, p. 143 
57 ibid. 
58 ibid. p. 145; Benhabib, 2004, Judith Butler in Cohen (ed. ), 1996, and Fine, 2003a 
59 Linklater, 1992b, p. 32. In the context of the aim of this research, it is preferable to see 
Habermas's pragmatic rules of fairness not as an individual right or entitlement to inclusion 
which its link with citizenship might suggest, but rather as focused on the conditions of 
legitimacy of the discourse: thus the onus is then on the institutions of democracy/international 
community to find ways to include individuals if they and their justifications for action wish to 
be legitimate. See Blaug, 1999, p. 45-6 
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of discourse ethics which argues that all individuals should have the right to be 
consulted about decisions which may adversely affect them. Without this notion of 
potential consent, then decisions cannot be made legitimately. The thin version of 
discourse does not require conformity to the dominant perspective, but rather requires 
that `all individuals have a right to be consulted about decisions made outside their 
society which disadvantage them. '60 As dialogue and consent gradually replace 
domination and force as determining factors in international relations, then, Linklater 
argues, we can move towards an approximation of the normative ideal of a universal 
communication community. 
Linklater is one of an increasing number of scholars who have attempted to 
explore what communication and `good conversation' might mean in international 
relations. He argues that Habermas's discourse ethics is appropriate for "post- 
Westphalian" forms of community in which radically different agents `are equally free 
to express their moral claims, able to explore the prospects for solving their moral 
differences and capable of reaching an appropriate compromise in the absence of 
consensus'. 61 Linklater draws on Habermas's work, particularly that of discourse 
ethics, for several reasons. It enables him to develop critical international theory; to 
`contribute to the philosophical defence of moral universalism'; and to develop his 
concept of cosmopolitan community. 62 Discourse ethics is particularly apt because it 
offers both procedure to govern just conversation, and a normative and philosophical 
justification for discourse as a means. However, several problems have been 
highlighted in relation to Linklater's attempt to construct a dialogic cosmopolitanism 
which attempts to respond to critiques of the homogenising power of universalism, 
suggesting that the thin universalism he advocates may not be as thin as he claims. 
3.4 Adapting Discourse Ethics 
Despite Linklater's intention to establish a `thin' cosmopolitanism, he is unable 
to avoid some of the same critiques to which Habermas has been subjected. Ironically, 
Haacke suggests that Linklater enacts various strategic moves in order to establish a 
transformative effect on international politics. Such strategic acts (common to many 
60 Linklater, 2005, p. 144 
61 Linklater, 1998, p. 92 
Richard Shapcott, 2002: `Cosmopolitan Conversations: Justice, Dialogue, and the 
Cosmopolitan Project', Global Society, 16(3), p. 224 
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forms of cosmopolitanism), Haacke claims, include the granting of international or 
global citizenship to individuals as well as the opening of regional supranational 
institutions to outsiders. 63 Arguably, these do not fall within the Habermasian project to 
develop procedural frameworks for discourse. As Haacke points out, it is difficult to 
see how such moves would command legitimacy unless they are established through a 
practical discourse and not established strategically. Dryzek similarly declares that 
`critical theory renounces instrumental manipulation of social conditions - even in 
pursuit of manifestly desirable ends. ' 64 
Returning to Linklater's `thin universalism' and his definition of the procedures 
of dialogue, he states that these include the convention that `no person and no moral 
position can be excluded from dialogue in advance, and the realisation that authentic 
dialogue requires a particular moral psychology. '65 By matching his position so closely 
to Habermas's discourse ethics, he becomes vulnerable to Hopgood's charge that it 
`presumes people are at least minimally liberal (other-regarding, egalitarian) in the first 
place. ' Hopgood goes further and argues that the `very act of establishing a universal 
communication community of equals in reality clashes with any number of existing 
social and cultural norms. '66 Linklater tries to ameliorate this by acknowledging the 
potential for a universal communication community to be Western and thus 
ethnocentric, and claims that `most cultures recognise that the differences between 
insiders and outsiders are not always decisive. '67 Furthermore, some `notion of 
answerability to others, and some sense of an obligation to engage outsiders in dialogue 
about matters which concern them deeply, may not be universally accepted but they are 
widely supported across the world nonetheless. ' 68 
Hopgood's argument is developed further by Shapcott who argues that 
Habermas's model, and Linklater's, is potentially exclusionary or assimilative. 
Recognising that a universal communication community is likely to be an impossible 
goal because a `universal community, one that in principle includes all members of the 
63 J. Haacke: `Theory and Praxis in International Relations: Habermas, Self-Reflection, Rational 
Argumentation' 1996, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 25(2), p. 279 
6a John Dryzek, 1987: `Discursive Designs: Critical Theory and Political Institutions', American 
Journal of Political Science, 31, p. 664-5 
65 Shapcott, 2002, p. 224 
66 Stephen Hopgood: `Reading the Small Print in Global Civil Society: The Inexorable 
Hegemony of the Liberal Self, 2000, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 29(1), p. 10 
67 Linklater, 1998, p. 101 
68 ibid. p. 102 
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species, must, by virtue of being a community, exclude or deny important differences 
amongst its members', Shapcott nonetheless argues that communicative models offer a 
better resolution than other frameworks to the tension between community, inclusion 
and difference identified within the cosmopolitan and communitarian debates. 69 
Shapcott raises two fundamental problems with the conception of dialogic communities 
within the cosmopolitan project as advocated by Habermas and Linklater, arguing that it 
is `potentially exclusionary of radical difference in at least two ways; in relation to the 
topics of conversation and to the conception of agency required for just conversation. ' 70 
Shapcott articulates these two main problems in context of what Hutchings calls the 
Kantian paradox of `limitation and legislation'. This refers to the way in which it 
simultaneously `legitimates and encourages freedom of speech, while arguing that only 
certain speech is legitimate' "71 
Linklater advocates a universal and unconstrained dialogue of equals in which 
`no person and no moral position can be excluded from dialogue in advance'. 72 This 
dialogue however, must take a certain form. The implementation of dialogue in 
accordance with discourse ethics requires that people must be willing to enter into 
dialogue and to be motivated by finding consensus; no position can be excluded in 
advance and people must be willing to be guided by the force of the better argument. 
Dialogue requires that there be no pre-determination of the outcome and that all 
members of the dialogue should be open to each others' perspectives and able to reflect 
upon their own embedded positions. Such dialogue implies that `there is no certainty 
about who will learn from whom. '73 These characteristics form what Habermas calls a 
`post-conventional morality', a term derived from Kohlberg's stages of development 
which distinguish three levels of moral consciousness: 
69 Shapcott, 2002, p. 223 
Although Habermas offers a theory with universal intentions, some argue that his discourse 
ethics is informed by a specific German, and continental, philosophy and politics, thus falling 
prey to the particular and re-creating the tension between the universal and the particular. 
Habermas himself would acknowledge the German roots of his thought, although he argues that 
his horizons have broadened somewhat. Dews, 1992, p. 148; Danilo Zolo, 2002: Invoking 
Humanity: war, law and global order, New York, Continuum, p. 81 
70 Shapcott, 2002, p. 223. The consensus required by the telos of (U) means that conversation is 
restricted primarily to the `right' (p. 106). 
71 ibid. p. 224, citing Hutchings 
72 Link-later, 1996: `Citizenship and Sovereignty in the Post-Westphalian State', European 
Journal of International Relations, 2(1), p. 86 
73 ibid. p. 86 
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the preconventional level, on which only the consequences of actions are 
judged, the conventional level, on which the orientation to norms and the 
intentional violation of them are already judged, and finally the 
postconventional level, on which norms themselves are judged in light of 
principles. 74 
Habermas's own definition of postconventional morality is also useful to set out in 
terms of the discussion that will follow: 
The concept of the capacity to act that develops at the post-conventional 
stage of interaction makes it clear that moral action is a case of 
normatively regulated action in which the actor is oriented toward 
reflectively tested claims to validity. Intrinsic to moral action is the claim 
that the settling of action conflicts is based on justified reasoning alone. 
Moral action is action guided by moral insight. [... ] Only at the 
postconventional stage is the social world uncoupled from the stream of 
cultural givens. 75 
For Habermas, such a standpoint is necessary in order to learn how to conduct social 
life in a consensual manner. Linklater places this perspective in context of International 
Relations and contrasts it with pre-conventional and conventional standpoints: 
Pre-conventional morality exists when actors obey norms because they 
fear that non-compliance will be sanctioned by a higher authority; 
conventional norms are observed because actors are loyal to a specific 
social group; post-conventional morality occurs when actors stand back 
from authority structures and group membership and ask whether they are 
complying with principles which have universal validity ... Post- 
conventionalism demonstrates a capacity for ethical reflexivity in which 
agents recognise that moral codes are malleable social products rather than 
immutable conventions to which they must submit. 76 
This brings us to Shapcott's primary concern, raised already by Hopgood, which 
is that the `Habermasian understanding of the conditions of universal moral dialogue 
are unnecessarily restrictive at the level of agency. ' For Habermas, a post-conventional 
moral perspective requires a commitment to universal discourse. Post-conventional 
ethics `requires a reflective orientation towards the forms of unjust exclusion which 
subjects have created in the process of pursuing interests and protecting valued 
differences' and the inclusion in dialogue of those who have been excluded. 77 This 
requires a particular conception of agency in order to be able to participate and suggests 
74 Habermas, TCA, Vol. 2, p. 174. For Kohlberg's specific stages of development see White, 
1988, p. 66-8. The three stages reflect different levels of reflexivity. 
75 Habermas, 1990, p. 162 
76 Shapcott, 2002, p. 226-7, citing Linklater 
77 Linklater, 2005, p. 20 
108 
that only those who are able to `conform to a specific ideal of reason' are able to 
participate in dialogue which, therefore, remains potentially exclusionary. 78 This 
excludes those who may conform to a pre-conventional or conventional consciousness 
and therefore favour traditional social practices and conceptions of the good life from 
participating in reasoned discussion. It also implies that those who inhabit conventional 
or pre-conventional consciousness are immature and need to be freed from such 
moralities in order to be able to engage in conversation, consequently endorsing an 
evolutionary, teleological and developmental account of human agency. 79 In response 
to the question of post-conventional morality, Habermas notes that in the failure to 
identify a shared good, the formal features of the shared situation of deliberation offers 
a way out of the `modern dilemma, since the participants have lost their metaphysical 
guarantees and must so to speak derive their normative orientations from themselves 
alone. ' 80 
Benhabib also acknowledges that discourse ethics presupposes and privileges a 
`secular, universalist reflexive culture in which debate, articulation, and contention 
about value questions as well as conceptions of justice and the good have become a way 
of life'. 8' If we recall Shapcott's argument that justice also occurs at the level of 
identity and recognition, then in this context, the self-other relation is only equal insofar 
as `all have developed the same consciousness. '82 There is then, clearly a sense of 
hierarchy implicit in Habermas's account of agency. This exclusion, or assimilation, is 
arguably aggravated by the goal of critical theory being emancipation, if as is suggested 
by Shapcott, emancipation is not the goal but the prerequisite of dialogue. 83 Shapcott 
argues that: 
despite his efforts to emphasise the openness of conversation, Linklater 
does not appear to have succeeded in adopting the inclusive dimension of 
discourse ethics (D) without simultaneously endorsing the legislative 
aspects that accompany the telos of U. Most importantly, Linklater's 
formulation, like Habermas's, does not rest at defining universalism in 
relation to the inclusion alone but extends it to the process of the 
validation of norms. 84 
78 ibid. p. 227 
79 Shapcott, 2001, p. 119 
80 J. Habermas, 1998: The Inclusion of the Other, Cronin, Ciaran, De Grieff, Pablo (eds. ), 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, p. 41 
81 Benhabib, 1992, p. 42 
82 Shapcott, 2002, p. 230 
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In addition to these objections, critics have raised another important objection 
concerning Habermas's and Linklater's emphasis on the principle (U) which takes us 
closer to the concern raised over the potential range of topics of conversation. Critics 
argue that (U) has greater implications for substantive content than Habermas 
acknowledges and so it is necessary to reject Habermas's aim to seek to define the 
`standpoint from which moral questions can be judged impartially', recognising that it 
may be both impossible and undesirable to find such an Archimedean perspective. 
Benhabib addresses the problem of the implications raised by (U) in a way 
which, she claims, allows us to avoid the charges of `dogmatism and/or circularity'. 85 
Emphasising the procedural aspects of discourse ethics which are evident from 
Habermas's insistence that content can only be determined by the participants, thus 
preventing the theoretical pre-selection of any specific institutional arrangement or 
political model, Benhabib seeks to reformulate universalism as an `interactive 
subjective procedure of argumentation' which encourages reversibility. 86 She puts 
forward two principles to support her formulation: first, the principle of universal moral 
respect, and secondly, the principle of egalitarian reciprocity. The former requires that 
we `recognize the right of all beings capable of speech and action to be participants in 
the moral conversation', while the latter requires that within conversations everyone has 
the `same symmetrical rights to various speech acts, to initiate new topics, to ask for 
reflection about the presuppositions of the conversation'. 87 Key to Benhabib's 
argument is the notion of respect for others which, she argues, develops from processes 
of communicative socialization. In order to defend her argument from claims of 
circularity or dogmatism, she argues that `the presuppositions of the moral conversation 
can be questioned from within the conversation itself, they are placed within the 
purview of argumentation'. 88 
Although Habermas implies awareness of historical contingency, the notion of 
the universal normative `ought' becomes problematic and homogenizing. Benhabib 
concurs that Habermas has gone too far by `insisting that the purpose of 
universalizability procedures in ethics must be the uncovering or discovering of some 
85 Benhabib, 1992, p. 29 
86 ibid. p. 28 
87 ibid. p. 29 
88 ibid. p. 32 
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"general interest" to which all could consent'. 89 Instead, she argues, (D), which states 
that only those norms that meet, or could meet, with the approval of all concerned in 
their capacity as participants in a practical discourse can claim to be valid, is sufficient, 
in conjunction with those rules of argument governing discourse which she has 
summarized as the principles of universal moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity, to 
serve as the only universalizability test. 90 One of the key differences between Benhabib 
and Habermas is the role they attribute to consent. While for Habermas, (U) guarantees 
consent, Benhabib is unsatisfied by this prospect, arguing that the: 
core intuition behind modem universalizability procedures is not that 
everybody could or would agree to the same set of principles, but that 
these principles have been adopted as a result of a procedure, whether of 
moral reasoning or of public debate, which we are ready to deem 
"reasonable and fair. "91 
If we are willing to adopt Benhabib's version of communicative ethics, then we are free 
to place a firmer emphasis on the role of procedure as fairness rather than implying a 
need for consent. She argues that consent should not be interpreted as an end-goal, but 
rather as a `process for the cooperative generation of truth and validity'. 92 As has been 
mentioned, it is unlikely that we either could or would want to specify the `general 
interest', however, discourse ethics, when focusing on process, offers the means to 
reveal the `exclusion and silencing of certain kinds of interests. ' At stake, therefore, is 
`the uncovering of those partial interests which represent themselves as if they were 
general', thus exposing certain kinds of discourses which claim greater legitimacy than 
others. 93 This leads us to move away from a strict interpretation of discourse ethics, 
drawing upon its procedural ethics while combining them with a broader approach to 
practical communication. It moves away from the necessity for universal consensus, 
towards an emphasis on universal participation. The emphasis placed on procedure is 
important for developing either applications of discourse ethics or for integrating a more 
dialogical understanding of politics, legitimacy and decision-making within the 
international sphere. 
Feminist critical theorists have highlighted another crucial critique which affects 
both who is included and the topic of conversation, arguing that gender bias and gender 
89 ibid. p. 9 
90 ibid. p. 37 
91 ibid. p. 37 
92 Benhabib, from Benhabib, Dallmayr, (eds. ), 1995, p. 345 
93 Benhabib, 1992, p. 48 
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blindness is implicit in Habermas's discourse ethics. Hutchings argues forcefully that 
Habermas's `account of the lifeworld/system distinction and the role of the public 
sphere in modernity does little to challenge the liberal private/public distinction. ' 94 
Additionally, Habermas appears to `endorse a conception of the human subject which 
embodies the rationalist bias of the Western philosophical tradition of which feminists 
have been consistently critical. This bias relies on a binary logic in which the feminine 
is denigrated as the `other' of reason'. 95 Benhabib also addresses this issue arguing that 
Habermas's theory relegates women's perspectives of moral life to the private sphere: 
`the restriction of the moral domain to questions of justice [ ... ] result 
in the 
privatization of women's experience and lead to epistemological blindness toward the 
concrete other. '96 It is worth briefly exploring the different ways in which this 
distinction is considered to operate. Gilligan's critique of Kohlberg's account of moral 
development highlighted the fact that men and women may often speak in different 
voices. Her argument was that by associating the higher stages of moral consciousness 
with more abstract principles of justice, this privileges an `objective' or impartial view 
of the public sphere which is free from the distorting influence of the particular or the 
private and grants superiority to abstract notions whilst paying little attention to the 
ethic of care and responsibility. 97 The ethic of care, largely considered to be the 
domain of women, instead focuses on the development: 
of individual family members rather than on the consistent compliance 
with generalisable principles. A highly developed hermeneutic grasp of 
personal character and social context - the very considerations which an 
abstract morality of justice deliberately ignores - is one of the main 
constitutive features of the ethic of care and responsibility. 98 
Although Habermas places greater importance on the morality of justice because of its 
universal nature, and the consequent need to transcend the particular, this by itself, is 
insufficient. Instead, many feminists have argued that `the morality of justice and the 
ethic of care and responsibility are complementary moralities: they should both feature 
94 Kimberly Hutchings, 2005: 'Speaking and hearing: Habermasian discourse ethics, feminism 
and IR', Review of International Studies, 31, p. 156; Nancy Fraser, 1985: `What's Critical about 
Critical Theory? The Case of Habermas and Gender', New German Critique, 35 
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96 Benhabib, 1992, p. 164 
97 Linklater, 1998, p. 68 
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prominently in a just society. '99 Taking up this criticism, Shapcott argues that the 
preference for justice to the exclusion of an `affective' dimension is restrictive and 
exclusive `precisely because it rules out certain topics and concerns, which can 
justifiably be considered moral, from the conversation pre-discursively. " 00 
Consequently, the content of what is considered acceptable dialogue has already been 
decided prior to any engagement with others. 
Removing (U) from the equation also allows us to address this problem, since it 
is possible that conversation might be opened up with a broader focus that is more 
inclusive of difference and which seeks to engage with the other rather than form a 
universal consensus. '01 Young highlights this potential when she discusses the 
transformation that the communicative process can produce in the opinions of 
participants and thus the potential to avoid either the exclusiveness or homogeneity of 
(U). If we assume that: 
communicative interaction means encountering differences of meaning, 
social position, or need that I do not share and identify with, then we can 
better describe how that interaction transforms my preferences. [... E]ach 
position is aware that it does not comprehend the perspective of the others 
differently located, in the sense that it cannot be assimilated into one's 
own. There is thus something to be learned from the other perspectives as 
they communicate their meanings and perspectives, precisely because the 
perspectives are beyond one another and not reducible to a common 
good. 102 
Drawing on Benhabib's terms, this allows us to better recognise concrete identities. 
Echoing earlier arguments and developing the notion of `different voices', 
Young claims that the tendency to restrict democratic deliberation to argument carries 
`implicit cultural biases that can lead to exclusions in practice. Its assumption that unity 
is either a starting point or goal of democratic discussion, moreover, may also have 
exclusionary consequences. 103 She notes, in line with advocates of discourse ethics, 
that deliberative democracy promotes a `conception of reason over power in politics. ' 104 
99 ibid. p. 69 
100 Shapcott, 2002, p. 229 
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However, the deliberative model of communication which we are most familiar with 
and which is implicitly referred to in the literature is derived from Western institutional 
contexts - scientific debate, parliaments, courts etc - ruling institutions, which have 
been predominantly male, white and upper class. Thus, Young's criticism is significant 
as she adds that the `norms of deliberation are culturally specific and often operate as 
forms of power that silence or devalue the speech of some people. ' los Some contexts 
privilege certain speaking styles over others; for example, contestatory, assertive and 
confrontational styles are privileged in parliaments and courts over tentative, 
informative, conciliatory, emotional or explorative styles. Consequently, Young is right 
when she remarks that such formal situations often privilege the right to speak or the 
authority of the well-educated white, middle-class man, rather than other groups in 
society whose voice may not conform to the established requirements and formal rules 
of speech. As a result, if other groups do speak, they may do so in a way which is 
classed as `disruptive'. 106 This refers us back to Bernstein's observation that the 
conditions necessary for an ideal speech situation are social and material rather than 
linguistic. Here it becomes evident that they are both. Young's point has obvious links 
to those made by Benhabib and Hutchings concerning the relegation of the `feminine' 
to the private sphere when she states that: 
[t]he norms of deliberation also privilege speech that is dispassionate and 
disembodied. They tend to presuppose an opposition between mind and 
body, reason and emotion. They tend falsely to identify objectivity with 
calm and absence of emotional expression. Thus expressions of anger, 
hurt, and passionate concern discount the claims and reasons they 
accompany. 1 07 
A more sensitised approach to communication and the ways in which 
communication can operate to exclude alternative forms of speech is particularly 
important when considering dialogue arising out of conflict situations where it is likely 
that anger, hurt and passionate concern may dominate communication, but do not 
necessarily make that communication any less valuable. The ethical-political 
possibilities resulting from interconnections between different levels of discourse 
relating to both an ethic of care and an ethic of justice are illustrated by Elshtain's 
analysis of the case of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayos in Argentina: 
105 ibid. p. 123; Crawford, 2002, p. 416 
106 Young, 1996, p. 124 
107 ibid. 
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The language [the Mothers] spoke was double: the language of a mother's 
loss and the language of human rights, moving from intensely particular, 
yet universally recognized, imperatives of love and terror, to what has 
become a universal and potent political discourse. '08 
In addition, communicative competence as understood to be the ability to reason 
as well as to produce grammatically correct sentences, may exclude the very young, the 
mentally ill or those in too much physical or emotional pain to participate effectively. ' 09 
Young inhabits similar ground to Benhabib as she argues that the conditions for a 
communicative democracy are much thinner that those of shared understandings or the 
goal of finding common goods. The conditions required by a communicative 
democracy - significant interdependence, formally equal respect, and agreed-on 
procedures - have much in common with Benhabib's notion of conversation as 
procedure and her principles of egalitarian reciprocity and universal moral respect. 
Linklater raises several problematic critiques of Habermas's discourse theory, 
including Mouffe's assertion that `Habermas cannot defend the claim that the discourse 
theory of morality is only concerned with the procedures which agents should follow 
and not with advocating any substantive way of life. Her argument is that those 
procedures already privilege a particular vision of the good society. "' 0 In a similar 
vein, Rustin argues that `Habermas has formulated a discourse ethic that is clearly 
situated within the liberal-democratic and state-centred-experience'. 111 Effectively, 
when applied to non-liberal democratic countries, discourse ethics may be 
incomprehensible. This implies notions of assimilation rather than the aim of 
democratic will-formation and universal consensus-building that Habermas might have 
intended. To some extent, reflecting Young's comments, this critique can be mitigated 
by drawing on the hermeneutics of Gadamer. 
Philosophical hermeneutics bears much in common with discourse ethics, yet it 
provides an alternative model which allows us to avoid some of the assimilatory 
potential inherent in discourse ethics. It also conceives understanding as a 
108 White, 1991, p. 112 - citing Elshtain 
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communicative act, `between equal but differently situated agents, in which self and 
other achieve recognition through dialogue. 112 The emphasis on understanding here, 
however, is not on the need for universal consensus, but rather on the experience of a 
new or different truth claim: 
this does not mean that when we listen to someone or read a book we must 
forget all our fore-ground meanings concerning the content and all our 
own ideas. All that is asked is that we remain open to the meaning of the 
other person or text. But this openness always includes our situating the 
other meaning in relation to the whole of our own meanings or ourselves 
in relation to it. 113 
As Gadamer indicates that understanding is in fact interpretation and occurs through 
language, he also emphasises the primacy of dialogue. ' 14 All interpretation and 
understanding take place within the "tradition' or horizon of consciousness constituted 
by the linguistic and historical tradition of the interpreter: the webs of meaning in which 
and through which we experience the world and which are the conditions of possibility 
of understanding. ' lis While philosophical hermeneutics begins from the premise of 
situated agents and particular norms, it does not limit understanding to the boundaries of 
a particular community in the same way as communitarianism. Conversation is not 
limited, because, being `finite and situated beings we must engage in conversation in 
order to learn. ' 116 Gadamer stressed that `understanding is always the fusion of these 
horizons supposedly existing by themselves', from which the prejudices of others are 
not simply obstacles to our understanding, but also a possible means towards it. 1l7 
Habermas captures the concept when he argues that `hermeneutics, then, accord[s] a 
higher position to acting and speaking than to knowing. ' 118 
The `fusion' that Gadamer refers to is not assimilatory, but rather: 
captures the idea that the individual horizons come to occupy the same 
place, while not necessarily losing their particular perspective. 
Understanding involves a fusion in the sense that it does not involve either 
the annihilation or assimilation of existing positions but rather their 
coming to inhabit a shared perspective. 119 
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According to philosophical hermeneutics, a conversation is not motivated by an 
exchange of information or by seeking information for strategic or instrumental 
purposes. It is, instead, "`a process of coming to an understanding" in regards to the 
subject (sache) of conversation. ' 120 Shapcott argues that it shares similar characteristics 
to discourse ethics in the expectation that conversation will be oriented towards 
understanding and truth in terms of what the other has to say concerning the subject. 
With a genuine understanding of another's perspective, then the potential for the 
development of a new perspective as a result of the dialogic encounter emerges, thus 
bringing about a `transformation of our own horizon, that is to say we are changed by 
the conversation. ' 121 It is this ability to perceive the other's perspective that its 
advocates argue offers a more inclusive and non-assimilatory approach to self-other 
relations. Both parties may possess truth, but they recognise that it is a different truth. 
Both sides become listeners and communicators, perceiving each other as equals and yet 
also different. This implies, similarly to discourse ethics, an inclination to learn from 
what the other is saying. 
Where Gadamerian hermeneutics might diverge from Habermas's discourse 
ethics concerns the end result of the conversation. The purpose of a hermeneutic 
conversation, according to Shapcott, `is not the eradication of difference in agreement, 
but instead the understanding of identity and difference through what is common: 
language. ' 122 While Habermas, like Gadamer, distinguishes between moral and 
strategic conversation, highlights the possibility of moral learning and the lack of 
certainty of the outcome, and does not intend that the conversation should be `won' by 
one side or the other, he still indicates that there should be universal consensus. For 
Gadamer, the `Sache (subject) is always a particular thing, text, interpretation, topic. 
Thus, truth is always particular, situated and in reference to some subject. ' 123 
Consequently, agreement on the scale implied by Habermas's principle (U), (i. e. only 
universalizable statements, therefore very few norms would be validated) cannot 
demonstrate the same sensitivity towards alterity and understanding that hermeneutics 
offers. 
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Returning to the issue of agency already raised by Benhabib and Shapcott, we 
can see that hermeneutics provides another critique of Habermas's discourse ethics. 
Whereas Habermas gives preference to, indeed even requires, a post-conventional 
capacity for moral reasoning, hermeneutics `sees reason and understanding through 
dialogue as a capacity of any linguistically constituted agent', not in association with 
particular stages of development or consciousness. 124 For some, this is the assimilatory 
moment of philosophical hermeneutics; however, it arguably reduces it considerably. 
This means that language and understanding do not become exclusionary criteria, but 
rather start from the premise that all humans are linguistically constituted and therefore 
inherently capable of understanding and conversation. For Gadamer, reason is a 
property of tradition, it does not stand in opposition to tradition and prejudice as often 
implied by Enlightenment thinkers. If reason existed prior to the Enlightenment and 
cannot be separated from the context from which it comes, then it is reasonable to 
suggest that reason also operated within the traditions against which the Enlightenment 
set itself up and which it sought to replace with reason. 125 If the ability to reason and 
reflect, to transform understanding in response to conversations with others, are 
properties of understanding which we possess as linguistically constituted agents, then 
Habermas's assignation of these qualities to post-conventional agents is shown to be 
unnecessarily restrictive. It is important to note here that the term `reason' is not used 
in exactly the same way within these approaches: 
Gadamer is not arguing that the capacity for thinking universally and post- 
traditionally in Habermasian terms is a product of all who possesses 
language. He is arguing that reason should be understood as the capacity 
of reflection and change; this does not have to be equated with the capacity 
to be ruled by the unforced force of the better argument, to be 
"rationalised" in Habermas's terms. 126 
If the telos of conversation for discourse ethics is consensus between post- 
conventional agents regarding universalisable principles, then for philosophical 
hermeneutics the purpose of conversation is simply that of hermeneutic understanding. 
In this way we avoid the notion of impartiality required by cosmopolitanism whilst 
recognising that such a claim to theoretical impartiality `obscures real particularity'. 127 
An important consequence of the hermeneutic argument is that `it can relieve the 
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cosmopolitan project of the emancipatory task of seeking to create a realm of similarly 
constituted agents. ' 128 Moreover, it no longer maintains the clear-cut distinction 
between the `right' and the `good', arguing that both are required to engage fully with 
others and that there is no need to remove the private from the purview of dialogue. By 
removing the requirement that dialogue can only address questions of `right' and topics 
that can consequently be universalised, there is a much broader and more inclusive 
conception of conversation and engagement between participants. Here, we see echoes 
of Benhabib's argument that the procedure of conversation alone is sufficient. 
However, it is important not to lose sight of Habermas's intention when he restricted his 
theory to the moral realm; we do not want the `good' to be dictated, rather a greater 
understanding of the relationship between the good and the right both within particular 
contexts and a universal framework. Habermas's criteria for `fair' conversation offer a 
critical tool which hermeneutics does not otherwise have. It is, once again, (U) which 
should be dropped in order to benefit from the critical implications of Habermas's 
discourse ethics whilst utilising it in a more radically inclusive manner. 
Habermas's critique of hermeneutics notes the problem of `linguistic 
idealism'. 129 This refers to the neglect by hermeneutics of the fact that language is not 
just a means of communication with which to mediate and interpret our experiences, but 
also: 
a medium of domination and social power; it serves to legitimate relations 
of organized force. Insofar as the legitimations do not articulate the power 
relations whose institutionalization they make possible, insofar as these 
relations merely manifest themselves in the legitimations, language is also 
ideological. 130 
Bernstein argues that Habermas perceives three idealizations of ordinary language with 
a hermeneutic approach: firstly, by `overestimating the degree of consistency and 
comprehensibility it possess; secondly, by assuming there to be a greater potential for 
communication in a given context than is usually present; and thirdly, by presuming a 
degree of agreement (consensus) among speakers which is almost never exemplified. ' 
131 
Habermas argues that these combine to prevent a critical enough stance being taken and 
thus prevent the possibility of distinguishing between true communication and pseudo- 
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communication or recognising systematically distorted communication. If, `in the face 
of covert domination, social groups or whole societies have adapted to distorted forms 
of communication, hermeneutics would hence be in danger of preserving the status quo, 
rather than helping to achieve emancipation. ' 132 What we require in such situations 
then, in order to retain the sensitivity towards understanding offered by hermeneutics, 
without falling prey to its `blind spots' is a `depth hermeneutic'. What this means is 
that the agent's self-interpretation and interpretation of others is placed into the context 
of social relations and agents are able to reflect upon this context. Social relations are 
considered to operate `like a natural force upon [agents] (but behind their backs), ' 
distorting their communicative actions. 133 The depth-hermeneutic in this context is 
Habermas's analysis of the operation of technological rationality in modem politics and 
it serves to make causes of distorted communicative visible, placing the individual or a 
collective: 
in a position to remove the source of the distortion, and so to give voice to 
the inhibited meanings. The point of such analyses, then, is to allow for 
the abolition of the quasi-causal mechanisms they detect, to allow 
repressed meanings, interests, and desires to be formed and 
communicated. 134 
For Habermas, we can only distinguish between a genuine and a false consensus if we 
presuppose the possibility of the ideal speech situation; understanding needs to be 
linked to the idealising presuppositions of speech. Rasmussen suggests that, in essence, 
discourse ethics is an "ethics of suspicion", that it is suspicious of reliance on tradition 
for determining moral categories. Even traditions such as liberal democracies, which 
have provided a basis for the principles of political discourse, have to be looked at with 
suspicion. 135 
Linklater has accepted some of the critiques of discourse ethics, particularly 
those of Benhabib and others who have suggested that discourse ethics requires a 
hermeneutic perspective. He also goes to greater pains than Habermas to emphasise the 
inclusive nature of a cosmopolitan community. A form of thin cosmopolitanism 
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precludes loyalty to only one sovereign: in `recognising the diversity of social bonds 
and moral ties, a thin cosmopolitan ethos seeks to multiply the types and levels of 
political community; recognising the community of humanity at the same time as it 
recognises regional, national and subnational political associations. ' 136 Connolly also 
takes up these arguments, commenting that convergence might give ground `to the 
pursuit of multiple connections of respect across persisting differences'. 137 He 
distinguishes between concentric pluralism (family, friends, community, state, world) 
and network pluralism. Concentric pluralism allows boundaries to be established more 
easily than a network form which may serve to prevent general gravitation towards 
uniformity. This has similarities to the revival of the neo-medieval idea suggested 
many years earlier by Bull and Carr. 138 Placing dialogue and consent at the heart of 
good international citizenship refutes any assertions of fixed moral hierarchies. 
This raises the question of what the implications of the above critiques of 
Linklater and Habermas are for the definition of citizenship within the concept of good 
international citizenship. On the one hand, a henneneutic understanding of discourse 
implies an understanding of difference in international practice, so it is pluralist (on the 
pluralist-solidarist scale where pluralism acknowledges a tolerance of difference). In 
contrast, a cosmopolitan notion of discourse implies a hope of consensus; a recognition 
or hope of something more than understanding. The revised notion of good 
international citizenship refers to the core notion of the kind of dialogue required and 
seeks to draw on both of these traditions. The difference between Linklater's concept 
and the concept presented here is the process by which we might hope to arrive at 
consensus - for Linklater, it is limited by the exclusive implications of Habermasian 
dialogue, whereas a hermeneutically informed dialogue may still hope for consensus, 
but does so on a different, more inclusive basis. So a hermeneutically informed 
understanding of discourse forms part of an alternate concept of citizenship. In terms of 
international practice, this has implications for both inter-state relations and state-non- 
state relations. Our engagement with the `other' is not motivated by an intent to create 
or realise a particular form of agency or community, but by a responsibility towards 
them. This notion is particularly appealing for rethinking the question of responsibility 
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in connection to contemporary conflicts such as Bosnia and Kosovo because it claims 
that there is no circumstance under which we could declare that it was not our 
concern. 
139 
Bearing in mind Habermas's goal of enlarging human freedom, discourse ethics 
makes no assumptions about human freedom having a finite goal. While some 
restraints on human freedom may be discovered and removed, there may always be 
additional restraints which remain unseen at any particular point in human history. 140 
The same argument can be applied to dialogue, which must accept the importance of 
historicity (the belief that no conceptual system is likely to be true for all time) and the 
realisation that ethical neutrality is impossible. '41 This awareness that there is no pre- 
determined finite goal for dialogue demonstrates the need for `constant attention to the 
danger that a particular world-view will be preferred and others marginalised by every 
effort to characterise ideal discourse. This is essential given the postmodern claim that 
no form of non-coercive deliberation may ever succeed in removing all traces of 
power. ' 142 
A pertinent example of dialogue in relation to conflict is the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission in Rwanda, following the genocide. Parlevliet rightly notes 
that our desire to seek the truth is paradoxical as it seems to indicate that one, non- 
controversial, truth can be established in the face of conflicting versions of the past 
which all claim to be valid. 143 While it is tempting to wander down the road to 
relativism: 
If what is considered true would be completely conditioned by one's 
subjective preferences and the particular context in which one finds 
oneself, it would not be possible to pass judgement on anyone else's view, 
nor on any past period. 144 
Clearly, however, we still value some notion of the truth, particularly in context of gross 
human rights violations and conflict. Normative legislative developments indicate our 
conviction that passing judgement on some actions is both legitimate and desirable. 
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Both Rorty's pragmatism and Habermas can help us in this situation as they emphasise 
the importance of argumentative practice: 
while it may not be possible to specify truth in any detail, it is possible to 
point to conditions in which a search for the truth will most likely be 
successful. 145 
Thus, the emphasis is placed on intersubjectivity. In addition, Habermas offers us 
procedures by which this type of argumentative practice can be implemented and which 
allows us to judge certain actions. The equality implied by Habermas's discourse ethics 
ensures that no one interpretation of events is privileged over any other: 
A definition of the situation by another party that prima facie diverges 
from one's own presents a problem of a peculiar sort; for in cooperative 
processes of interpretation no participant has a monopoly on correct 
interpretation. For both parties the interpretive task consists in 
incorporating the other's interpretation of the situation into one's own in 
such a way that in the revised version "his" external world and "my" 
external world can - against the background of "our" lifeworld - be 
relativized in relation to "the" world, and the divergent situation 
definitions can be brought to coincide sufficiently. 146 
This search for consensus may appear problematic because it requires converging 
understandings of events. However, hermeneutics, as mentioned already, offers us a 
means to temper this interpretive process whilst at the same time retaining Habermas's 
emphasis on procedures for discourse which allows us to pass judgement and legislate 
without falling prey to total relativism. 
A dialogical process such as that encountered through truth and reconciliation 
practices may change the terms of the framework in which knowledge is constructed 
and in which dialogue takes place. To be legitimate, Bellamy argues, such practices 
must highlight the need for as wide a sphere as possible for dialogue, show an 
awareness and respect for the fallibility of past decisions and dominant forms of 
knowledge as well as acknowledging the possibility of their revision, and must prioritise 
adherence to democracy. 147 Such a process draws us back to Young's 
acknowledgement of the value of different types of speech/communication. While such 
a change in the way in which knowledge is constructed may have far-reaching 
consequences, the discourse approach to morality is not only relevant to those who 
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already enjoy liberal security and stability. It can also be one way in which members of 
divided communities can negotiate agreed narratives and shared principles which do 
justice for those who have been affected by structures, policies and decisions which 
have caused unnecessary suffering. 
Shapcott suggests that the communicative approach which rejects the 
cosmopolitan/communitarian divide in International Relations allows us to shift the 
basis of our understanding of justice. Rather than being understood simply in 
distributive terms, there has been a shift towards understanding justice in terms of 
culture, identity and recognition: 
Justice understood as recognition embodies the assumption that inequality 
occurs not only in the realm of material well-being but equally in the realm 
of identities. It suggests that justice should refer to a more complete and 
inclusive account of well-being to include external recognition of identity. 
Justice as recognition conceives ethical questions in terms of how to do 
justice to those who are marginalised or excluded because of their different 
identities or because they are seen as "other". 148 
What Shapcott does with this argument is to make us question the boundaries between 
inclusion and exclusion and how those are decided. 149 By engaging someone in a 
different position from yourself, you have to move outside the established language 
games or strategies of your own context and are forced to redefine yourself and your 
own moral position vis-a-vis the other. 150 The act of dialogue makes it much harder to 
dehumanise the enemy in a manner necessary to retain support for conflict. 151 In order 
to move beyond the rules of the shared context and introduce alternatives, it is necessary 
to rename the Other, to engage in dialogue as if the situation were already different. 152 
This foray into dialogue requires a reappraisal of the relevant concepts and the shared 
rules governing these concepts. Once the notion that the language of force is the only 
option has been moved away from, it becomes much harder to justify the use of force to 
domestic publics. Practices such as state sovereignty and concomitant perceptions of 
identity have prevented effective communication, particularly when `other' identities 
148 Shapcott, 2002, p. 221-222 
149 Whilst dialogue and discourse ethics have been adopted as a means to address issues of 
recognition and cultural division within critical theory and, increasingly, within international 
relations, it is not unproblematic, for example, as might be seen through a closer analysis of 
dialogue projects such as the TRC, although this will not be discussed here. 
150 Fierke, 2001, p. 37 
151 Fierke describes conversations with a Bosniac who also spoke of his preference for dialogue 
over force, and the likelihood of its greater long-term effectiveness. 2001, p. 139-40 
152 ibid. p. 136-7 
124 
are perceived to be inferior and different. Language as used within the international 
community is both shared and contested as Bellamy notes: 
[t]he very term `humanitarian intervention' is made possible by an 
international regime of truth that constructs the limits of appropriate 
knowledge by reference to the boundaries of sovereignty. In a pluralist 
world of states, we talk about the intervention problem in terms of the 
human rights versus sovereignty schism not because it represents how the 
world actually is, but because we find it a useful way of making sense of 
the order of things. ' 53 
Echoing Gadamer's hermeneutics, Dallmayr looks at what such dialogue might 
entail when he claims that `genuine dialogue or consensus requires a reciprocity of 
understanding, in the sense that it is not only up to others ('them') to understand `our' 
perspective, but it is equally up to `us' to grasp things from `their' perspective'. 154 
Although it is debatable to what extent he has managed this tension, where Habermas's 
argument is most convincing is when he attempts to address the tension between the 
claims to objective knowledge and contextualism by arguing that `the validity claimed 
for propositions and norms `transcends spaces and times'; but in each case the claim `is 
raised here and now, in a specific context, and accepted or rejected with concrete 
implications for social interaction' '. 155 Indeed, Habermas is aware that `cultural values 
are always components of intersubjectively shared traditions, the revision of the values 
used to interpret needs and wants cannot be a matter for individuals to handle 
monologically'. 156 
Benhabib develops this idea theoretically through the notion of `democratic 
iteration' which involves: 
complex processes of public argument, deliberation, and exchange through 
which universalist rights claims and principles are contested and 
contextualized, invoked and revoked, posited and positioned, throughout 
legal and political institutions, as well as in the associations of civil 
society. 157 
Democratic iterations may change established understandings and transform 
what is accepted as the `valid or established view of an authoritative precedent'. 158 
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Benhabib locates these iterations within a `jurisgenerative politics' which refers to the 
iterative acts through which `a democratic people that considers itself bound by certain 
guiding norms and principles reappropriates and reinterprets these, thus showing itself 
to be not only the subject but also the author of the laws'. Such a politics opens up a 
`space of interpretation and intervention between transcendent norms and the will of 
democratic majorities. ' 159 This strengthens the role of dialogue and implies a degree of 
fluidity within the ethical values that we protect, offering a means to constantly re- 
assess and re-constitute the tension between the universal and the particular and 
between inclusion and exclusion. A discourse approach must ensure that `marginal 
voices and subordinated cultures' can be as equally heard as those of the dominant 
culture. 160 The logic of the dialogic approach suggested by Benhabib indicates that 
those who are excluded may be included through the reflexivity required by democratic 
iterations. 
Dialogue refers to a process of reciprocal critique and a willingness to engage in 
dialogue without any certainty about who will learn from whom. Linklater defends the 
need to act dialogically when he defends himself against Elshtain's criticism that the 
`cosmopolitanism which runs through [The Transformation of Political Community] has 
little connection with the real needs of the most vulnerable members of humanity who 
require practical assistance rather than advances in cosmopolitanism or movement 
towards a universal communication community'. 161 Linklater argues that humanitarian 
aid or conflict management without dialogue with those who are suffering has its own 
problems. What Habermas brings to this approach is an insistence that we are able to 
assess the legitimacy of communicative claims and that we are aware of and can 
analyse, the problems of distinguishing a true or false consensus or manipulated 
agreements from truly consensual ones. When modified with a focus on procedure and 
hermeneutics, some of problems faced by a universalist discourse ethics may perhaps be 
surmounted. 
In his support of Benhabib's relaxation of universal consensus, Shapcott argues 
that this allows the goal of conversation to be oriented towards other tasks such as 
`community building and solidarity, without denying its role in dispute resolution or in 
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the pursuit of universally agreeable norms. ' 162 In this way Shapcott highlights some of 
the potential areas of application for a more developed understanding of dialogue, one 
which addresses the problems of inclusion and exclusion whilst maintaining the power 
of critique offered by Habermas's procedural emphasis and wider philosophical defence 
of normative justification and legitimation through communicative processes. 
It seems that good international citizenship acts as a bridge between rationalism 
and discourse ethics. While rationalism remains state-based, rejecting the emergence of 
a world state or cosmopolitan society, and discourse ethics provides the means to 
transcend the traditional conception of political community, good international 
citizenship provides the framework with which developing notions of consensus, 
legitimacy and discourse can challenge the intentions and motives of state action, thus 
acknowledging the realities of power inequalities and interests whilst refuting the 
necessity of accepting this as the status quo. It is here that Linklater's dialogic 
cosmopolitanism is so important, as it shares with other poststructuralist writers in 
international relations, such as Walker, Campbell and Ashley, a commitment to `the 
critique of structures and beliefs which obstruct open dialogue. ' 163 Despite some of the 
problems his project encounters, it is a powerful vision which argues for a more 
inclusive global community, not least because it entails a separation of the ethical 
community from the modern state in order to recognise the plurality of concrete `others' 
and to prevent modes of exclusion being erected which derive from the structures of the 
modern, sovereign state. The concern that Linklater shares with critical theorists and 
post-structuralists alike is to develop more `rigorous tests of the legitimacy of inclusive 
and exclusive practices. ' 164 It is this aim that informs the development of evaluative 
criteria in the following chapter. Intended to address these concerns identified within 
international practice, the evaluative criteria not only build on the theoretical debates 
discussed so far, drawing on and adapting relevant theoretical critiques, but also 
encounter a number of problems in the relationship between theory and practice which 
have been raised thus far in a theoretical context. 
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4. Developing Evaluative Criteria 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter is the point at which we make the shift from theory to practice. It 
charts the development of this attempt to formulate a set of evaluative criteria, termed 
`communicative imperatives', and fruitfully apply them to practices in international 
relations. The communicative imperatives derive from a number of general principles 
emerging from and justified by the theory. Having explored a variety of theoretical 
interventions in the debates surrounding Habermas's discourse ethics and the issues 
raised by the intervention in Kosovo, the development of operational criteria indicate 
ways in which the theory has been adapted, incorporating a number of key critiques, in 
order to find ways to address these contemporary concerns. It is useful to reiterate the 
understanding of discourse ethics which motivates its application to questions of 
conflict and intervention: discourse ethics requires that controversies over the validity of 
contested norms should be settled through argumentative processes which serve to 
decide upon the legitimacy of the norm in question. 
Approaches to evaluating humanitarian intervention in international relations 
generally focus on developing pragmatic threshold criteria. Particular examples of such 
frameworks will be explored briefly in order to identify some of the problems with this 
approach and to indicate how these differ from the current framework. Two other 
applications of Habermasian discourse ethics in international relations will also be 
examined, namely the concepts of interpretive communities (Johnstone) and 
deliberative legitimacy (Bjola), in order to clarify existing applications of theory to 
practice and to demonstrate how they may contribute to the current framework. 
Certain problems were raised in Chapter 1 in relation to two facets of the 
legitimacy of decisions surrounding Kosovo: procedural legitimacy and the 
operationalization of those decisions. Having developed these issues both thematically 
and philosophically in Chapters 2 and 3, the communicative imperatives formulated 
here build on the approaches to evaluative criteria of Beetham and Alexy. They serve to 
offer indications as to ways in which dialogue may take place with the intention of 
addressing problems such as inclusion and exclusion, legitimation and the politics of 
equality and recognition. They are by no means exhaustive, nor are they intended to be 
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infallible or prescriptive. While the communicative imperatives may also be applicable 
(with appropriate alterations) for assessing dialogue at a domestic level and between 
non-state actors, they are structured here with a recognition of the role of states in 
international relations and with a dual purpose: firstly, they are intended to serve as a 
critical tool to analyse and critique dialogue and the construction of dialogue and 
secondly, to offer a normative approach to dialogue in the context of conflict resolution. 
It is important for any theoretical model to be aware of its limitations and, offering a 
number of theoretical clarifications and insights into the problems of moving from 
theory to practice, this chapter will develop some practical implications of the 
philosophical grounding of dialogue in international relations offered in Chapters 2 and 
3. It is suggested that in navigating these difficulties we focus upon the relationship 
between reflective capabilities and understandings of communicative fairness. 
4.2 Threshold criteria for humanitarian intervention 
Cosmopolitan and similarly-inclined theorists have addressed the ambivalence of 
competing norms intrinsic to contemporary humanitarian intervention by specifying, in 
a variety of ways, a set of formal criteria for the justification, authorization and conduct 
of military force. ' It is worth briefly noting four versions of relevant threshold criteria 
put forward, partly in connection with Kosovo, which would effectively institutionalise 
humanitarian intervention in one way or another: those of the Independent International 
Commission on Kosovo (IICK, 2000); the `Responsibility to Protect' doctrine put 
forward by the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (2001); Nicholas Wheeler, and Neta Crawford. These allow us to highlight 
certain methodological and political problems with such an approach and to 
demonstrate certain similarities between Crawford's approach and the one adopted in 
this research. 
The IICK's framework of principles consists of two parts. First, those threshold 
principles which must be satisfied in order for any claim of humanitarian intervention to 
be legitimate and second, a series of `contextual principles' which `enhance or diminish 
the degree of legitimacy possessed by forceful intervention. '2 There are three threshold 
principles indicated by the Commission. The first comprises two valid trigger factors 
I Fine, 2006 
2 The Kosovo Report, p. 193 
129 
for humanitarian intervention: `severe violations of international human rights or 
humanitarian law on a sustained basis' and the `subjection of a civilian society to great 
suffering and risk due to the "failure" of their state, which entails the breakdown of 
governance at the level of the territorial sovereign state. ' The second principle is that 
the `overriding aim of all phases of the intervention involving the threat and the use of 
force must be the direct protection of the victimized population. ' The third principle is 
that the `method of intervention must be reasonably calculated to end the humanitarian 
catastrophe as rapidly as possible, and must specifically take measures to protect all 
civilians, to avoid collateral damage to civilian society, and to preclude any secondary 
punitive or retaliatory action against the target governments. '3 
The principles developed for military intervention by the `responsibility to 
protect' doctrine reflect certain similarities to the above guidelines. It draws heavily on 
just war theory to construct its four main principles which are: 1) the just cause 
threshold (large scale loss of life, or large scale ethnic cleansing), 2) the precautionary 
principles (right intention, last resort, proportional means, and reasonable prospects), 3) 
right authority, and 4) operational principles (clear objectives and mandate, common 
military approach, appropriate rules of engagement, acceptance of gradualism in the 
application of force, maximum coordination with humanitarian organizations, and 
acceptance that force protection cannot become the main objective). 4 It has worked to 
place these principles within a more developed conceptual context than that indicated by 
the IICK. 5 Firstly, the debate concerning the `right to intervene' which has traditionally 
characterised the humanitarian intervention debate, has become a `responsibility' to 
protect those at risk, and its perspective is not that of the prospective interveners, but 
rather those on whose behalf we claim to act. Secondly, it was argued that in the 
absence of the state's will or ability to protect its citizens, then a secondary 
responsibility to protect falls on the wider international community. 6 Thirdly, it makes 
clear that the `responsibility to protect' was about more than military intervention and 
covered three broad strands of action and obligation: 1) the responsibility to prevent 
ibid. p. 193-4 
4 The Responsibility to Protect, 2001, p. xii-xiii 
5 Ramesh Thakur, 2002: `Intervention, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: 
Experiences from ICISS', Security Dialogue, 33(3) 
6 Gareth Evans, 2006: `Crimes against humanity: overcoming indifference', Journal of 
Genocide Research, 8(3), p. 333 
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situations arising by addressing the root causes and direct causes of conflict and other 
man-made crises, 2) the responsibility to react, and 3) the responsibility to rebuild. 7 
Wheeler proposes a slightly different interpretation of the minimum criteria 
required by interventions in order to qualify as humanitarian. Briefly, he claims that 
these are: supreme humanitarian emergency, necessity or last resort, proportionality, 
and a positive humanitarian outcome. Wheeler's solidarist argument indicates that in 
the instance of a supreme humanitarian emergency, state leaders should accept the risk 
of casualties in order to end human rights abuses. 8 Noticeable by its absence is the 
requirement of positive humanitarian motive. Wheeler argues, contrary to conventional 
wisdom, that the primacy of humanitarian motives is not necessary for an intervention 
to qualify as humanitarian. It is only when either the motives or the means employed 
served to undermine a positive humanitarian outcome that the intervention may no 
longer be counted as humanitarian. 9 
Crawford's guidelines for humanitarian intervention are interesting because they 
stress a discourse ethical procedure and come closest to the framework discussed so far: 
The procedural aim must be to conduct a discourse with all potential 
actors who will then develop an approach to deciding questions of 
humanitarian intervention. The substantive aim would be to establish 
general procedures for avoiding humanitarian crises and, when necessary, 
conducting humanitarian interventions. 10 
This is significant because she highlights the need to develop means of avoiding 
humanitarian crises as well as for managing them. The convention she has in mind 
should be sufficiently flexible to meet a variety of cases, but would look at such 
questions as who can legitimately call for humanitarian intervention; who should be 
authorized to carry out intervention and what means are acceptable; what constitutes a 
humanitarian intervention; what are the limits of humanitarian intervention, and what 
kind of humanitarian crises demand an international response. 11 As Crawford points 
out, it is precisely because humanitarian intervention violates discourse ethical 
principles that a discourse ethical practice must be used to decide when force can or 
must be used. Without such a dialogue, humanitarian interventions may come to 
7 ibid. p. xi 
8 Wheeler, 2000, p. 50 
9 ibid. p. 38; Taylor Seybolt, 2007: Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for 
Success and Failure, SIPRI, New York, Oxford University Press 
'o Crawford, 2002, p. 431 
i' ibid. p. 431-2 
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resemble colonial practices. By emphasising the need for broad and inclusive 
participation in any conversation that shapes the guidelines for humanitarian 
intervention, Crawford demonstrates the link between a discourse ethical approach and 
the principles espoused in the current interpretation of good international citizenship 
which places discourse at its core: 
Dialogue could help actors see the consequences of their actions, in the 
long chain of events, which help create humanitarian crises (such as great 
powers sending arms to authoritarian regimes to promote the "interests" of 
the great power), and help actors avoid, prevent, or halt those actions. 
Avoiding the crises that lead to humanitarian interventions - by being 
attentive to the ways that external actors are setting the groundwork for 
crises or failing to act to discourage early abuse - would clearly be better 
than intervening after the fact. 12 
There is an increasing body of literature which focuses on the gap between legitimacy 
and legality and Crawford suggests that interventions might be granted greater 
legitimacy (and under a Convention, greater legality) if the `entire international 
community were part of the discourse that leads to a convention on humanitarian 
intervention. ' 13 
The notion of sovereignty as responsibility instituted by The Responsibility to 
Protect doctrine articulates standards for intervention, but in an attempt to provide 
answers it does not sufficiently address the need for the legitimacy of process. While 
Wheeler acknowledges that these criteria must be applied on a case by case basis, there 
is no indication as to the legitimacy of the process which is burdened with making these 
decisions. It does not suggest who might be included in this process, or how the process 
might deal with complex situations where there is no clear means to assign blame or 
victim status and it neither looks for nor is able to recognise coercion or distortion 
within the legitimating process. One concern is that these frameworks do not tend to 
question the assumption that a right (or duty) of intervention implies a right to use force. 
Iris Marion Young raised such a concern when she argued in regard to Kosovo that, 
drawing on Arendt, there is a distinction between justifying violence and claiming that 
it is legitimate. She argued that `violence can never be legitimate, in the sense that its 
use can be thought to follow from principles and procedures of law. Violence can 
12 ibid. p. 433 
13 ibid. 
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nevertheless sometimes be justified. '14 It is the process by which the latter takes place 
that we shall focus on rather than the larger debate concerning the institutionalisation of 
humanitarian intervention and the use of force. Whilst it is acceptable to argue that we 
should not make success the defining test of legitimacy, as this would suggest that we 
can only judge the `legitimacy of an intervention motivated by humanitarian reasons 
only with the benefit of hindsight' 15, along with Bjola it is also argued that the process 
by which the decision to intervene is arrived at is also key to its legitimacy. Both 
deliberative process and consequences are crucial to establishing legitimacy. 
The ongoing search for legitimating criteria to institutionalise intervention in 
international law faces certain problems. Such criteria may simply provide a basis for 
reasserting and legitimising the rights of the interveners which are likely to be those of 
the most powerful states. Alternatively, the argument for non-intervention and 
sovereignty can also be interpreted as legitimising the interests of the powerful and 
reaffirming the status quo. Formal criteria do not address the problem of the 
effectiveness of force, or the problem that each situation is different and reflects a 
different set of needs and interests, nor allow sufficient space for critical re-evaluation 
(fallibility) or dialogue. Rightly raising the issue that those actors involved in the 
dialogues envisaged by the frameworks discussed above are primarily the intervenors, 
Bellamy argues that there appears to be: 
little basis in pragmatic epistemology for claims that link the legitimacy of 
force to a set of criteria that are removed from lived experiences about the 
efficacy of armed intervention. Moreover, it is important to bear in mind 
that the Socratic demand that we collect as many experiences as possible 
when constructing `good' knowledge means that the experiences of the 
interveners should not be prioritised, as they appear to be in the move to 
establish legitimising criteria. We also need to ask the victims, 
perpetrators, and bystanders about the instrumental usefulness and moral 
purposes of such acts. '6 
This argument goes to the heart of a communicative politics, suggesting that it is not a 
matter of prescribing or prohibiting the use of humanitarian intervention, but that it 
should be constructed and questioned communicatively and openly, following 
principles developed thus far in these chapters. It emphasises the need for process, 
based on dialogue, to be taken into consideration as well as content and outcome. 
14 Iris Marion Young: `Violence against power: Critical thoughts on military intervention', from 
Chatterjee, Scheid (eds. ), 2003, p. 253 
15 Wheeler, 2000, p. 40 
1' Bellamy, 2002, p. 484 
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4.3 Trial runs 
4.3.1 Ian Johnstone's approach 
In this section we shall explore alternative attempts to apply discourse ethics or 
discursive political models to international relations. The concept of `interpretive 
communities' was previously a device employed in literary interpretation by Stanley 
Fish and has been adapted for the purposes of international politics. Johnstone contends 
that legal arguments as justificatory discourse have an influence on decision-making 
processes within the Security Council and has explicitly drawn on Habermasian ideas in 
order to develop his thesis in relation to NATO's intervention in Kosovo. It is, 
therefore, worthwhile to explore whether his application of Habermas, albeit somewhat 
different to the present attempt, may contribute to this research. 
When we examine the processes by which decisions to intervene are arrived at, 
it is helpful to consider themes of dialogue such as international law or humanitarian 
intervention in light of Johnstone's notion of an `interpretive community'. 17 
Interpretive authority, Johnstone argues, `resides in neither the text nor the reader 
individually, but with the community of professionals engaged in the enterprise of treaty 
interpretation and implementation. ' 18 While this collective, professional, interpretive 
approach diverges from previously mentioned hermeneutic approaches (e. g. that which 
is perceived by the individual), there are elements of similarity in that interpretive 
communities draw on accepted conventions, traditions and practices within a known 
social horizon, albeit through the lens of a particular issue. Interpretive communities 
are produced by repeated and frequent communicative actions which produce the kind 
of `common lifeworld' that Johnstone perceives in the Security Council. Risse defines 
a common lifeworld as `a supply of collective interpretations [actors have] of the world 
and of themselves, as provided by language, a common history, or culture. ' 19 The 
common world that Johnstone refers to is one that `does not simply come out of the 
shared beliefs and attitudes of its inhabitants but in fact generates those beliefs and 
attitudes through common participation. 920 Although the depth to which a common 
17 Johnstone, 2003, Johnstone, 1991: `Treaty Interpretation: The Authority of Interpretive 
Communities', Michigan Journal of International Law, 12 
18 Johnstone, 1991, p. 372 
19 Thomas Risse, 2000: `Let's Argue!: Communicative Action in World Politics', International 
Organization, 54(1), p. 10, citing Habermas, TCA, vol. 2 
20 Johnstone, 1991, p. 386 
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lifeworld exists in international relations is debatable, the UN does operate according to 
a set of conventions, practices and shared understandings, particularly on issues such as 
human rights and trade, leading to the understanding that the presuppositions for 
argumentative rationality, including a common lifeworld and `the mutual recognition of 
speakers in a non-hierarchical relationship' are more common in international relations 
than is commonly thought. 21 Not only do institutions serve as information-rich 
environments, but they also provide a normative framework which structures 
interactions. Johnstone argues that whilst the normative framework was not '2 
sufficiently developed to produce a single `right' answer in the case of Kosovo, it was 
enough to distinguish between good arguments and bad arguments. 23 
Interpretive communities are linked to a complex combination of strategic and 
discursive arguing which is recognised as an intersubjective practice; to persuade others 
that our own position is justified we often follow certain norms, for example language 
rules, which enable our interaction. Johnstone argues that governments, due to the 
nature of the interpretive communities they find themselves in, are forced to justify their 
positions in terms other than those of self-interest. However, this does not mean that 
strategic self-interest may not be driving their actions, but rather that the interpretive 
community has provided it with an appropriate language and terminology with which to 
cloak its real strategic interests and motives. In response to this criticism, Johnstone 
quotes Elster's argument refering to the `civilizing force of hypocrisy': `even if 
impartial arguments are used hypocritically, they often lead to concessions to the 
general interest and more equitable outcomes from the debate'. 24 The power of 
argumentation which takes place within interpretive communities serves, therefore, as a 
mediating force between the collective interest and self-interest: even when arguments 
are made for strategic reasons, the constraints within which they must be seen to operate 
have a moderating effect. Johnstone argues that the rhetorical acceptance of a legal 
norm eventually persuades governments to match their words with deeds as they are 
then debating its application to particular instances rather than its validity. Risse also 
argues that argumentative `self-entrapment', whilst not an ideal speech situation as 
governments have not necessarily entered the discourse voluntarily so the discourse is 
21 Risse, 2000, p. 33 
22 ibid. 
23 Johnstone, 2003, p. 460 
24 ibid. p. 454 
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not free from international pressures or sanctions, is still indicative of genuine 
argumentative rationality as both sides `accept each other as valid interlocutors, try to 
establish some common definition of the human rights situation, and agree on the norms 
guiding the situation. '25 
The concept of an `interpretive community' seems to be a double-edged sword 
however, as legitimation through such dialogic themes can constrain and shape `the 
exercise of military power, both as to the initiation and manner of its use'. 26 Hutchings 
makes this point in a slightly different way in her consideration of the dominance of 
liberal vocabulary in international institutions and the extent to which, for Spivak, it 
underlines: 
the degree to which equality of exchange between those she identifies as 
the global `subalterns' and hegemonic actors, such as metropolitan 
feminists working in the INGOs of global civil society, is impossible. 
The difficulties of dialogue are exacerbated not simply by differences in 
power but by the degree of exclusiveness and the inextricability from 
power relations of the language through which attempts at dialogue are 
27 conducted. 
Consequently, the concept of an `interpretive community' should be perceived more 
critically. It is undoubtedly important to be aware of the different justificatory 
discourses offered by states to support their actions within a commonly accepted 
framework; yet without an awareness of the power relations inherent within such an 
interpretive community, we achieve little more than the continuation of such power 
relations, thus losing any transformative potential offered by such a tool. This is similar 
to Habermas's critique of hermeneutics for its lack of a critical dimension. 28 
Whilst the influential presence of legal argumentation in interpretive 
communities impels states to justify their actions in accordance with law, once a 
decision has been taken states may fear to challenge or criticize it as they are unwilling 
to be seen as failing to comply with international law. This means that the interpretive 
discursive community may not have the power to criticize the actions of its own 
members even if they disagree with them, thus changing the parameters of the 
discourse. As Johnstone says, although without this interpretation, interpretive 
communities are `composed of the participants in a field of practice who set the 
25 Risse, 2000, p. 32 
'`' Barkawi: `Air Power and the Liberal Politics of War', from Booth (ed. ), 2001, p. 310 
27 Hutchings, 2005, p. 164 
28 Robert Holub, 1991: Jürgen Habermas: Critic in the Public Sphere, London, Routledge, p. 66 
136 
parameters of what constitutes reasoned argumentation for that practice. '29 Thus, 
challenges to what is, effectively, the status quo remains difficult as `sustained 
insistence' on an interpretation considered `wrong', in that it cannot be reconciled with 
the conventions and practices of the relevant interpretive communities, is `symptomatic 
of a breakdown in the relationship or a dissolution of the community. '30 This 
perpetuates exclusionary practices and reflects criticisms uttered by critical theorists in 
relation to Habermas's discourse theory in which he is criticised for limiting both 
agency and topic of conversations. 31 Interpretive communities no longer seem to be as 
non-hierarchical nor as open to participation or inclusion as first perceived. Instead, 
they appear insular and closed off from critical reflection or outside influences and 
rejecting of those interactions which do not `fit' the accepted practices of the 
community. 
This criticism of what, on closer inspection, appears to be rather a conservative 
approach, resonates with aspects of the criteria for good international citizenship and an 
ethic of communication which require the potential to engage with and to change the 
nature of discursive parameters where necessary. Wolin argues that `[d]emocracy was 
born in transgressive acts, for the demos could not participate in power without 
shattering the class, status, and value systems by which it was excluded. 32 This seems 
an appropriate analogy to apply to the development of greater discursive freedom along 
critical theoretical lines. It is by transgressing those obstacles which prevent greater 
dialogical inclusion that discourse may approximate more closely those criteria offered 
by Habermas. 
To conclude, interpretive communities are of limited use to this research. 
Similarly to Crawford, Johnstone's work is intended to support the move to formulate a 
set of considerations (not hard and fast criteria) to be used as guidelines in future 
decisions on humanitarian interventions. Although they offer a useful means with 
which to understand the arguments offered by actors as justificatory discourse which 
operates under certain conditions, interpretive communities are insufficiently open or 
reflexive in relation to their own construction or the means by which they may be 
29 Johnstone, 2003, p. 439 
30 Johnstone, 1991, p. 385 
31 See Chapter 3 
3" Sheldon Wolin, 1994: `Fugitive Democracy', Constellations, 1(1), p. 17 
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manipulated by more powerful actors to serve a particular purpose to meet the 
requirements of this research. 
4.3.2 Corneliu Bjola's approach 
One further concept informs the application of the theoretical framework in this 
research. Bjola has also explicitly drawn on Habermasian ideas to develop his concept 
of deliberative legitimacy in the case of Kosovo in a way which is closer to this research 
than that of Johnstone's approach. While it will be explored in more depth in Chapter 
5, we must briefly explore its relevant theoretical components. Bjola argues that the: 
legal provisions of the United Nations Charter offer imprecise and 
insufficient criteria for discriminating properly between legitimate vs 
illegitimate uses of force. The conflation of the concept of the legitimacy 
of the use of force with what is lawful, as agreed upon by a small number 
of major international actors, overlooks those situations in which legal 
standards are rendered instruments of political deception and manipulation 
in the hands of the most powerful actors. 33 
This demonstrates a more critical approach to the use of legal argumentation than is 
indicated in Johnstone's argument. The need to clarify the relationship between legality 
and legitimacy - otherwise described as the gap `between a strict legal positivism and a 
common sense of moral justice'34 - in context of the use of force was also picked up in 
the Independent Commission on Kosovo's report. 35 If, as Bjola suggests, legitimacy 
represents the `moral and legal platform on which political authority is constructed and 
harnessed in international politics', then clearly legitimacy is fundamental to any 
normative justification of political action. 36 Recognising the importance of the 
structure of the talks themselves, Bjola argues that the simple adoption of a UNSC 
resolution, and the consequent assumption of legitimacy for military action, does not 
question the manner in which this consensus is reached. 
With this in mind, Bjola draws upon Habermas's theory of communicative 
action to inform his concept of `deliberative legitimacy' which can be defined as `the 
appropriateness of the manner in which consensus about the decision to use force is 
33 Bjola, 2005, p. 266 
34 Thomas Franck: `Interpretation and 
Holgrefe, Keohane (eds. ), 2003, p. 216 
35 The Kosovo Report, p. 10 
36 Bjola, 2005, p. 267 
change in the law of humanitarian intervention', 
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attained. '37 He perceives a deliberative dimension to be necessary in addition to the 
legal component intrinsic to the concept of the legitimate use of force. The question he 
asks is whether those who argue in favour of military interventions: 
try to reach a reasoned consensus on the need for the use of force, or do 
they just engage in power games based on credible threats, intimidation or 
rhetorical exchanges with no visible intention to achieve argumentative 
consensus with the other members of the international community on the 
definition of the situation and on the course of action? 38 
This question informs a key aspect of our later analysis of the decision-making process 
surrounding Kosovo. Bjola states three conditions under which deliberative legitimacy 
can be validated: 
" The facts on the basis of which decisions about the use of force are taken are truthful 
and complete as informed by the best evidence available. 
" All interested parties must be allowed to participate in the argumentative discourse, 
and all participants should have equal rights concerning making an argument or 
challenging a validity claim. 
" The participating actors show genuine interest in using argumentative reasoning for 
reaching consensus on the use of force. 39 
Like others, Bjola recognises the common lifeworld within international 
institutional settings such as the UN which operate on a basis of a `dense and tested 
network of collective understandings, rules and diplomatic norms'. 40 Bjola, however, 
also clearly acknowledges the `various power asymmetries' between actors which 
control access to the deliberative process as well as affecting the `weight' of the 
arguments presented. 41 With the increasing contestation of the definition and scope of 
application for existing international law, of which Kosovo is a prime example, there is 
a greater need for closer scrutiny of the procedures by which decisions are made and the 
conditions under which discourse takes place. Communicative action therefore, can 
3' ibid. 
38 ibid. 
39 ibid. p. 280: The first condition is required for denying actors opportunities to engage in acts 
of political manipulation and deception with respect to the legal aspects of the intervention. The 
second provision serves to reduce, as much as possible, the influence of power relationships, 
coercion, or intimidation during the deliberative process. The third condition is important for 
making sure that the decision to use force is taken based on the most compelling (legal) 
arguments available. ' 
40 ibid. p. 279 
41 ibid. p. 277-8, emphasis added 
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address these issues in ways unavailable to strategic or instrumental action, and can 
allow actors to make well-informed decisions based on coercion- or domination-free 
discourse. In a clarification of his argument which rests on procedure and clearly 
emphasises the strong Habermasian influence, Bjola argues that deliberative legitimacy 
`represents the platform on the basis of which the points of contention between actors' 
justifications to use force can be ascertained and validated. '42 The conditions that he 
sets as requirements for deliberative legitimacy, derived from Habermasian discourse 
ethics, are reflected in the communicative imperatives set out below. His application 
can be distinguished from the one presented in this research in two ways. The 
communicative imperatives are more comprehensive, drawing more extensively on the 
tradition of critical theory and on Habermas in particular. They also differ in terms of 
the target of application. Both Bjola and Johnstone focus on legal aspects of their 
discursive analyses. Bjola's criteria explore the problem of the conflation of legitimate 
and lawful use of force, and the contemporary legal ambiguity surrounding Kosovo. 
This research focuses more specifically on the construction of the communicative 
imperatives, the process of dialogue, and actual dialogues through which decisions to 
intervene were taken, thus looking to see what can be learnt from a communicative 
ethics approach to the practical, and morally problematic, question of intervention. 
4' ibid. p. 279 
140 
4.4 Formulating the Communicative Imperatives43 
The `adaptations' or limitations to discourse ethics discussed in 3.4 now need to 
be addressed in a way which allows us to draw closer to practice and empirical analysis. 
Thus, prior to articulating the communicative imperatives it is helpful to reiterate in 
more practical contexts some of the key themes developed from the theory and reflected 
in the imperatives. It is hoped that the theoretical framework developed here will 
provide some means of recognising communicative distortion through revealing 
moments of illegitimacy. If we accept that the UNSC is a forum for deliberation for 
many divisive issues in world politics, then it is increasingly important that some ability 
to recognise aspects of illegitimacy within its decision-making procedures is available. 
Through our reconstruction of discourse ethics we have seen that there is a relationship 
between assessing legitimacy and the ability to be reflexive or to recognise fallibility. 
In other words, when political practices can survive the criteria that will be defined 
later, then they can be accepted as forming the basic political structures of that 
particular society, so long as they continue to meet the requisite conditions and it is in 
this caveat that reflexivity is significant. A legitimate political practice or consensus 
can only remain legitimate if two factors are present: first, there should exist a 
continuing openness to criticism and secondly, the possibility of further debate leading 
to a new consensus or practice. In light of the previous critiques of Habermas, it is 
worth reiterating that in order to retain the practical use of this understanding of 
43 See also Risse's (2000) articulation of criteria for recognising an arguing situation in 
international politics, p. 18-19: 1) `By carefully examining the communicative utterances of 
speakers it should be possible to establish whether the conditions are present for argumentative 
rationality in terms of nonhierarchy. Communicative situations where actors point to their rank 
or status to make an "argument" do not qualify as a discourse. 2) Discursive rationality 
requires argumentative consistency. Actors changing their arguments depending on the audience 
with which they are dealing probably engage in rhetorical behavior. 3) Assuming that the 
materially more powerful actors do not necessarily have the better arguments, an arguing 
situation should disproportionately empower the weaker actors who have less material resources 
at their disposal. [... ] 4) Argumentative rationality can be investigated particularly well in 
situations where instrumental interests of actors (material or ideational) are stacked against the 
arguments being made. If actors change their mind in a communicative process, even though 
their instrumental interests would suggest otherwise, we have probably observed a process of 
persuasion. 5) Whether actors engage in dialogue and argumentation or not should be 
particularly obvious in situations in which they are accused of violating certain norms of 
appropriate behavior to which they have previously agreed. Do they dismiss such accusations as 
irrelevant or engage in some self-serving rhetoric? Or do they start justifying their behavior, 
give reasons for their action, or even apologize? ' 
Similar approaches have been articulated by Fishkin, 1992, p. 124, Davy Janssen and Raphael 
Kies, 2005: `Online Forums and Deliberative Democracy', Acta Politica, 40, p. 317-335 
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dialogue, the notion of consensus need only be procedural. It may, for example, be a 
consensus specifying agreement on how to disagree, but also, given those 
disagreements, how each side must be given an appropriate hearing to resolve 
disputes. 44 
Let us return to the need for reflexivity and the link between this and forms of 
coercion or manipulation. There are different kinds of coercion and manipulation that 
may prevent or control access to dialogue and it is important to consider some of these. 
Some forms of coercion may be more or less overt while others remain covert; some 
may be linguistic while others may be more material. Fishkin offers an example of 
practices which involve the systematic exclusion of some racial or ethnic group through 
discrimination. Empirically, it is unlikely that such a practice would satisfy the 
condition of consensus as this would require support from those excluded as well those 
included. But, it is possible that such a consensus might be achieved through repressive 
means. The repression necessary to maintain such a consensus would violate the 
requirements of liberty for a self-reflective society. If, however, the subordinate group 
remains quiescent, obviating any need for overt acts of repression by the dominant 
group, then clearly this also violates the conditions for legitimacy as it no longer gives 
`unimpeded and effective voice to the interests across every significant cleavage in the 
society. '45 Boreus, in her concept of discursive discrimination 46, extends the notion of 
coercion as exclusion through her distinction between the exclusion of voices and 
invisibility making. 47 The former occurs when a group of people is excluded from 
participating in debates which affect them. This type of exclusion is a matter of degree: 
the voices of a particular group may be totally absent from any manifestations of a 
particular discourse which fail to refer to or elicit their opinion or their perception of 
their own interests; the opinions of the group may be referred to but no more; or, on a 
higher level of inclusion, representatives may take part in the debate on their own 
initiative and, as much as possible in public discourse, on their own terms. The latter 48 
44Fishkin, 1992, p. 127 
45 ibid. p. 134 
46 Kristina Boreus, 2006: `Discursive Discrimination: A Typology', European Journal of Social 
Theory, 9(3). She defines discursive discrimination as discrimination carried out through the 
use of language (p. 405) and distinguishes between four main forms: 1) negative other- 
presentation; 2) exclusion; 3) proposals pointing towards non-linguistic unfavourable treatment; 
and 4) discriminatory objectification (p. 409). 
47 Boreus, 2006, p. 413 
48 ibid. p. 414 
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type, invisibility making, refers not to the voiced opinions of a group being excluded, 
but to the consistent exclusion within multiple discourses of `references to and images 
of group members. '49 
When voices are silenced, forcibly or otherwise, the conditions for legitimacy 
are not present: `The fact that the practice might conceivably be so successful that it 
robs the subordinate group of any desire to voice its interests is only an indication of 
how dramatically our conditions are violated. ' 50 Once again, we return to Benhabib's 
`interactive universalism' which may be articulated in this context as `what is necessary 
for equal consideration of one's claims or interests in the public dialogue'. 51 By equal 
consideration, Fishkin means that: 
they are treated as deserving equal consideration on their merits; they are 
not discounted because of the identities of the people involved (either in 
voicing the claim or in applying it). It is publicly accepted - by both 
speakers and listeners - that such claims deserve the same serious hearing 
given to the interests of other groups. 52 
Here, Fishkin not only recognises potential means of coercion or manipulation, 
but also the importance of identity and recognition. Boreus supports this link between 
discrimination/coercion, inclusion, and the importance of recognition as she argues that 
under-representation, inherent in the notion of invisibility making, constitutes 
unfavourable treatment and has social and political implications. This is because there 
seems to be a `strong social and psychological need to be seen: it is a kind of 
recognition and confirmation. To be made invisible can be seen as unfavourable 
treatment, since it frustrates that need. ' 53 
Honneth provides further theoretical justification for the importance of 
recognition to justice and morality. 54 As Shapcott reminded us, justice requires more 
than merely the fair distribution of material goods. Claims concerning recognition, 
inclusion, exclusion, and harm, imply normative judgements about the legitimacy of 
social arrangements. Honneth seeks to develop characterizations which must be formal 
or abstract enough to avoid simply representing concrete interpretations of the good life, 
49 ibid. p. 415 
50 Fishkin, 1992, p. 134 
51 Fishkin, 1992, p. 137 
52 ibid. p. 13 8 
53 Boreus, 2006, p. 415 
54 Axel Honneth, 1995: The Struggle for Recognition 
(trans. Joel Anderson), Cambridge, Polity Press 
The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts, 
143 
whilst, at the same time, must `have sufficient substantive content to be of more help 
than Kantian references to individual autonomy in discovering the conditions for self- 
realization. ' 55 Honneth also captures the need for fallibility when he argues that the 
`character of intersubjective prerequisites for self-realization becomes visible only 
under the historical conditions of the present, which in every case has already opened 
the prospect of further normative development regarding relations of recognition. ' 56 
Honneth's work on recognition is important for two main reasons. First, it adds 
another element to the case for a reconstructed discourse ethics which is sensitive to 
difference, and second, it allows us to develop a clearer understanding of inclusion and 
exclusion and the implications of this for the individual. If human self-realization is the 
end for recognition, then self-realization is enabled by three conditions, or patterns of 
recognition: self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem, or otherwise referred to as 
love ('relations of love and friendship'), rights ('legally institutionalized relations of 
universal respect for the autonomy and dignity of persons') and solidarity ('networks of 
solidarity and shared values within which the particular worth of the individual 
members of a community can be acknowledged') respectively. 57 These are neither 
`purely beliefs about oneself nor emotional states, but involve a dynamic process in 
which individuals come to experience themselves as having a certain status, be it as a 
focus of concern, a responsible agent, or a valued contributor to shared projects. '58 
These aspects of a positive relation-to-self are gained through the experience of 
recognition which can only be acquired through interaction with others. If denied this 
recognition due to exclusion from social groups, legal rights or status, then the 
individual faces a form of coercion which prevents recognition or identity-formation. 
Should a person or groups of persons be `systematically denied certain rights [... ], this 
would imply that he or she is not being accorded the same degree of moral 
responsibility as other members of society. ' 59 To develop the link between recognition 
and the harm principle intrinsic to Linklater's later concept of good international 
citizenship, Linklater observes that `indifference harms the self-respect of the 
vulnerable by forcing them to conclude that they have no claims against communities 
55 ibid. p. 173 
56 ibid. p. 175, emphasis added 
57 ibid. p. xii 
58 ibid. 
59 ibid. p. 133; Charles Taylor, 1994: `The Politics of Recognition', Taylor, Gutman (eds. ) 
Multiculturalism, Princeton, Princeton University Press 
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which can alleviate their misery without much cost to themselves. '60 Denial and the 
resulting hurt or harm rests, however, as indeed does mutual esteem, on the perceived 
existence of a shared, or intersubjective, interpretation of normative expectations and 
values within a society which amount to recognition and enable self-realization. This 
intersubjective awareness of values and moral expectations may be arrived at through a 
discursive process. 
Saward's acknowledgement that, `Defining democracy is a political act; the 
assumptions involved must be justified explicitly and convincingly to be of real 
value'61, indicates that the establishment of any theoretical framework derives from a 
particular political perspective and can never be value free. He goes on to argue that, 
`What is needed is a definition of democracy which is not forged in theoretical isolation, 
but which is embedded in a theory which justifies and clarifies the concept of 
democracy as part of the process of definition. '62 If attempting to define democracy is 
political, then it is also a political act to argue in favour of a communicative as opposed 
to strategic rationality, and as such needs to be justified. Here, we are drawn back to the 
debate between the cosmopolitan and communitarian literature concerning our ability to 
justify certain positions. Being able to separate the procedural from the substantive 
goes some way to acknowledging the communitarian or relativist argument that 
universal substantives may be unacceptable. It indicates that one viewpoint is not 
inherently superior to any other. However, taken to the extreme this runs the danger of 
falling into absolute relativism which precludes the construction of any normative 
model. In view of previous discussions, there are strong arguments to support the claim 
that some of these problems may be circumscribed by a more context-sensitive and 
procedural approach. 
Both Beetham and Saward emphasise that it is not enough to base a critical 
assessment of democracy on existing practices or institutions as this offers no way to 
address the crucial question: how can these practices be made more democratic? 63 
However, a purely abstract theoretical approach does not aid us in the quest to apply 
theory to practice. Parallels can be drawn between Saward and Beetham's approach to 
auditing democracy and the construction and application of a model of good 
60 Linklater, Suganami, 2006, p. 252-3 
61 Michael Saward: `Democratic Theory and Indices of Democratization', from Beetham (ed. ), 
1994: Defining and Measuring Democracy, SAGE Publications, London, p. 7 
b2 ibid. 
63 David Beetham, 1993: Auditing Democracy in Britain, London, The Charter 88 Trust, p. 6 
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international citizenship which holds a concept of discourse ethics at its core. Beetham 
suggests each indice within the audit represents a continuum rather than a black and 
white alternative, 64 although he acknowledges that the idea of a continuum neither in 
itself determines what a `good' democratic standard or benchmark should be nor where 
the beginning and end-point of that continuum should be situated. 65 Beetham also 
suggests, in line with the concept of reflective judgement, that when it comes to 
measuring such criteria, it is `preferable to leave such assessments in the form of 
qualitative judgements, in which the difference points of strength and weakness can be 
identified. ' 66 On this matter, this research concurs with Beetham, and has no intention 
of engaging in an attempt to measure quantitatively the quality of discourse. 67 
The closest that Habermas comes to drawing up any form of criteria for dialogue 
is developed from his presuppositions of argumentation and Alexy's subsequent 
formulation of pragmatic rules for discourse which Habermas has accepted: 
1. Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a 
discourse. 
2. a. Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever. 
b. Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into the discourse. 
c. Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires, and needs. 
3. No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising his 
rights as laid down in [1] and [2]. 68 
1.1 No speaker may contradict himself. 
1.2 Every speaker who applies predicate F to object A must be prepared to apply F to all 
other objects resembling A in all relevant aspects. 
1.3 Different speakers may not use the same expression with different meanings. 69 
64 Beetham: `Key Principles and Indices for a Democratic Audit', Beetham, (ed. ), 1994, p. 32: 
http: //www. democraticaudit. co. uk/auditing democracy/guideframework. php 
65 ibid. This also fits with Butler's definition of universalism, Cohen (ed. ), 1996 
66 ibid. p. 33 
67 contra Marco Steenbergen et al. 2003: `Measuring Political Deliberation: A Discourse Quality 
Index', Comparative European Politics, 1 
6' Habermas, 1990, p. 88; Robert Alexy, 1989: A Theory of Legal Argumentation, (trans. Ruth 
Adler and Neil MacCormick), Oxford, Clarendon Press, p. 193 
69 Habermas, 1990, p. 87; Alexy, 1989, p. 188 
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Alexy notes that these criteria should be treated openly and as being fallible. He 
adds that they may, in practical discourses, only be approximately satisfied. Moreover, 
he indicates their two-fold use: first, as an `instrument of criticism of unjustifiable 
limitations of the rights and opportunities of discourse-partners'; second, `they define an 
ideal which can be approached through practice and organizational arrangements. ' 70 It 
is precisely this dual approach of critique and normative development that the 
framework presented here seeks to offer. Bearing in mind, however, our exploration of 
attempts to sensitize the practice of dialogue and discourse ethics, to back off from 
Habermas's universalist moral account of behaviour, we want to consider moving away 
from Alexy's formulation of `rules' for discourse towards a less rigid object. 
The communicative imperatives presented here follow a similar approach to 
Beetham's democratic audit and bring together a range of theoretical interventions in 
debates on a communicative ethics approach. Although termed `communicative 
imperatives', they are only imperative in the sense that they are normative; they are not 
equivalent to rules of conduct or institutionalised practices. Instead, they are practices 
which allow us to analyse institutionalised practices and which offer normatively- 
oriented guidelines for `fair' communication. 7' The qualities that form the 
communicative imperatives are not all-or-nothing, but will occur to different degrees in 
dialogue. In order to examine the particular instances of communication during the 
debates over Kosovo where they will be tested, these communicative imperatives are 
themselves the basis for a number of questions developed to allow the 
operationalization of these imperatives in the analysis of dialogue. These do not 
indicate isolated concepts; the questions may at times relate to more than one 
imperative, nor is the order of the questions an indicator of their relative importance. 
Grounded within a critical theoretical perspective, the communicative imperatives 
effectively build on the principles developed by, among others, Linklater, the specific 
criteria articulated in the works of Bjola and Alexy and can be considered as `norms of 
evaluation internal to that political practice'72, if the political practice in question is the 
dialogue through which legitimacy is claimed. 
70 Alexy, 1989, p. 194 
71 Coupled with discourse ethics, it is Habermas's colonisation thesis, grounded in the 
distinction between communicative and strategic rationality, which secures the critical power of 
the communicative imperatives. 
72 Fishkin, 1992, p. 123 
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The Communicative Imperatives: 
1. Maximising inclusion 
2. Minimizing coercion 
3. Maximising dialogue over violence 
4. Maximising diversity 
5. Coherence 
6. Reflexivity 
7. Recognition 
1. Maximising inclusion 
  Who is consulted? (Communities of interests, communities of place) 
  Do smaller actors have an equal effective opportunity to participate and to be heard? 
  Are non-state actors consulted? 
  Can any interested party participate with equal rights? 
  To what degree do participants in the dialogue have the ability to initiate discourse 
on any issue pertinent to the discussion? Or, conversely, how fixed are the 
parameters of the dialogue? 
  How are actors included? (e. g. as observers, participants, how often are they 
consulted? ) 
  Are the interests of absent actors represented? 
2. Minimizing coercion 
  To what extent is there evidence of effective persuasion? 
  Are there signs of cooperative behaviour which transcend short-term self interest? 
  Can we identify instances of systematic compulsion, threat, coercion (direct or 
indirect), ideology or manipulation within dialogue? 
  Is there an equal means of control over decision-making procedures, the agenda, and 
decisions? 
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3. Maximising dialogue over violence 
  If there is failure to reach agreement, what happens? Do states supplant the rules of 
communication with the rules of war? (e. g. breaking off communication and 
resorting to force, or adopting a strategic or manipulative attitude towards the other. ) 
  Do states enter into a different sort of communicative interaction where those norms 
and truth claims which are contested and problematic are treated as hypotheses 
requiring justification and defence? 
  Are alternatives to strategic action discussed within the dialogue? 
  Is strategic (military) action acknowledged and justified? 
4. Maximising diversity 
  To what degree do public sphere opinion-forming media (e. g. the media) reflect and 
support official government (/TNCs) policy as opposed to serving as an independent 
vehicle for discourse and the expression of differences? 
  Are dominant discourses reinforced through the use of interpretive communities 
(legal or humanitarian)? 
  Are there noticeable polarisations of identity? 
  Which is given preference in the dialogue: hermeneutic understanding or universal 
consensus? 
5. Coherence 
  Are the same norms always offered in argument or do evolving norms gain 
acceptance? 
  Do participating actors show genuine interest in using argumentative reasoning for 
reaching consensus on the use of force? 
  Is there coherence between the actions of states and their words? 
  To what extent do actors present consistent arguments? 
6. Reflexivity 
  Is there any indication of reflexivity concerning the construction of negotiations? 
  Is there acknowledgement of error? 
  Do states recognise or acknowledge their own explicit or implicit historical 
involvement in conflict environments? 
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  Are compromises reached? If so, are the relevant trade-offs acknowledged and 
discursively redeemed? 
7. Recognition 
  Are certain values/identities publicly set up as the `right'? 
  Do actors seek to understand other perspectives or do they stick rigidly to their own 
viewpoint? 
  Do participants in dialogue acknowledge their situated positions? 
  Do different types of voice/speech receive equal opportunities to participate and be 
heard? 
4.5 On using the Communicative Imperatives: Problems between 
theory and practice 
As already indicated, there is a long roll-call of theorists who have lamented the 
apparent disjuncture between Habermasian theory and practice. The difficulties of 
constructing a Habermasian politics and the dangers of conflating the distinction (which 
Habermas insists upon) between normative grounds for legitimation and institutional 
design are well documented. 73 At a theoretical level, discourse must be left as open and 
as inclusive as possible. It is only within practical discourses which reflect these 
conditions that boundaries to interpretations can be drawn. 
This research does not look to move onto the dubious grounds of institutional 
design, seeking instead to find a way of utilising the critical tools that Habermas has 
provided through the notion of communicative action in order to respond to some of the 
contemporary requirements of international politics in the face of contested legitimacy, 
structural inequalities and accusations of a democratic deficit. Perhaps inevitably, when 
we consider the theoretical tools and the empirical focus of this research, questions of 
ideal democratic practices, institutional arrangements and substantive political goods 
arise despite awareness of the pitfalls of too literal a translation or transposition from 
theory to practice, or what Wellmer has called a 'short-cut'. 74 The idea of a short-cut is 
the attempt to `overextend theory, to move too quickly from normative to empirical 
73 Blaug, 1999, Dryzek, 1987, Wellmer: `Practical Philosophy and the Theory of Society: On 
the Problem of the Normative Foundations of a Critical Social Science' from Benhabib, 
Dallmayr (eds. ), 1995; Benhabib, 1992 
74 Cited in Blaug, 1999, p. 65 
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matters and thus to be excessively utopian in one's institutional designs. '75 However, as 
indicated, it is not institutional design that this research has in mind, but the critical 
evaluation of existing practices: an aim with which Habermas would concur. 
The theoretical framework offered in this research reflects the practical 
intentions of critical theory in three ways. Firstly, it identifies a set of issues and 
structures which operate as mechanisms of repression and domination. 76 The 
communicative imperatives which serve as the practical face of a theoretical framework 
offer an understanding of the presence and function of these mechanisms; in other 
words, they serve to reveal illegitimacy. Secondly, this has an educative role as it 
reveals illegitimate practice to social actors, specifically, those actors whose interests 
are affected by decisions taken within a community or society. Fay argues that one of 
the key links between theory and practice is the educative role of critical theory. This 
means that the theory is not used by an expert in order to impose policy in order to 
manipulate social conditions to reach a particular pre-determined goal, but rather `to 
enlighten the social actors so that, coming to see themselves and their social situation in 
a new way, they themselves can decide to alter the conditions which they find 
repressive. ' 77 In other words, the theory has a transformative effect on the 
consciousness of actors of their understanding of their own positions and the constraints 
affecting these positions. 78 
Thirdly, the framework offers a means of social change or emancipation in the 
tradition of critical theory through the possibility of acting as a catalyst for change 
which remains situated and dialogic. Such change cannot be implemented as a set of 
external or abstract laws, or imposed, as the nature of critical theory demands that it is 
interpretative and intersubjective. For this reason, Fay argues that a critical social 
theory `is not divorced from social practice in the sense of being set over and against it 
as a blueprint to be followed: here, the objects of the theory actually become subjects of 
it, which is to say, they help to fashion it by their own choices and actions, and by their 
responses to it. ' 79 This is an important conceptual perspective because a static blueprint 
does not allow for communication or reflexivity which in critical theory remains an 
75 ibid. 
76 Brian Fay, 1975: Social Theory and Political Practice, London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 
1975, p. 104 
77 ibid. p. 103 
78 Manin, 1987, p. 354 
79 Fay, 1975, p. 109 
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intersubjective and continuous process. Fay strongly defends the intrinsic and 
constitutive link between critical theory and practice, calling for recognition of the `self- 
conscious integration of theory and practice' as critical theory's central core80, and it is 
in this sense that this framework seeks to be understood, despite the problems which 
haunt our theoretical exploration of Habermas and his theory of communicative action. 
Any normative theoretical approach incurs the danger of becoming prescriptive 
when attempts are made to apply it in practice. E. H. Carr captured the utopian 
dilemma when he said that: 
[t]he human will will continue to seek an escape from the logical 
consequences of realism in the vision of an international order which, as 
soon as it crystallises itself into concrete political form, becomes tainted 
with self-interest and hypocrisy, and must once more be attacked with the 
instruments of realism. 8' 
Effectively, once an ideal has been institutionalised it ceases to be an ideal and instead 
becomes the expression of vested interests. While Carr suggests this is due to the 
incompatibility of power and morality, Blaug argues that the difficulties faced by the 
application of theory to practice are related to the `profound ambivalence regarding the 
relation of meta-theory to substantive political questions. ' 82 Blaug suggests that critical 
theorists are faced with a problem that is inherent in any theoretical account which 
attempts to address the issue of universalist ethics; 
[w]anting to provide images of emancipation yet at the same time fearing 
the coercive power of utopianism, they are left to squeeze themselves into 
the middle ground, where their knowledge of the consequences of 
utopianism prevents them from acting and where their awareness of the 
suffering in the world only serves to make them miserable. 83 
In response to charges that critical theory in general and Habermas in particular, 
runs the risk of moving into authoritarian territory, Fay argues for the distinction 
between the instrumentalist potential in critical theory and the instrumentalism intrinsic 
to positivist models of social science. Fay frames his understanding of the relationship 
between critical theory and practice firmly within an intersubjective communicative 
model which goes a long way to remove the authoritarian strains visible in other 
models: `according to the critical model there must exist a constant critical interchange 
80 ibid. 
81 Carr, 1939, p. 118 
82 Ricardo Blaug, 1997: `Between Fear and Disappointment: Critical, Empirical and Political 
Uses of Habermas', Political Studies, 45(1), p. 112 
83 ibid. 
152 
between the policy expert and the actors who will be affected by his decisions. '84 Not 
only must they be consulted in the first instance, but they must continue to be consulted 
as policy effectiveness can only be judged by the social actors concerned. 85 While 
some, like Dryzek86 and Harald Müller, have argued that international regimes 
themselves constitute `incipient discursive designs' because they are considered to 
`promote cooperative behaviour that transcends `short-run self-interest', I would argue 
caution, in conjunction with Haacke, as the case is not so simple. 87 This is not simply 
because of the fear of imposing repressive utopian blueprints, although this is quite 
rightly a serious concern, but rather because it brings us to a slightly different concern. 88 
Deitelhoff and Müller have argued that: 
Institutions also serve to create interaction settings approximating the ideal 
speech situation. Institutions, which are characterised by densely and 
largely non-hierarchical settings, help foster trust and empathy between 
participants and establish equal rights of participation. The formal right of 
sovereignty and formal negotiation setting prevent the success of brute 
power in negotiations. 89 
Leaving aside the empirical questions concerning institutions these comments raise, 
Haacke accurately notes that the pertinent question is not whether international regimes 
promote cooperation, but whether `the rules and decision-making procedures 
underpinning cooperative processes are themselves derivative of prior bargaining or 
argumentation processes. '90 This brings us to my argument that there are two elements 
to a dialogical critique of decisions concerning conflict. The first concerns `talks about 
talks'; are the institutions and decision-making procedures themselves subject to the 
communicative imperatives intended to promote distortion- and domination-free 
discourse? Is there any process of reflexivity which considers the structural 
implications of institutions and the consequent power relations for discourse? The 
second element refers to the discourse itself which should also be considered in 
accordance with the communicative imperatives in order to engage with it critically. 
84 Fay, 1975, p. 106 
85 ibid. p. 106-7 
86 Dryzek, 1987 
87 Haacke, 1996, p. 287 
88 Dryzek, 1987, p. 664-5, p. 657: Dryzek writes that `a fear of foisting institutions and practices 
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89 Nicole Deitelhoff and Harald Müller, 2005: `Theoretical paradise - empirically lost? Arguing 
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Implicit in Fay's conception of critical theory is the distinction between 
procedure and substantive content that Habermas is keen to make explicit in order to 
limit the use of theory and prevent its use in a more prescriptive and authoritarian 
manner. The transformation of consciousness necessary for social change cannot be 
dictated from above in a vanguardist fashion, but must originate with the participants of 
dialogue themselves. Any move to alter structural constraints, institutional composition 
or institutional practices must develop with the approval of the participants themselves. 
The framework can only offer guidelines which might allow dialogue to be constructed 
in a manner approximating Habermas's ideal notion of speech, but this cannot be 
imposed, only offered as a regulative ideal with the intention of removing certain of the 
injustices and unfair procedures revealed by a close inspection of current practice. 
This framework is intended to reveal illegitimate practice rather than measure 
the extent of legitimacy present in decisions, not least because of the ever-present 
problem of measurement. How does one measure a degree of legitimacy? Without 
wishing to resort to more objective, social scientific methods of measurement, it is 
necessary to find another approach to the empirical material. As has been 
acknowledged by Deitelhoff and Müller, 91 it is not necessarily possible in practice to 
distinguish clearly between different types of communication. However, we may 
develop that problem a stage further and suggest that neither is it always possible, or for 
Habermas, desirable, to assign a normative value to different types of actual 
communication, for example, when strategic action is used for communicative ends. 
Theoretically, communication is not Habermasian if an actor has been manipulated into 
dialogue through coercion or pressure; in other words, the ends do not justify the means. 
Practicalities indicate that we will never find a situation which maps onto Habermas's 
theoretical model perfectly and so we must find procedurally acceptable trade-offs 
which allow us to act without losing all normative grounding. To return to our example 
of strategically induced communicative action, this might be an example where it can be 
justified if such a trade-off is acknowledged by the participants and redeemed 
discursively. 
The same problem arises when we address the notion of inclusion. If we follow 
Habermas, then participation in deliberation should extend to all those who are affected, 
however, in practice, this is never reflected in actual dialogue. Instead, then, we must 
9' Deitelhoff, Müller, 2005, p. 176 
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look for ways in which we might conceive procedures to be as fair as possible and to 
remain as close as possible to the deliberative core of the normative ideal. This brings 
us back to the idea of trade-offs and the definition of affected interests. Dahl's solution 
to this dilemma, although empirically useful, is not sufficient as it does not address the 
issue of how the notion of `affected interests is defined and by whom. 92 If we accept the 
necessity of trading-off levels of inclusion for practical purposes such as efficiency, 
then the question is not whether we have excluded those within Dahl's definition, but 
how we defend these exclusions and who has decided who should be excluded. Thus, it 
helps to use this framework negatively to look for illegitimacy rather than to use it 
affirmatively to identify legitimacy. 93 
By seeking to apply principles of discourse to international politics, we 
encounter yet another form of the universal/particular tension present within the 
differing demands that decisions at an international level are required to fulfil. While 
dialogue encourages interpretive reason which Saward defines as `the acceptance of the 
inevitability of pluralism and `the undecidability and inconclusiveness of all 
interpretation", order (and action) within the international system calls for legislative 
reason which involves the `philosopher's untrammelled `licence to judge' and to 
impose'. 94 Bauman captures this dilemma when he says that interpretive reason `is 
engaged in dialogue where legislative reason strives for soliloquy'. 95 Reus-Smit 
demonstrates how history has seen both approaches from the ancient Greek city-states 
which evolved a discursive norm of justice to the legislative conception of justice 
sustaining the sovereignty of modern states. 96 
In tandem with the theoretical difficulties of Habermas's universalism raised in 
Chapter 3 are the problems incurred in the moment of application. Habermas is well 
aware of Hegel's powerful critique of Kantian ethics which focused on Kant's ability to 
abstract from the particular. 97 One such issue is how a general law may be applied to a 
particular situation. The ability to determine the appropriate application of a universal 
92 See Chapter 4, p. 101 
93 See Clark's (2005) definition of legitimacy, Introduction, p. 14 
94 Michael Saward, 2003: `Enacting Democracy', Political Studies, 51, p. 161 
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96 Christian Reus-Smit, 1997: The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the 
Nature of Fundamental Institutions', International Organization, 51(4), p. 568 
97 Habermas, 1990, p. 195-6 
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law implies that `some sort of judging faculty is required'. 98 In light of this, Habermas 
has offered a distinction between Kantian morality and his own: 
Kant restricted morality as a whole to Rousseau's perspective of the 
lawgiver, who considers how a certain material can be regulated in the 
common interest of all citizens, and thus from the standpoint of 
universalizablity. In this way the problematic of application disappears 
from view. 99 
Habermas recognises that: 
Practical reason cannot bring itself into force merely through foundational 
discourses alone. In the process of grounding norms practical reason 
expresses itself in the principle of universalization, whereas in the 
application of norms it appears in the form of a principle of 
appropriateness. 100 
However, Habermas does not make a substantial leap towards relativism with this 
acknowledgement, as he argues that even in discourses of application, `we must rely on 
grounds which are valid not only for you or me, but in principle for everyone. ' A 
procedure which requires sensitivity to context does not need to be `itself context- 
dependent and lead to context-dependent results. ' 101 
In addition to the critique of abstraction offered by Benhabib, Gilligan and 
others, Habermas's concept of justice implies that our moral motivation is drawn from 
reason rather than from moral feelings. Nevertheless, Habermas acknowledges the role 
of moral feelings in constituting moral phenomena as `feelings provide the basis for our 
perception of something as a moral issue. ' 102 Moral feelings also provide the basis for 
the judgement of individual cases (application of moral norms), as they `build the 
experiential basis for our first intuitive judgements', for example, `pain and the sense of 
injury for our reproaches against another person who has harmed us'. 103 Lastly, they 
also serve to aid in the grounding of moral norms through discourse as: 
Empathy, [... ] the capacity to transport oneself by means of feeling across 
cultural distance into alien and prima facie incomprehensible life 
conditions, patterns of reaction, and interpretive perspectives - is an 
98 Blaug, 1999, p. 13 
99 Habermas in Dews, 1992, p. 251 
loo ibid. 
101 ibid. p. 267 
102 ibid. p. 269 
103 ibid. 
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emotional precondition for the ideal taking over of roles, which requires 
each person to adopt the standpoint of all the others. 104 
By focusing on procedure over content, Habermas deliberately maintains a space for 
dialogue between participants which is the only way to determine content. '05 It is by 
creating such a space that he is able to retain the distinction between the right and the 
good and attempt to balance the scales between Kant and Hegel: 
Where Hegel criticized Kant for his abstraction, indeterminacy in regard 
to outcomes, inability to generate morality, and for the insufficiency of the 
moral law alone, Habermas accepts his theory be limited to a procedural 
test and asserts the importance of processes of socialization in the 
generation of norms and in the practical discourses to test their validity. '06 
We can not simply transfer the principles of discourse ethics to `reality', even if 
we were all to agree on what that `reality' should be, but the practical intentions of 
Habermas's theory should be conceived along `critical-hermeneutic lines': 
Normative theory should help us understand our social world, to penetrate 
beyond its mere appearances and reveal its hidden structures. Theory 
should change minds, train eyes, exert a pressure on our intuitions, and 
help us reclaim our individual and collective authorship of the social 
world; thus moving us closer to living the lives we wish to live. 107 
Like Habermas, Klaus Günther has argued that we should perceive the discourse of 
justification as separate from that of the discourse of application and that both are 
needed in order to apply norms to actual contexts. Wellmer critiques this separation 
however, on several grounds, one of which being that: 
Only in cases where we are concerned with authoritatively given norms, 
as in law, can we meaningfully distinguish between justification and 
application; whereas in morality, which does not have norm-giving 
authority, everyone is directly confronted with the situation and must act 
with moral sense, so that moral discourse and moral judgement belong 
together here'. 108 
It is sufficient to say here that this distinction is only necessary if one accepts 
Habermas's definition of (U) in order to justify a norm. If we accept that Habermas's 
discourse ethics might be made more context sensitive through the processes advocated 
104 ibid. This is different from the version of hermeneutic understanding elaborated in Chapter 3. 
See Linklater's (2007) discussion of empathy. 
los ibid. p. 167-8 
106 Blaug, 1999, p. 16 
107 ibid. p. 36 
log Klaus Günther, 1993: The Sense of Appropriateness. Application Discourses in Morality and 
Law, (trans. John Farrell), New York, State University of New York Press, p. 51 
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by Benhabib, Gadamer, Gilligan, Wellmer, Maclntyre109 and others, then this separation 
of justification and application is no longer necessary as the `situational 
appropriateness' can be developed through different understandings of dialogue and 
judgement. 
The problem then becomes one of situated judgement. If we look at the way in 
which judgement appears in a Habermasian context and then move towards a more 
reflective understanding of judgement, it enables us to frame the manner in which the 
communicative imperatives may be interpreted. As noted in Chapter 3, Habermas's 
strong emphasis on consensus and universalizability renders judgement determinant and 
impartial, thus failing to recognise real differences between individuals. llo Another 
criticism of the Habermasian conception of judgement concerns the possibility of 
achieving consensus in collective deliberation: 
Whether this threatened impossibility is due to the increasing multiplicity 
of value-perspectives in modern societies or to the quite extraordinary 
cognitive capacities seemingly required of participants in order to make 
valid collective judgements, this kind of criticism accuses Habermasian 
accounts of judgement of being hopelessly unrealistic. ' 11 
Blaug refers to the difficulties of meeting the requirements of (U), particularly when 
confronted with conflicting norms and the need to justify exceptions as "cognitive 
overload". 1 12 As we have seen, although abandoning (U) threatens to withdraw our 
critical leverage, it still leaves us with the validity of the process, with the ideal of 
procedural fairness. Benhabib argues that by rejecting (U) we can consider the validity 
of moral judgement in terms of the presuppositions of fairness. By retaining the 
inescapable presuppositions of argumentation, we retain a cognitive aspect of 
judgement and thus validity can be communicatively defended. 113 
109 Maclntyre argues that there is no such separate category as applied ethics: `Moral rules exist 
only in and through their range of applications [... ]. The conception of morality articulated in 
this account of moral rules is one according to which moralities are social phenomena, each of 
which has its own peculiar history of growth and change, [... ]. But the conception of morality 
which both generates and underpins the dominant contemporary conception of applied ethics is 
one according to which morality, not moralities, provides the subject-matter for ethics and 
according to which morality has at its core a set of timeless principles or rules. ' Alasdair 
Maclntyre, 1984: `Does Applied Ethics Rest on a Mistake? ', The Monist, Vol. 67, p. 508 
110 Blaug, 1999, p. 89-90 
111 ibid. p. 92 
112 ibid. Refers to two meanings of "cognitive": 1) the ability of the human intellect to process 
information, and, 2) the ability to rationally defend one's arguments. 
113 Blaug, 1999, p. 102-3 
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We can clarify what judgement might mean in this context by looking at 
reflective judgement and Arendt's notion of `enlarged thinking'. Reflective judgement 
was developed as part of Kant's work on aesthetics and is a type of judgement wherein 
the universal is looked for in the particular. In Kant's doctrine, Arendt discovered a 
`procedure for ascertaining intersubjective validity in the public realm. This kind of 
intersubjective validity clearly transcended the expression of simple preference while 
falling short of the a priori and certain validity demanded by Kantian reason. ' 114 
Intersubjective validity, according to Arendt, means the idea that common consent must 
be won or `wooed' and is not simply provided by a shared background of 
understandings. In Arendt's words, this enlarged way of thinking is defined as follows: 
I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, 
by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; 
that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly 
adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look 
upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of 
empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of 
counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my 
own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I 
have present in my mind while I am pondering a given issue, and the 
better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the 
stronger will be my capacity for representative thinking and the more 
valid my final conclusions, my opinion. 115 
This formulation of enlarged thinking as the basis for judgement indicates the need for 
capacities such as imagination - imagining what it would be like to be somewhere else 
- and the subsequent requirement for the exercise of imagination, disinterestedness, in 
other words, `the liberation from one's own private interests'. 116 
This shift in the understanding of judgement might be viewed as the move from 
Kant's precept, "Act in such a way that the maxim of your actions can always be a 
universal law of nature" to Arendt's reformulation, "Act in such a way that the maxim 
of your actions takes into account the perspective of everyone else in such a way that 
you would be in a position to `woo their consent'. "' 17 This brings us closer to the 
hermeneutic and context-sensitive approach to dialogue discussed in Chapter 3. In 
other words, consent is still required, but it is no longer the consent required by 
114 Benhabib, 1992, p. 132 (citing Arendt) 
115 Ronald Beiner (ed. ) 1982: `Hannah Arendt on Judging, from Hannah Arendt', Lectures on 
Kant's Political Philosophy, Sussex, The Harvester Press Limited, p. 107 (citing Arendt) 
11f ibid. (citing Arendt) 
117 Benhabib, 1992, p. 136 
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Habermas's (U). In line with the interpretation of discourse ethics presented thus far, 
Benhabib argues that: 
to "think from the perspective of everyone else" is to know "how to 
listen" to what the other is saying, or when the voices of others are 
absent, to imagine to oneself a conversation with the other as my 
dialogue partner. "Enlarged thought" is best realized through a dialogic 
or discursive ethic. 
1 18 
This brings us to the question of what the universal is which is being looked for 
within the instance of the particular. Following the lines of argument presented thus far, 
we arrive at the notion of communicative fairness. When we question the validity of a 
judgement, we are, in fact, questioning `its procedure for communicative fairness'. As 
Blaug writes, we are reformulating `judgement in terms of a reflective discourse of 
application whereby the presuppositions of argumentation, or communicative fairness, 
[are] sought for in ethically patterned ways. ' 119 Fishkin also indicates that questions 
concerning political practice and legitimacy must be settled `contextually: they must be 
settled within the confines of ongoing practices. ' 120 To put this in the context of 
Gadamerian hermeneutics: 
[w]hat is decisive is not [Kantian] "knowledge of the general, " but the 
appropriate interpretation of the "demand present in the situation" where 
an ethical choice must be made. We gain access to the demands of the 
situation only by proceeding from our own empirical, ethical-political 
conditionedness, and not from the self-determination of reason in an 
intelligible sphere. 121 
It is widely acknowledged that decision-making procedures and institutional 
arrangements must be examined for their relative fairness, they must be as fair as we 
can make them. This, Blaug argues, is the same as saying `they should be as fair as we 
are here and now able to see. Such judgements are reflective, for they inspect 
particulars for their exemplification of the ideal of communicative fairness. ' 122 
However, this actual judgement by participants of validity or comparative validity is 
akin to recognising `family resemblances between fair and unfair procedures' 123 rather 
"8 ibid. p. 137 
119 Blaug, 1999, p. 107 
120 Fishkin, 1992, p. 133 
12 Günther, 1993, p. 183. Hence the problems which arise with Habermas's separation of the 
right and the good. 
I-)-) Blaug, 1999, p. 111, emphasis added; Ferrara, 2007: "Political' Cosmopolitanism and 
Judgement', European Journal of Social Theory, 10(1) 
123 Blaug, 1999, p. 1l l 
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than a direct comparison with Habermas's ideal of undistorted communication which 
would inevitably indicate a failure to meet the required standards. It is an appropriate 
means with which to approach a conflict such as Kosovo where the way in which the 
problem is described is `both crucial and contentious' 124 and where we confront what 
appear to be either conflicting established norms or exceptions to norms and must find 
some way to assess the legitimacy of competing claims. 
The nature of judgements in international politics (and decision-making 
procedures at all levels) require that some form of compromise or trade-off must be 
reached in order to retain the practical application of such an approach, either as a 
response to the existing plurality of views and values, or as a response to the need for 
efficiency and effectiveness. Within the approach formulated above, this may simply 
be that `there must be reasons for the provisional closure of a discourse [or limiting the 
potential participants], and that these reasons must themselves be discursively 
redeemable. ' 125 Despite the need for compromise or trade-offs, there must still remain 
sufficient provision for political actors to participate meaningfully in order to prevent 
calling into question the legitimacy of actors, institutions or decisions. 
4.6 Conclusion 
Although discourse ethics can enable awareness of the power inequalities 
inherent in the structure of the United Nations, and particularly those concerning 
dialogue, it cannot by definition, remove the notion of the nation-state altogether from 
the construction of the framework. Our perception of abuses of power within the 
United Nations, or examples of manipulation of interests in the favour of the powerful 
elite, do not indicate that they are anomalies, but rather to be expected given the nature 
of the composition and structure of the institution. As Schattschneider remarks, it is fair 
to suggest that an organization like the UN has developed some kind of political bias 
because `organization is itself a mobilization of bias in preparation for action. ' 126 The 
124 ibid. 
125 Blaug, 1999, p. 115; Linklater, 2007, p. 23 
12' E. Schattschneider, 1975: The Semisovereign People, Illinois, The Dryden Press, p. 30. 
Although Schattschneider's analysis is focused on pressure groups within the US domestic 
system, certain parallels may be drawn within the international system. The clear presence of 
state interests and other, non-state, interests which partly make up the central bodies of the UN, 
indicate that there exists a `bias in favor of the exploitation of some conflicts and the 
suppression of others because organization is the mobilization of bias' (p. 69). In other words, 
he argues that these interests are, by their nature, exclusionary of other interests, and they are 
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UN, for example, legitimises undemocratic behaviour by the exercise of the veto. 127 In 
addition, there is little distinction in the international arena between the executive and 
the judiciary; in domestic politics, this would be unacceptable and subject to accusations 
of corruption. The use of force, sanctioned under Chapter VII of the UN Charter is 
restricted to the elite members of the Security Council, particularly the permanent five. 
Such distortions and their effects clearly depend upon where you stand within both the 
individual debates and the system. A discourse ethical approach not only enables us to 
recognise power differences, but to reduce power differentials through being able to 
challenge arguments and validity claims. 128 Such inequalities highlight one of the 
limitations of this framework; in its appropriation of good international citizenship, it 
remains at least partially state-based and is unable to avoid the tensions intrinsic to the 
international system being grounded in the nation-state. Such problems are not just 
empirical, but, as Beck has shown, systemic: `The comparative analyses of societies, 
international relations, political theory, and a significant part of history and 
jurisprudence all essentially function on the basis of methodological nationalism. ' 129 
Habermas is well aware of the limitations of theory; while he confirms that his 
theory can offer a valid, normative, ground for social criticism, he is also clear that the 
theoretical principles which constitute discourse ethics are insufficient, by themselves, 
to determine what is morally right or wrong. It has been suggested that interpreting 
Habermas's theoretical principles from the perspective of enlarged thinking and 
reflective judgement, we are better able to respond to context-sensitive concerns raised 
by many critics. Taking into consideration the concerns of hermeneutics, feminism and 
other exclusionary factors, we have a procedural concept of discourse ethics that no 
longer has universalizable interests at its core, but rather operates on the understanding 
that conversation and judgement grounded in communicative fairness is sufficient. 
the interests of (social and economic) elites and not, as advocates of group theories suggest, 
representative of a universal community (p. 33-5). 
12' This may depend on how high the standards for democratic behaviour are, but this judgement 
is justified when considering notions of deliberative or participatory democracy. For a good 
discussion of different standards of democracy and consequent conditions of legitimacy, see 
Wolff, 1970, p. 27-33. 
128 Crawford, 2002, p. 417. Although we do not need discourse ethics to recognise the power 
differentials that exist around the permanent five in the UNSC, it does allow us to theoretically 
ground the subsequent critique and attempt to reduce such power differentials. 
129 Beck, 2003, p. 454,2002, p. 51: `Both states and societies are imagined and located within 
the dichotomy of national and international, which so far has been the foundation of the 
dominant ontology of politics and political theory. ' 
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With the aim of building bridges between critical theory and international relations, we 
have explored the benefits and limitations of previous attempts to apply Habermas's 
discourse ethics to international relations and explored many of the problems raised 
when considering the application of theory to practice. 
We have, then, a set of communicative imperatives located at the core of good 
international citizenship which situates it within a critical theoretical framework as well 
as indicating what kind of procedural ethics should inform dialogue. By opening up the 
content, future and fallibility of good international citizenship and making it reliant 
upon discourse, it attempts to, following Linklater, prevent it from becoming a concept 
hamstrung by the need for order as suggested by Williams and unable to effectively 
address those issues which most challenge both the theory of international relations and 
relations within world politics. On the grounds that a revised understanding of good 
international citizenship places commitment to inclusion, dialogue, fairness and 
legitimacy over that of great power responsibility for order, it is then, part of the duty of 
a good international citizen to respond reflexively and to act communicatively in its 
relations with states and non-state actors. Such a theoretical perspective seeks to foster 
spaces for deliberation and negotiation which offer political alternatives to strategic 
action in situations of conflict which are precluded by the traditional paradigms offered 
by international relations; it is with this in mind that we now turn to the case of Kosovo 
to explore what the critical interpretive power of the communicative imperatives can tell 
us about unfair procedure and communication. 
A number of concerns have been raised so far which indicate difficulties faced 
not only by any attempt to operationalise Habermasian discourse ethics, but also 
specific difficulties in an application of the current theoretical framework to the object 
of analysis - intervention in Kosovo - which is both broad and complex. These 
difficulties will be carried over into Chapter 5 where we seek to operationalise the 
communicative imperatives, focusing on the public communicative practices during the 
Kosovo conflict. 
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5. Testing the Communicative Imperatives: Debating Kosovo in 1998-1999 
5.1 Introduction 
Although, as already mentioned, there were dialogic opportunities before 1998, 
the focus for the application of the communicative imperatives will be the deliberations 
which took place over the Kosovo conflict within the UN Security Council (March 
1998-June 1999) and at the Rambouillet negotiations in February 1999 prior to the use 
of force. The discursive practices which took place at these times are particularly 
relevant for a communicative ethics approach for several reasons. Kosovo took place at 
a time when the principle and nature of humanitarian intervention was highly contested 
and understandings of legitimacy and legality were shifting. At the same time, the 
moral and legal justifications, both prior to and during NATO's intervention, formed the 
basis of claims to legitimacy for action yet met with significant resistance from a 
number of sources in the public sphere. The controversy over the public justifications 
indicates the need for further analysis of the communicative practices underpinning the 
claims of legitimacy for military intervention. 
The ability to identify different forms of constraints on practical discourse offers 
access to a powerful account of legitimacy. Having interpreted Habermas's model of 
discourse as a principle of legitimacy rather than a concrete institutional design, we are 
still able to recognise that practical political dialogues and debates take place under a 
variety of conditions and constraints. The framework developed from Habermasian 
ideas offers possible criteria for deciding which constraints are legitimate and which are 
not. ' Another way of constructing the link between the communicative imperatives and 
legitimacy is to use Clark's distinction between legitimacy as recognition or 
membership - the construction of legitimate order which focuses on notions of 
community, citizenship and participation; and the legitimacy of rules which focuses on 
procedures, democratic deficit, consent and accountability. The communicative 
imperatives seek to address both of Clark's aspects of legitimacy, indeed, suggest that 
they cannot be conceived of separately. 2 It is with these criteria in mind that we now 
' Stephen White, 1980: `Reason and Authority in Habermas: A Critique of the Critics', The 
American Political Science Review, 74(4), p. 1010 
2 Ian Clark, 2003: `Legitimacy in a global order', Review of International Studies, 29 
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turn to the discursive practices surrounding Kosovo in order to see what the 
communicative imperatives can tell us about unfair practices. 
The different versions of good international citizenship presented in Chapter 2 
indicate that these accounts would have, and indeed have, analysed the situation in 
Kosovo somewhat differently than the analysis offered here. Apparent in Dunne and 
Wheeler's work, as well as in some of Linklater's, is the perception that good 
international citizens are clearly states, albeit whose focus must incorporate individual 
human rights. To summarise, either good international citizens would have supported 
military intervention in Kosovo as a solidarist action to support human rights, or they 
would have prioritised regard for agreed norms of international law and therefore would 
have been unwilling to act without UN Security Council authorisation. For those of a 
solidarist persuasion, particularly those who remain uncomfortable with using force in 
contravention of international law, arguments have been voiced in favour of developing 
a new legality for humanitarian wars which would challenge the status quo, notably the 
problematic veto within the UN Security Council. Without entering into this debate in 
great detail, it seems necessary briefly to indicate how the approach of this research 
addresses the issue of Kosovo in ways that traditional notions of good international 
citizenship do not. The framework offered here presents specific criteria which are 
firmly grounded in theory and tell us more than the moral or ethical guidelines for 
behaviour offered by good international citizenship. The development of the theory in 
the form of communicative imperatives gives us specific targets concerning process that 
can be used to `read' practice and reveal illegitimacy. Moreover, a revised concept of 
good international citizenship, which has at its core concepts of dialogue and reflexivity, 
might suggest multiple actors in response to questions of agency rather than the 
traditionally dominant role of the state. 
We begin with a discussion of Habermas's own position on the intervention in 
Kosovo. This indicates a number of ways in which his interpretation of Kosovo 
diverges from that presented here. Consequently, in line with the interpretation of 
discourse ethics presented thus far, it demonstrates ways in which we can move beyond 
this with the communicative imperatives and explore the dialogue surrounding Kosovo 
in more depth. This chapter seeks to test the communicative imperatives through an 
exploration of the dialogues within the Security Council debates surrounding 
Resolutions 1160,1199,1203,1239 and 1244 and the discussions at Rambouillet. 
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While the main focus is on the dialogue within the Security Council, there are a number 
of supplementary points developed in relation to the Rambouillet negotiations in order 
to better demonstrate the use of the communicative imperatives. The following section 
offers a critique of Bjola's analysis of the conflict in order to explain why his use of 
Habermas's theory of communicative action is insufficient for the claims it purports to 
fulfil. In conclusion, we will consider what has been revealed through the use of this 
framework as well as the limitations of the framework in this particular context. 
5.2 Beyond Habermas 
We cannot write about NATO's intervention in Kosovo using a framework 
derived, at least in part, from Habermas, without discussing his reflections on the war in 
Kosovo. Habermas was in favour of the intervention in Kosovo, and his views were put 
forward most clearly in an article published in Die Zeit in April 1999, later translated 
and published in English. Although the article is written in the context of contemporary 
German politics, we can glean much about Habermas's contemporary, cosmopolitan 
world perspective. Habermas sees an opportunity in the intervention in Kosovo to move 
away from the classical conception of international law for sovereign states towards the 
development of cosmopolitan law and a world civil society: `Direct membership in an 
association of global citizens would protect the citizens of an individual state against the 
arbitrariness of his or her own government as well. '3 Advocating a `legal pacifist' 
approach, he identifies the absence of a `proper institutionalisation of cosmopolitan law' 
as responsible for the gap between `the legitimacy and the effectiveness of 
peacekeeping and peacemaking interventions. '4 The legal ambiguity of the situation in 
Kosovo, aided by the weak global institutionalisation of human rights, is where 
Habermas locates the concerns over legitimacy and morality provoked by NATO's 
intervention. He argues that the moral legitimacy on which NATO had no choice but to 
base their actions, considering that the Security Council was blocked, is problematic 
because it relied on norms for which `no effective and universally recognized instances 
assure their application and enforcement. '5 It might be suggested that the UN Security 
Council dialogue addresses issues of the `right' - moral norms which affect the interests 
3 Habermas, 1999: `Bestiality and humanity: a war on the border between law and morality', 
Constellations, 6(3), p. 264 
4 ibid. p. 269. By legal pacifism, Habermas refers to the construction of peace through the 
strengthening of international institutions and the universalisation of law along Kantian lines. 
5 ibid. 
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of others. But, as a result, in the context of intervention, it also tries to dictate the good 
- in terms of a substantive outcome - which is, perhaps, inevitable in the context of 
humanitarian intervention and the discourse of humanitarianism from which such 
evolving practices have emerged, demonstrating the difficulties of maintaining this 
distinction. 
However, it may equally be argued that Habermas is guilty of a strategic move 
in his own normative thinking similar to that described by Haacke in relation to 
Linklater's work on cosmopolitanism. This move begs the question of whether or not 
there really is sufficient common understanding and communication within a world 
`public sphere' to support such a move. Where does the authority for such a move 
come from? This move is clearest when he argues that only if human rights become 
part of a `global democratic legal order, as have basic human rights in our national 
constitutions, will we be able to work from the assumption that on the global level the 
addressees of these rights can simultaneously understand themselves as their authors. ' 6 
He does not address the question of which sources we might address ourselves to in 
order to find such a world-wide consensus, nor the process by which such a consensus 
might legitimately be formed. Habermas succinctly analyses the flaws within the 
current system, but his solution seems purely normative rather than critical: 
When they authorize themselves to act militarily, even nineteen 
indisputably democratic states remain partisan. They are making use of 
interpretative and decision-making powers to which only independent 
institutions would be entitled if things were already properly in order 
today; to that extent their actions are paternalistic. There are good moral 
grounds for this. Whoever acts with an awareness of the inevitability of a 
transitory paternalism, however, is also aware that the force he exercises 
still lacks the quality of a compulsory legal action legitimated by a 
democratic civil society of global citizens. Moral norms appealing to our 
better judgement may not be enforced in the same fashion as established 
legal norms. 7 
Despite the advocacy of an approach which has less critical purchase than we 
are accustomed to, Habermas has perhaps rightly suggested that we need to 
institutionalise these (moral) normative claims to rightness in order for intervention to 
be legitimate and so remove sources of `disquiet'. If so, then the notion of 
humanitarian intervention is defunct in current structural and legal circumstances 
because we are caught between the promise (if that is what it is) of a cosmopolitan legal 
6 ibid. p. 270 
7 ibid. 
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order, and the critical realism of classical international law. The statist bias and 
foundation of the United Nations, particularly the Security Council, serve to keep this 
paradox static, as it is hard to envisage member states convening to institutionalise such 
a cosmopolitan order. 
One of the reasons for disquiet that Habermas rightly raises in regard to Kosovo 
is that it represents `a strategy of negotiations that left no alternative to armed attack. '8 
Among the most important and disquieting complications of armed intervention in 
Kosovo in the name of humanitarianism he notes are doubts about the appropriateness 
of the military means in use: 
Every incident of "collateral damage", every train that goes down with a 
bombed Danube bridge, every tractor laden with Kosovo Albanian 
refugees, every Serbian settlement, every civil target that is unintentionally 
hit by a stray bomb, does not highlight just another contingency of war, 
but a suffering, which "our" intervention has on its conscience. 9 
Although Habennas argues that the causal links locating responsibility for human rights 
violations finely with Milosevic cannot be denied, the threads of responsibility become 
entangled once military intervention and all its implications takes place under the guise 
of humanitarianism. As a realist like Schmitt would argue, it is the human rights 
discourse itself that causes what was a natural struggle between nations to `degenerate 
into a hopeless "fight against evil". "o 
Habermas is somewhat scathing about this view and argues that nation states are 
not restricted by moves towards a world community. Rather, reversing Schmitt's 
causality, it is through the erosion of nation states through civil wars and ethnic 
conflicts within states that calls for intervention have emerged. Kosovo, for Habermas, 
demonstrates that `universalist justifications do not by necessity always function as a 
veil for the particularity of undeclared interests. ' 11 In a move which this research seeks 
to refute, although not necessarily for the same reasons Habermas raises here, he argues 
that `[w]hat a hermeneutics of suspicion levels against the attack on Yugoslavia is 
pretty lightweight): 
For politicians who have little scope in domestic affairs, due to the 
globalisation of economies, a noisy show of strength in foreign affairs 
might offer some chance to improve their profile. But neither the motive 
8 ibid. p. 265 
9 ibid. p. 266 
10 ibid. p. 267 
'1 ibid. p. 268 
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of extending and securing the sphere of influence attributed to the United 
States, nor the motivation of finding a role attributed to NATO, nor even 
the motive attributed to "fortress Europe", of a precautionary defence 
against immigration movements, explain the decision to engage in such a 
weighty, risky and costly operation. 12 
It may be that Habermas dismisses these rather realist reasons for action too lightly and 
makes too big a claim for universalist justifications. This is, at least in part perhaps, a 
reflection of his rather ambitious opinions of the normative foundations for states' 
actions. Although much of Zolo's analysis of Kosovo may be regarded as questionable, 
he also makes this point, arguing that Habermas does not `balk at lending NATO's 
political and military leadership the motivations and ends of his own personal 
cosmopolitan philosophy and theory of the moral universality of human rights. ' 13 
Despite Habermas's support for NATO's adoption of the role of human rights protector 
in the absence of more established legal mechanisms14, and his ambitions for a `fully 
institutionalised cosmopolitan condition', he recognises that self-legitimation and self- 
empowerment by NATO member states should not become the rule. In this 
acknowledgement, there is significant room for a critical examination of the 
legitimating process and decisions made concerning, in Chomsky's terms, military 
humanism' 5, without necessarily subscribing to Habermas's broader perspective of the 
global condition. 
5.3 The imperatives applied: what can they tell us about unfair 
procedure? 
5.3.1 Maximising inclusion 
Linklater argues that good international citizens must offer justification for 
failing to comply with existing arrangements if they look for new forms of decision- 
making when humanitarian crises occur. 
16 This is similar to the argument that 
exclusions from dialogue require justification. This argument can be justified on a 
number of grounds. First, it is important to remember the reason for which Habermas's 
12 ibid. 
13 Zolo, 2002, p. 80 
14 William Smith, 2007: `Anticipating a Cosmopolitan Future: The Case of Humanitarian 
Military Intervention', International Politics, 44, p. 79 
15 Noam Chomsky, 1999: The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo, London, Pluto 
Press 
16 Linklater, 2000 
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communicative ethics differs fundamentally from the Kantian categorical imperative for 
deciding the standard of right. As Kantian ethics remains a monological process, 
universal laws could be willed in a manner which excludes consultation with those most 
affected. For Habermas, the standard of right is: 
derived from the intersubjective structure of discursive communication in 
which each who is affected by a proposed norm has the opportunity to 
participate; to exclude someone thus affected is to render one's normative 
validity claim immediately suspect. ' 7 
Here we see that `right does not derive simply from agreements between interest- 
bearing individuals, rather it derives from the relation of intersubjectivity. Hence, the 
significance of participation in communicative ethics follows from the recognition each 
subject is due when validity claims are addressed to him. ' 18 This rules out the 
acceptance of strategically oriented agreements in order to protect particular interests, 
and requires not only participation in a practical discourse, but also the recognition of 
individuals or groups when validity claims, such as truth or normative rightness, are 
decided which affect them in order for dialogue to retain legitimacy. Under the 
communicative imperative of inclusion there are a number of questions which are 
designed to reveal elements of illegitimacy within practical dialogue. These questions 
relate to the `who' and the `how' of inclusion which we shall now examine. 
The proceedings within the Security Council were driven largely by the Contact 
Group and the resolutions agreed upon reflect, to a large extent, the demands and 
statements of the Group. The Contact Group consisted of France, the Russian 
Federation, the UK, USA, Germany and Italy. Four of these six countries are 
permanent members of the Security Council and therefore have the right of veto on 
decisions taken within this forum. The combination of their permanent status within the 
Security Council and their membership of the Contact Group indicate that these 
countries were able to participate in the dialogue and influence the framing of the 
resolution to a greater extent than other states. This signifies that some actors were thus 
granted a degree of access to dialogue unavailable to others. It also reveals a preference 
for consultation within a particular community of interest such as that made up of 
17 White, 1980, p. 1015 
'8 ibid. 
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established, Western, and sovereign powers. 19 This preference is further reinforced by 
the procedures for participation in the Security Council; the transcript of the meeting at 
which Resolution 1160 was voted on states that interested countries who are not 
members of the Security Council have a right to participate in the discussion but not to 
vote and only to speak after the vote has taken place. 20 This denies to such actors the 
opportunity for effective participation. 
Furthermore, remaining on the `who' of inclusion, the legitimacy of the 
decisions taken within the Security Council may be questioned by the absence of 
inclusion of either elected representatives of the Kosovo Albanians or the KLA. This is 
particularly important given the opportunities afforded to the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (via both written and spoken statements) and the Republic of Serbia (via 
submitted statements) to participate and be heard. 21 This reinforces the privileged status 
of sovereign powers; due to its lack of statehood, Kosovo Albanian representatives were 
denied equal opportunity to speak and to be heard, despite the degree to which decisions 
taken would affect their interests and their future ability to participate. There is no 
attempt to justify the exclusion of such a key actor from the dialogue, although if 
pressed, it is likely that the international community would have defended their actions 
by arguing that they were talking to the Kosovo Albanians, albeit not within the UN 
forum, and that it is not accepted policy to talk to terrorists, which is how the KLA were 
defined both by Serbia and the international community. However, there are two 
responses to this: firstly, the rise of the KLA has to be situated in the context of Kosovo 
Albanian politics and the involvement of the international community in wider Balkan 
conflicts in conjunction with their earlier refusals to address Kosovo Albanian concerns; 
secondly, the international community did eventually talk to the KLA, first behind the 
scenes as they recognised the likelihood of prolonged conflict if no agreement could be 
reached and then at Rambouillet in an attempt to tie in all Kosovar factions to an 
19 I recognise that labelling the Russian Federation in this way may be an issue of contention, 
but for the purposes of pointing out the relations and locations of power in this context it is 
sufficient. 
20 S/PV. 3868 
21 This is despite the fact that at this point the FRY had no seat at the UN. It was, however, 
permitted to maintain the permanent mission of the SFRY to the UN and officials were 
accredited as representatives of the SFRY mission, and therefore able to circulate documents, 
participate in the work of UN committees and attend Security Council meetings as observers. 
Sean Murphy, 2000: `Contemporary Practice of the United States relating to International Law', 
American Journal of International Law, vol. 94(4), p. 677-8 
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agreement. Consequently, it could be argued that their public exclusion is somewhat 
difficult to justify. 
Prior to Rambouillet there was also a distinction in the treatment of and validity 
granted to Rugova and the KLA as official, high-level talks were only held with 
Rugova. Although this seems a legitimate distinction, at first glance, between an 
elected representative and a non-elected armed group, this distorts the reality of 
Kosovar politics and, rightly or wrongly, excluded the KLA from talks. The 
misunderstanding of Kosovo Albanian politics here is crucial as a better understanding 
and recognition of the actors involved would have indicated that no agreement emerging 
from dialogue solely with Rugova would have met with acceptance in Kosovo and 
therefore ended the conflict. This issue is addressed in an OSCE report which states 
that: 
Representatives of the KLA believe that the political parties should accept 
the existence and importance of the armed organization and that none of 
the parties represents the KLA. Neither do they recognize the leadership 
of Ibrahim Rugova. The KLA further rules out the possibility of declaring 
a ceasefire should the talks resume without them being accepted as one of 
the negotiating parties. '22 
The KLA, at least, recognised the need for their inclusion in further talks, to be able to 
participate equally and be recognised in the context of the validity claims being decided. 
Despite this, we should be cautious in attributing to them a more reflexive or open 
approach to communication, as they were also motivated by strategic interests, namely 
achieving independence. 
There were also pertinent issues concerning inclusion and participation at a local 
level within the groups constructed by Rugova to participate in dialogue at a regional or 
international level which went unmentioned at the level of international. dialogue. 
According to an ICG report, the group of 15 organised by Rugova in spring 1998 to 
participate in talks included a number of prominent and diverse ethnic Albanian 
opinion-makers. According to testimony given to ICG, Rugova did not intend to 
consult with or listen to anyone from that group. Members complained that `meetings 
were often humiliating and, worse still, unproductive. ' 23 Not only were the conditions 
for fair communication questionable at an international level, but neither were they 
22 S/1998/712, Annex 1 
23 Kosovo 's Long Hot Summer, 1998, p. 11-12 
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present at a local level, a factor which greatly compounds the complexity of political 
and communicative distortion. 
The refusal to include the KLA, a non-state actor, in negotiations, but to only 
label them as terrorists, thus denying them the right to participate or be heard, reflects 
the structural inequalities inherent in state-centric Security Council practices and a type 
of discursive discrimination, the exclusion of voices, identified by Boreus. Boreus 
argues that if voices are silenced, either through force or by other means, then the 
conditions for legitimacy are not present. If this is the case, then it raises concerns 
about the legitimacy of social arrangements and the structural exclusion of non-state 
actors within formal deliberative fora. This exclusion not only violates the inescapable 
presuppositions of argument, but closes off any possibility of `enlarged thinking' in 
terms of understanding the perspective of the other within dialogue, a requirement for 
genuine communication. 
At the same time as clearly delineating the boundaries of inclusion, all of the 
UNSC resolutions call for all parties to enter `without preconditions' into a meaningful 
dialogue on political status issues: the `how' of dialogue. Other phrases included 
demanding the initiation of `genuine dialogue between the Serb authorities and the 
ethnic Albanians'24, and the need for the Kosovo Albanian team to be `fully 
representative of their community in order to speak authoritatively. ' 25 As mentioned, it 
seems that this could only have taken place outside the forum provided by the UNSC as 
the Kosovo Albanians had no effective means of participation there. Whilst the later 
negotiations at Rambouillet were the most substantive of those held over Kosovo there 
were significant differences in the attitudes of the parties towards engaging in dialogue 
conducive to compromise. While the Kosovo delegation submitted detailed comments 
on the formal documents presented to it, eleven days passed before the Serb/Yugoslav 
delegation submitted any written comments. During this time, Kosovo's own 
submissions had not received any feedback. Hill's visit to Belgrade, considered by the 
Kosovars at least as having been responsible for breaking the Yugoslav/Serb silence, 
also indicates a degree of inequality in favour of the Serbs in terms of effective 
opportunity to participate and influence outcomes, as well as giving the lie to the 
24 S/1998/223 
25 S/1998/657 
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statement concerning the status of the participants in the Serbian delegation. 26 This 
raised concerns regarding the sincerity of both the Contact Group representatives and 
the Serbs for the Kosovar Albanians. Following the Yugoslav/Serb submission, a 
revised draft was produced by the negotiators, which not only reintroduced the issue of 
the legal status of Kosovo (a key condition of the Kosovar agreement to come to 
Rambouillet was that Kosovo's legal status would not be determined), but also 
introduced a number of proposals responding to Milosevic's demands, including a 
second chamber which further entrenched the concept of national communities and a 
veto mechanism for all national communities which would have effectively paralysed 
legislative action in Kosovo. 27 In the attempt to ensure that the Serbs would sign, some 
argue that significant compromises and attention were granted the Serb delegation, thus 
skewing the effective opportunity of the Kosovo Albanians to guide the development of 
the settlement. 28 The Kosovo delegation questioned the fairness of a process which 
rewarded the Serbs for their obstruction of the talks. 29 
This draft was submitted to the parties who were invited to consider this the 
final version: in other words, initiating further dialogue on issues would not be 
welcomed. 30 The Kosovo delegation considered this new draft, substantially different 
in key aspects and favourable to the Serbs, as unacceptable and as evidence of 
exclusion: 
If the consent of the delegation of Kosova is sought, the unilateral changes 
imposed, apparently as a result of talks outside of the Conference, must be 
reversed. There cannot be a process of obtaining concessions from the 
Kosova delegation first, through the process of regular proximity talks 
which this delegation has constructively supported from the first day of the 
conference, and of then imposing a second set of unacceptable concessions 
as a result of separate negotiations between the Contact Group and 
Belgrade in which the Kosova delegation has no involvement. 31 
26 Press Briefing by the three negotiatiors, Rambouillet, 9 February 1999, Weller, 1999a, p. 428. 
Ambassador Petritsch: `Both sides have sent politically competent people in regard to the 
negotiating process-experts. So I believe both sides have sent their best people. ' 
27 Weller, 1999a, p. 403. See Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, 2nd 
Draft, 18 February, 1999, Weller, 1999(a), p. 434-441 
28 Marc Weller, 1999b: `The Rambouillet conference on Kosovo', International Affairs, 72(2), 
p. 250 
29 Letter from Delegation of Kosova to Contact Group Negotiators, Rambouillet, 17 February 
1999, Weller, 1999a, p. 433 
30 Press Briefing by the Contact Group Negotiators, 18 February 1999, Weller, 1999a, p. 441 
31 Kosova Delegation Statement on New Proposal for a Settlement, 18 February 1999, Weller, 
1999a, p. 444-5 
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The Holbrooke agreement, endorsed by the Security Council in Resolution 1203, 
also reflects an absence of the understanding of the need to include all relevant parties. 
The KLA were not party to the negotiations, and therefore did not consider themselves 
to be bound by the agreement. This act of exclusion was to have significant 
consequences for the success of the agreement, a factor seemingly ignored by the 
international community, and certainly not presented as problematic. Not only did the 
Holbrooke agreement exclude any representation for the Kosovar Albanians, but the 
basic principles of the agreement failed to recognise Albanian grievances whilst 
reaffirming conventional norms of territorial integrity and sovereignty in relation to the 
FRY. 32 
A key meeting took place on 8 October 1998, in a VIP lounge at Heathrow 
Airport. It was a crucial meeting for determining a shift in policy towards permitting 
the use of military force as well as determining the balance between strategic and 
communicative action. The meeting brought together former British Foreign Secretary, 
the late Robin Cook, Hubert Vedrine, his French counterpart, Klaus Kinkel, the German 
foreign minister, Albright, Holbrooke, Igor Ivanov, the Russian foreign minister, as well 
as representatives of the OSCE, the Austrians in their capacity as current EU chairmen, 
and other ministers and aides. However, the decision was taken to reduce the number of 
people present to include only foreign ministers and a few other key actors. 33 The 
question was the use of force and the need - or not - for a Security Council mandate. 
This raises concerns when considered in context of inclusion. Not only is it clearly a 
deliberately exclusionary meeting; consulting only key (Western/Contact Group) figures 
firmly closes the door to other interested parties and locates control over the decision- 
making procedures and the agenda firmly in the hands of the powerful few, but neither 
the interests of the Albanians or Serbs are directly represented and there is little 
indication of reflexivity concerning whether or not this is an appropriate forum in which 
to decide such a crucial question. As it was not a public meeting, it is difficult to 
ascertain exactly what was said, although Judah reports that: 
32 `The leader of the Albanian community in Kosovo expressed the view that the agreement 
signed in Belgrade [Holbrooke agreement] contained many weak points that could cause 
disappointment in the Albanian community. He also voiced disappointment that no 
representatives of the Albanian community from Kosovo had been a party to the negotiations. ' 
S/1998/1068 
33 Judah, 2002, p. 183 
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Ivanov said: `If you take it to the UN, we'll veto it. If you don't we'll just 
denounce you. ' Kinkel says he wants to take it to the Security Council, as 
do the British and French. Madeleine and I [Holbrooke] say: `That's 
insane! ' So, Kinkel says: `Let's have another stab at it. ' But Ivanov says: 
`Fine, we'll veto it. ' And Kinkel asks again and Ivanov says: `I just told 
you Klaus, we'll veto it ... ' He says: `If you don't we'll just make a lot of 
noise .. _'34 
Even if the decision to exclude relevant parties had been justified in terms of efficiency. 
this clearly adopts a strategic and manipulative attitude both to dialogue and the need 
for inclusion and fair deliberation to achieve legitimacy; it successfully prevents further 
public dialogue and allows strategic action to dominate while remaining 
unacknowledged and unjustified in a public forum such as the UN Security Council or 
General Assembly. 
Later decisions taken concerning the basis for a political settlement after the 
failure of the Rambouillet negotiations lay largely with the G-8 countries. Although 35 
this was accepted by the Security Council under the terms of Resolution 123936, there 
remained a number of countries unsatisfied with the terms of the resolution, although 
unwilling to block it altogether. China's remark, although arguably reflecting its 
concerns over the maintenance of its own power through its exclusion from the G-8, is 
nonetheless valid: `We cannot accept that the Council has prejudged those principles in 
its draft resolution without first deliberating on them'. 37 The talks which finally ended 
the war were based on two elements. First, the G-8 principles, and second, the trilateral 
talks of Ahtisaari (EU), Chernomyrdin (Russia), and Talbott (USA), with Milosevic. 
However, rather than negotiations on an acceptable agreement for Serbs and Kosovo 
Albanians, the trilateral talks were focused on trying to find an acceptable agreement for 
the US, Russia, and Milosevic. The UN role was more or less limited to passing 
Resolution 1244 and was deliberately marginalised by the Americans out of fear that its 
inclusion would weaken NATO's position in negotiations. 38 There was no inclusion of 
Kosovar representatives within any of these dialogue fora; they were excluded from the 
UN, the G-8 and the trilateral talks. 
34 ibid. This also relates to the communicative imperative of maximising dialogue over violence 
as it indicates the propensity for strategic action over communicative action when there is no 
consensus. It also demonstrates the extent to which dialogue is used simply to present positions 
rather than engage in a communicative rationality; this is in itself a form of strategic action. 
35 The G-8 countries are Russia, UK, USA, France, Italy, Germany, Canada and Japan. 
36 S/RES/1239,14 May 1999 
3' S/PV. 4003 
3' Norris, 2005, p. 86 
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Although this use of theory cannot ascertain that the KLA, for example, should 
have been included in dialogue, it can tell us that their exclusion, when unjustified, has 
implications for the legitimacy of decisions taken which concern them. Dryzek makes 
this point when he states that `communicatively rationalized discourse requires only that 
there be no barriers to competent participation. '39 The significant exclusions identified 
pose barriers to competent participation, and in turn, affect the quality of intersubjective 
relations. They also suggest that agreements were struck and positions maintained as a 
result of interest-bearing states which contradicts Habermas's formulation of the 
standard of right. 
5.3.2 Minimising coercion 
If we accept the grounds for the communicative imperative of inclusion, then it 
is only a small step to accepting that included parties should be able to participate free 
from a variety of constraints. It is the presence of relevant constraints that this section 
seeks to identify. 
There are a number of examples of different kinds of constraints specific to this 
dialogue. On the Serbian side, the ongoing refusal to accept any outside mediation40 
and the continuing presence of security forces within Kosovo, coupled with various 
attempts to control or manipulate dialogue were sources of constraints. Evidence from 
an OSCE report suggests that the Serbian Government's decision to hold a referendum, 
on the suggestion of President Milosevic, on the question of accepting or rejecting "the 
participation of foreign representatives in the settlement of the problem of Kosovo and 
Metohija" was a diversionary and inflammatory tactic, favouring rhetoric rather than a 
genuine attempt at communicative engagement. 41 Evidence from an EU report indicates 
that the FRY were deliberately failing to meet the requirements put in place by 
Resolution 1160 concerning participation and representation in the dialogue in order to 
make progress on a political settlement of the conflict whilst outwardly seeming to be 
willing to initiate dialogue and thus able to blame the Kosovar Albanians for the failure 
of dialogue to actually take place. 42 Moreover, the EU report notes that, `although the 
39 Dryzek, 1990: Discursive Democracy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 72 
ao Daalder, O'Hanlon, 2000, p. 39 
" S/1998/361, Annex II 
The requirement on beginning a dialogue contained in Res. 1160 is explicitly directed at the 
Government of the FRY. In reality, any such invitation consistently originated with the Serbian 
Government, with only the inclusion of a Federal representative which does not meet the 
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Serbian authorities have insisted that the dialogue can take place without preconditions, 
the stipulation that a solution must be found within the Republic of Serbia (rather than 
leaving this question open) amounts to the establishment of a precondition. ' 43 Whilst 
this raises the question as to how different this precondition is from the affirmation of 
FRY sovereignty repeatedly declared by the international community, it does seem as if 
the statement of intent on the part of the FRY/Serbia to initiate genuine dialogue is not 
matched by its actions which appear as obstacles to dialogue or which seek to 
manipulate dialogue to suit its own ends. 
Another key issue to consider is the terms in which the need for dialogue is 
presented by the international community. The Contact Group statement agreed at a 
meeting in Bonn on 25 March, 1998, called for both sides to enter into an 
`unconditional dialogue'44 `without preconditions' 45 and without a `pre-determined 
outcome'. 46 Repeated calls for a dialogue `without preconditions' appear in the 
statements of many member states at the UNSC meeting of 31 March. 47 Yet, at the 
same time, the Contact Group formulated what must amount to a kind of prejudgement: 
Without prejudging what the result may be, we base the principles for a 
solution to the Kosovo problem on the territorial integrity of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and on OSCE standards, the Helsinki principles, 
and the Charter of the United Nations. Such a solution must also take into 
account the rights of the Kosovar Albanians and all those who live in 
Kosovo. 48 
The United Kingdom emphasises the point made by the Contact Group and other states 
by declaring that it `does not support separatism or independence in Kosovo. '49 The 
German statement also serves to emphasise the consensus on this point: 
to enter without preconditions into a meaningful dialogue, including on 
political status issues. Without prejudging what the result may be, the 
resolution supports an enhanced status for Kosovo within the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, with a substantially greater degree of autonomy 
Security Council requirement. S/1998/361, Annex I. See FRY/Serbian statements of 13 and 14 
March 1998, Weller, 1999a p. 351 
43 S/1998/361, Secretary-General's report, Annex 1. 
44 S/1998/272 
45 S/1998/223 
46 S/1998/272 
47 In the context of advocating dialogue, even at this early stage in the international proceedings, 
it is worth bearing in mind a point raised by Gambia in the Security Council meeting: `The use 
of force, more often than not, further exacerbates a problem and produces compliance based on 
a fragile foundation. ' S/PV. 3868, p. 14 
48 S/1998/272 
49 S. PV/3868, p. 12 
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and meaningful self-administration. Such a solution would by no means 
impair the sovereignty or the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia. 50 
Despite appearing to tick the right boxes, such preconditions and judgements are a form 
of constraint on dialogue. The dialogue in which these judgements are being voiced is 
not one which clearly attempts to `persuade' others of the normative rightness of their 
arguments, but instead, draws on the discourses of international law and 
humanitarianism to state that this position must indeed be the solution. Moreover, they 
reveal situated preferences for an end solution, without due respect for the dialogic 
process, implying procedural and substantive forms of communicative distortion. 
Although not openly voiced by many, the issue of preconditions was one recognised by 
some non-governmental actors, including the European Action Council for Peace in the 
Balkans, who stated that: 
The international community should not burden the process by promoting 
the option it prefers - enhanced autonomy - since this option is rejected by 
both sides. The parties themselves should define the permanent status of 
Kosovo. International promotion of any specific option will also hamper 
the principle of `no preconditions' in negotiations. Thus, the international 
community should aim to start the process, not define the final outcome. 51 
Similar pre-conditions underlay Rambouillet as the fundamental principles on 
which the talks were based were present in all key communications by Contact Group 
states and so were fairly clear. 52 Despite Robin Cook's representation of the framework 
document as being one which had enjoyed widespread consultation by all relevant 
parties as a result of Hill's shuttle diplomacy over several months, it had not been 
derived from direct dialogue between the parties, having been drawn up by the 
international mediators. Unmentioned is that both sides had already rejected the Hill 
50 S. PV/3868, p. 20 
51 Troebst, 1998, p. 92-93, citing European Action Council for Peace in the Balkans and the 
Public International Law and Policy Group of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: 
Kosovo: From crisis to a permanent solution, Amsterdam, Washington, D. C., 1 November 
1997, p. 14. This supports the question I have raised concerning appropriate agency in such 
conditions. 
52 Contact Group Non-negotiable Principles/Basic Elements, 30 January 1999, Weller, 1999a, 
p. 417. To recap, these include: peaceful solution through dialogue; interim agreement: a 
mechanism for a final settlement after an interim period of three years; territorial integrity of the 
FRY; international involvement and full co-operation by the parties on implementation; high 
degree of self-governance in Kosovo; establishment of national community structures. 
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draft and elements of the basic approach which underpinned it. 53 In this light, it seems 
difficult to perceive any negotiation or settlement based on the Hill document without a 
sense of the presence of coercion. 
As early as 11-12 June, despite the ongoing calls for dialogue, NATO defence 
ministers took steps to prepare for the use of force and to increase the perception of 
threat felt by the FRY/Serb authorities. 54 This approach overlaps with elements of the 
imperative of maximising dialogue over violence, in light of which this behaviour 
shows that the rules of war do not entirely supplant those of communication on this 
occasion, but are used strategically to coerce agreement. This notion of communication 
influenced by strategic action or dialogue is present throughout official dialogue over 
Kosovo. It is apparent in a number of speeches by key states within UN Security 
Council meetings. 55 It is impossible to judge whether or not, by itself, this is an 
acceptable form of communicative action because it is only one part of a very complex 
set of interactions. In this dialogue it is an approach grounded in the established 
practices of coercive diplomacy and international law. When taken in conjunction with 
other impediments to legitimacy, however, it may be seen as a constraint on dialogue. 
Discussed already in terms of its exclusionary foundations, the Holbrooke 
agreement must now be considered as an agreement reached on the basis of coercive 
factors. The agreement wad reached in the context of NATO authorities having voted 
on October 13 to authorize air strikes if security forces were not withdrawn from 
Kosovo within 96 hours. 56 Despite the agreement, NATO: 
decided to maintain the activation order for the limited air response on 
the understanding that execution would be subject to a further Council 
decision and assessments that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was 
not in substantial compliance with Security Council resolution 1199 
(1998). 57 
The implication is that decision on the use of force will lie with the NAC and not the 
UNSC. The absence of discussion of alternative positions such as had been voiced by 
53 Response of Kosova to Views Adopted by the Contact Group, 30 January 1999, Weller, 
1999a, p. 417 
sa Statement by NATO Secretary General on Exercise "Determined Falcon", 13 June 1998 
5' For example, the UK representative's speech: S/PV. 3930, NATO statements and approval of 
the Activation Warning, 24 September 1998 
56 The Kosovo Report, 2000, p. 76; Catherine Guicherd, 1999: `International Law and the War in 
Kosovo', Survival, 41(2), p. 26 
57 S/1998/1068. Annex II 
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the Kosovars in response to Hill's plan in September indicates a form of silencing. 58 
The Holbrooke agreement demonstrates that the cooperation on the part of the Serbs did 
not indicate a commitment to transcending their short-term interests. Signing the 
Holbrooke agreement was a means to an end for the Serbs; it allowed them to prevent 
the imposition of sanctions or the use of force by the international community without 
requiring that they make any major concessions to the Kosovo Albanians. 59 
NATO systematically threatened the use of force during the negotiations at 
Rambouillet. An NAC statement issued on 30 January 1999, states that `it stands ready 
to act and rules out no option to ensure full respect by both sides in Kosovo for the 
requirements of the international community [ ... 
] by compelling compliance with the 
demands of the international community'. Furthermore, this threat was reinforced by 
the NAC's agreement for the NATO Secretary-General to authorise air strikes on FRY 
territory. 60 NATO's actions highlight the distinction between political support for a 
Security Council/Contact Group decision and using force to obtain compliance with that 
decision. 61 Russia argued in the Security Council that the threat of force was 
detrimental to negotiations, warning of the `harmful consequences of this action [... ] for 
the prospects of a settlement of the Kosovo situation and for safeguarding security in the 
Balkans'. 62 In light of the long-term consequences for dialogue and a lasting settlement 
for Kosovo, Russia's position bears witness to two important points concerning the role 
of coercion in negotiations in terms of the procedural fairness of the talks and the 
consequences. 
58 This refers to the informal understanding reached between the parties about a three-year 
stabilization and normalization period to allow for the re-establishment of democratic 
institutions, after which period new approaches could be envisaged. The plan avoided the issue 
of the status of Kosovo and focussed on `a pragmatic assignment of powers to different levels of 
administration. ' Public power was not to be located in Kosovar institutions however, but in 
individual communes and national communities (based on ethnicity) which was considered 
highly undesirable by the Kosovars. However, while Kosovo was formulating its response to 
the initial draft, the Holbrooke agreements were concluded. This document, unlike the Hill 
document, included a specific provision concerning the territorial integrity and sovereignty of 
the FRY and was reached unilaterally. See Weller, 1999a, p. 349-350 
59 Daalder, O'Hanlon, 2000, p. 47-50 
6o Statement by the NAC on Kosovo, 30 January 1999, Weller, 1999a, p. 416. Article 2(4) of the 
UN Charter prohibits not only the use of force, but also the threat of the use of force. 
61 Joint Press Conference by the Two Co-Chairmen, Rambouillet, 23 February, 1999, Weller, 
1999a, p. 47. Cook states that the `NATO decisions taken after the "October package" remain in 
effect, and NATO preparations are more advanced than they were last October. ' 
62 S/PV. 3988,3988`'' Security Council meeting, 24 March 1999 
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The threat of force maintained by NATO must also be looked at in terms of its 
efficacy. Belgrade refused to sign the Rambouillet agreement, so its decision cannot 
have rested entirely on the threat. Whether or not this was a mistaken judgement on 
Milosevic's part is another issue; he questioned the political resolve and unity of NATO 
and was aware of the plans for a graduated plan of air strikes and the unlikelihood of 
ground troops. 63 Despite, or perhaps because of, the threat of force, however, Weller 
argues that the negotiations were `actually conducted in a way which made very 
significant concessions to Yugoslavia, in order to obtain consent relatively freely 
given. '64 The position for Kosovo was somewhat different. The threat of force 
amounted to an indirect threat rather than overt military strikes against the KLA. Far 
more damaging to the Kosovar cause than the threat of military strikes was the threat of 
political disengagement if they refused to sign at Rambouillet. The presence of political 
coercion as well as military, was a double-edged sword. As the weaker party, 
participation at Rambouillet was necessary, yet potentially might have produced an 
agreement inconsistent with the Kosovar demands and thus unenforceable in reality. 
The strategic bargain was made quite clear by Albright: without their agreement, NATO 
would not be in a position to act. Her spokesman, James Rubin, stated that: 
if one is to apply the military pressure on the Serbs that is necessary to get 
them to agree or that is the only way to get them to agree, that we need to 
work from the Kosovo Albanian yes, in order for Secretary General Solana 
to draw the appropriate conclusions. And so I think she explained very 
forcefully that reality. 65 
In order to be communicatively fair, there should be equal means of control over 
the decision-making procedures, the agenda, and decisions. The dominance of the 
Contact Group (and Holbrooke) in the decision-making process indicates that this was 
not the case either within the Security Council or at Rambouillet. Resolutions passed in 
the Security Council generally reflected provisions put forward by the Contact Group at 
varying points. Moreover, despite being passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it 
appeared as if control over the agenda and decisions was, to a degree, handed back by 
the Security Council to the Contact Group. Although this might be justifiable in terms 
of the need for efficiency or limited resources, it must also be considered in the light of 
63 Norris, 2005, p. 2 
64 Weller, 1999a, p. 398 
65 James Rubin, Press Briefing on the Kosovo peace talks, Rambouillet, 21 February 1999, 
Weller, 1999a, p. 451-2 
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the overall picture presented, taking into account an understanding of the presence of 
coercion and the examples of exclusion. Whilst the Contact Group's efforts were 
largely met with support from the Security Council, this does not negate the fact that the 
dominance of the Contact Group both in negotiations with the FRY and later with the 
Albanians and in the move to allow NATO to use force without a mandate from the 
Security Council suggests a systemic practice which can repress communicative 
potential, for example, by bypassing the UN. 
The Contact Group statement on 29 January set in progress the Rambouillet 
Conference. However, the statement outlining the construction of the talks indicates 
that control over the procedures, agenda, and final decisions lay with the Contact Group 
rather than the UN or the parties themselves. 66 Weller's summary of the procedural 
elements supports this: 
The rules of the conference provided for the tabling of detailed elements of 
a settlement based on the Non-negotiable principles. The Contact Group 
drafts would stand, unless either party could persuade its negotiators that a 
change would be required in order to better implement a specific 
provision, or if both sides agreed on a change. The inequality in 
formulating the Non-negotiable principle would therefore be directly 
injected into the conference proceedings through drafts based upon them, 
which could not be easily deviated from. 67 
Further evidence of manipulation within dialogue lies with the Contact Group, 
as they indicate that the framework already set out `meets the legitimate aspirations of 
the Kosovo Albanians', thus determining effectively what may be considered as a 
legitimate aspiration or otherwise. 68 Again, we see subtle control over the agenda as 
other aspirations that the Kosovo Albanians may have are ruled out prior to dialogue as 
unacceptable or illegitimate in the face of preferences voiced by the dominant states 
within the international community. The failure of coercion to deliver an agreement 
indicates the oversimplification of the approach adopted by the Contact Group towards 
Kosovo and the concealment of a number of disagreements between. states. It also 
locates the real elements of dissent on the level of international norms regarding self- 
determination/secession of non-colonial peoples, territorial integrity, non-intervention 
66 S/1999/96 - `(e) Agreed that the participants should work to conclude negotiations within 
seven days. The negotiators should then report to Contact Group Ministers, who will assess 
whether the progress made justifies a further period of less than one week to bring the 
negotiations to a successful conclusion. ' 
67 Weller, 1999a, p. 400 
68 S/1999/96 
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vs the legitimacy of the use of force in favour of humanitarian need and human rights 
and the role of international actors - states and other regional groupings such as the EU, 
NATO and the OSCE. 
5.3.3 Maximising dialogue over violence 
The stated emphasis on dialogue contrasts fairly significantly with the actions 
taken to promote democratic dialogue and the eventual resort to military force by the 
international community. The statement of 12 June clarifies the position held by the 
Contact Group concerning the use of force as it notes that: `Ministers repeated that no 
solution to the problems of Kosovo can be found through violence. '69 Moreover, they 
continue to condemn Belgrade's `massive and disproportionate use of force', insist that 
the `Kosovo Albanian leadership [must] make clear its rejection of violence and acts of 
terrorism. '70 It is not then, the use of force per se, which is being condemned here, but 
rather the use of force by those party to the conflict. It does not rule out the possibility 
of a legitimate use of force by a third party in order to protect or defend particular 
responsibilities, rights or values. By condemning the violent methods adopted by the 
KLA on behalf of the Kosovo Albanian community, however, the Contact Group fails 
to understand its own role in the development of the crisis, or the conditions under 
which the KLA developed. It also places Rugova in a position which is uncongenial to 
further dialogue as it requires him either to abandon his political aim in order to retain 
the favour of the international community, or to reject the blinkered perspective of the 
international community and to support the KLA. This is not a position calculated to 
aid the establishment of effective and legitimate dialogue over continuing violence. 
There is a lot of material which indicates the uncontested presence of self- 
interested strategic communication. While, on the one hand, the Secretary-General's 
report refers to the deterioration of the situation, the violation of human rights and 
international humanitarian law by the Belgrade authorities, the Serb representative 
insists that this approach `conceals the true nature of the hostilities: the terrorist attacks 
of Albanian separatists'. The operations of the security forces are seen as being `in 
accordance with their legal authority, aimed at protecting citizens and their property. '71 
Just because this issue is constituted through dialogue and debate does not guarantee 
69 S/1998/567 
70 S/1998/567 
71 S/1998/757 
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any degree of reflexivity concerning validity claims. There is little attempt to 
understand the perspectives of others and there are distinct differences between the uses 
of certain terms and the interpretation of actions which are not problematised or subject 
to discussion. Arguably, the Serbian approach is strategic, as their interpretation 
justifies the continued oppression of the Albanians and puts them in the right to claim 
continuing sovereignty over Kosovo. This interpretation and the rhetoric which 
supports it distort the reality of continuing actions on the ground. While it is claimed 
that the Governments of Serbia and the FRY are `determined to solve the problems in 
Kosovo and Metohija peacefully, through dialogue and with respect for the integrity of 
Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and with full guarantees of equal human 
rights to all citizens and ethnic communities living in the province' 72, this is not 
consistent with the Secretary-General's report noting `the sharp escalation of violence 
and the reported use of excessive force by security forces against civilians as part of the 
government operations against the KLA'. 73 Despite the contrasting positions put 
forward concerning events in Kosovo, there is little engagement with the validity claims 
raised by opposing opinions and Serbian justifications for military action. 
The position of the Russian Federation seems largely determined by strategic 
interests although is dressed up as normative concern. Its rejection of the use of force is 
justified on normative grounds, albeit the somewhat conventional discourse of 
international order. China's position is rather more contentious as it: 74 
appreciate[s] the position of the Government of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia regarding settling the Kosovo issue through unconditional 
dialogue. The situation in the Kosovo region is now stabilizing. There is 
no large-scale armed conflict, still less any escalation of the conflict. The 
Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has also taken a series 
of positive measures to encourage the refugees to return home and provide 
7s facilities for humanitarian relief work. 
72 S/1998/757 
73 S/1998/712 
74 S/PV. 3930: the use of unilateral measures of force in order to settle this conflict is fraught 
with the risk of destabilizing the Balkan region and of all of Europe and would have long-term 
adverse consequences for the international system, which relies on the central role of the United 
Nations. ' 
75 S/PV. 3930 
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Not only does this contradict findings in the Secretary-General's reports of 4 September 
199876 and 3 October 199877, but it demonstrates an apparent willingness to take the 
FRY's words at face value rather than critically assessing them against the reality on the 
ground. Granted it does not require any theoretically justified criteria to discern that 
China's position concerning minority rights is motivated by self-interest, but the 
purpose in drawing attention to this form of strategic action is that the transcripts of the 
Security Council meetings indicate that there is little or no public contestation of 
blatantly contradictory statements raising validity claims as put forward by members. 
While sincerity can only be established within interaction as in time it will be clear 
`whether the other side is "in truth or honestly" participating or is only pretending to 
engage in communicative action and is in fact behaving strategically' 78, neither do we 
see a move towards a different form of communicative interaction where truth and 
rightness claims are treated as hypotheses requiring justification and defence. The 
communicative interaction seen here, therefore, lacks many of the characteristics of a 
communicative rationality. 
Alternative constructions of the controversial military implementation 
agreement79 at Rambouillet which might have averted NATO action were not discussed, 
therefore questioning the legitimacy claimed by NATO. When questioned about 
flexibility concerning the implementation agreement and whether there might be a 
middle ground whereby the force might be composed in a way more conducive to 
agreement, James Rubin made it very clear, at least publicly, that this would not be the 
case - the construction of the implementation agreement was not up for discussion at 
this point: 
76 S/1998/834: the report refers to increasing numbers of refugees and internally displaced 
people, continuing human rights abuses, inadequate security conditions for returnees and the 
continuing destruction of homes. 
" S/1998/912: `During the reporting period, fighting in Kosovo continued unabated. [... ] In the 
week following the adoption, on 23 September 1998, of resolution 1199 (1998), the forces in 
fact intensified their operations, launching another offensive in the Drenica region and in the 
Suva Reka-Stimlj e-Urosevac triangle. Those operations have reportedly resulted in the 
displacement of some 20,000 additional people. [... ] Fighting continued on 28 and 29 
September, contrary to the statement of the Serbian Prime Minister, Mr Marjanovic, on 28 
September, that anti-insurgency operations in Kosovo had been completed and that peace 
reigned in Kosovo. ' 
'R Habermas, 1974, p. 18 
79 Zolo, 2002, p. 30; Pilger, 1999: 'Revealed: the amazing Nato plan, tabled at Rambouillet, to 
occupy Yugoslavia', Newstatesman, 17 May, Bellamy 2000, p. 48; Richard Miller: `Respectable 
oppressors, hypocritical liberators: morality, intervention, and reality', Chatterjee and Scheid 
(eds. ) 2003, p. 242 
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NATO has worked on a military implementation plan and I have not heard 
anybody talking about making substantial adjustments in that 
implementation plan. 80 
The late briefing of the parties on the implementation agreement and the lack of 
negotiation over it prevented the parties from being able to discuss the way the 
agreement would be implemented in practice with NATO representatives and others. 
Weller argues convincingly that this presented a number of obstacles to the signing of 
an agreement and precipitated the use of force which might have been avoidable had 
another approach been adopted: 
As the annex provided for the demilitarisation of the KLA, it could not 
have come as a surprise to the negotiators that some reassurances as to the 
implications of this concept would have to be given to a delegation which 
was effectively dominated by the KLA and a political party close to it 
[LBD]. Similarly, the negotiators lost the opportunity to explain certain 
provisions to the FRY/Serb side, which were later presented as evidence of 
entirely unacceptable demands of the part of the Contact Group, or rather 
NATO. 81 
Furthermore, this led to the need for the March talks in Paris to focus on the 
implementation agreement in order to prevent the talks breaking down altogether as 
significant elements had not been discussed at Rambouillet. This demonstrates a lack of 
reflexivity concerning the best possible construction of the talks, both practically and 
procedurally, as well as a failure to recognise the key interests of the parties. 
Overall, this suggests that the only participants who had the ability to initiate 
dialogue on issues pertinent to the discussion, although possibly outside extant 
parameters were those who had most control over the decisions. Consequently, 
participants with less influence, such as non-Contact Group members of the Security 
Council, or those who were unable to participate at all, found that the parameters of the 
dialogue were fairly fixed. Few attempts were made to address these inequalities by the 
Contact Group members themselves in an attempt to create better conditions for the 
possibility of dialogue over violence. 
80 Department of State Spokesman Briefing on Kosovo peace talks, Rambouillet, 20 February 
1999, Weller, 1999a, p. 447; James Rubin, US Press Briefing, Rambouillet, 20 February 1999 
81 Weller, 1999a, p. 403 
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5.3.4 Maximising diversity 
The elements identified in this section are intended to illustrate ways in which 
the potential for the expression of diversity were ruled out of the dialogue. Without 
engaging in an in-depth examination of the media coverage of Kosovo and the 
intervention which is not possible within the scope of this thesis, the elements which 
form this communicative imperative cannot be fully developed. Nonetheless, the extent 
to which the media represents an independent vehicle for discourse and the expression 
of differences within an intervening state remains important. Moreover, its role in terms 
of agenda setting and the framing or priming of issues is a central aspect of a model for 
communicative politics recently presented by Habermas which, he argues, can retain a 
critical empirical thrust. 82 The power of the media is located in the selection and 
processing of `politically relevant content' and thus they `intervene in both the 
formation of public opinions and the distribution of influential interests. '83 Despite 
Habermas's somewhat debatable assessment of the positive role played by the media in 
contemporary society, he nevertheless indicates the presence of power relations which 
act to constrain the ability of the media to form an independent and self-regulating 
system. His claim that structural distortion is evident in the contemporary nature of the 
media has been a long-running theme throughout his work, particularly in connection 
with the relationship between theory and practice. 
As regards the independence of the media and in terms of critical purchase, 
Habermas distinguishes between an `incomplete differentiation of the media system 
from its environments on the one hand and, on the other, a temporary interference with 
the independence of a media system that has already reached the level of self- 
regulation. ' 84 Despite the seemingly more minor nature of temporary interference, 
Habermas draws upon the manipulation of the American public by the US government's 
communications management before and after the Iraq war in 2003. What is important, 
however, is not the framing of 9/11 by President Bush as the trigger for a `war on 
terrorism', but the `absence of any counterframing. A responsible press would have 
provided the popular media with more reliable news and alternative interpretations 
82 Habermas, 2006: `Political Communication in Media Society: Does Democracy Still Enjoy an 
Epistemic Dimension? The Impact of Normative Theory on Empirical Research', 
Communication Theory, 16 
83 ibid. p. 419 
84 ibid. p. 420 
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through channels of an intermedia agenda setting. '85 Consequently, while it is not 
possible to examine closely the way in which the media may have been influenced or 
co-opted by governments to reflect and support official policy, there was sufficient 
controversy over the intervention by NATO to suggest a need to look closely at the role 
of the media and their support, or dissent, for the use of force. 86 
In an interesting assessment of the role of the media, Marina Blagojevic draws 
attention to the need to apply this critical logic not just to the Western media and their 
role in creating favourable conditions for NATO's intervention, but also to the role of 
the media in Serbia and Kosovo over an extended period of time. In a fairly balanced 
and highly critical discussion, Blagojevic draws a number of connections between the 
presentation of information through a particular interpretative framework, the 
construction of national identity, and ethnic and political conflict. Drawing on 
examples of specific mechanisms used by the media, this analysis raises issues also 
contained within the communicative imperative of recognition and, more generally, 
supports the argument that the construction and reproduction of particular discursive 
themes served to facilitate ethnic conflict. 87 
The preference for consensus rather than hermeneutic understanding appears to 
be intrinsic to international structures and practice. Consent or consensus is given 
preference in contemporary practice because it is understood to be a necessary prelude 
for action. Hermeneutic understanding seems to fit poorly with the current structures of 
international relations, where interests must be protected even in the battle to construct 
85 ibid. p. 421 
86 Herring, 2001, p. 239-40. Critical discussion of these issues can be found in a wide range of 
literature, including, Daya Kishan Thussu, 2000: `Legitimizing `Humanitarian Intervention'? 
CNN, NATO and the Kosovo crisis', European Journal of Communication, 15 (3); Hammond, 
Herman, 2000 (eds. ); Peter Goff, (ed. ) 1999: The Kosovo News and Propaganda War, Austria, 
International Press Institute; Indymedia and Media Lens 
(e. g. http: //www. indymedia. org. uk/en/2004/03/288316. html) A common critical view is that 
the media machine constructed by NATO to sell the war presented it in a highly distorted 
fashion, ensuring that the press briefings presented the `bombing campaign in a sanitised, 
euphemistic fashion, as if there could be no civilian blood spilt or fear induced. [... ] It is 
difficult not to conclude that the alliance used stories - which it knew were not adequately 
corroborated and were often coming from sources with a vested interest in intensifying the 
conflict - to justify the bombings to an unconvinced public. ' (Goff, p. 15) 87 Marina Blagojevic: `War on Kosovo: A Victory for the Media? ', Bieber, Daskalovski (eds. ), 
2003, p. 166-183. Mechanisms referred to include: reduction and simplification of the 
explanation; counting on ignorance; the power of victimization; producing stereotypes; 
prejudices and hatred; factual distortion; the destruction of meaning; hierarchization of the 
victims; omission of certain topics from discussion which might complicate or bring different 
perspectives to understanding the conflict; the destruction of empathy, and construction of a 
new moralism. 
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agreed-upon norms for action, and where states remain the dominant actor. While states 
clearly maintain their national identity, there is a polarisation within the current 
construct of international society between those states lining up behind a `humanitarian' 
identity as a justification or reason for action norms, and those preferring to be 
identified with the precepts of international order. Tony Blair's speech in the House of 
Commons immediately prior to the start of the bombing demonstrates clearly the types 
of discourse being utilised to justify and legitimate the intervention: 
We must act: to save thousands of innocent men, women and children 
from humanitarian catastrophe, from death, barbarism and ethnic cleansing 
by a brutal dictatorship; to save the stability of the Balkan region, where 
we know chaos can engulf all of Europe. 88 
Foremost, there was consensus on the humanitarian need of the situation, even if 
legal consensus was far less clear. 89 Costa Rica's statement in October 1998, with 
interesting echoes of Habermas's reflections on Kosovo, demonstrates the legitimating 
function of humanitarian language: 
What we have here is a moral and ethical imperative for the international 
community. Inasmuch as this moral objective leaves no room for doubt, 
and in that an international presence in Kosovo would take on a high 
moral character, Costa Rica would never fail to lend its support to a 
multilateral action aimed at such a noble purpose. [... ] we would like to 
state some of our misgivings, which are of a legal nature [... ]. A goal 
such as this one, which is ethically and morally unquestionable, deserves 
to be achieved by means of international law. 90 
There are clear references to humanitarian and Balkanisation discourses, as well as the 
construction of the enemy `other'. The language used by the US and British leaders, 
among others, became increasingly polarised prior to NATO's intervention, as Albright 
and others attempted to create a more or less unambiguous picture of good and evil; the 
innocent Kosovars and the evil, brutal Serbian dictator. Blair described the bombing as 
a `battle between good and evil; between civilisation and barbarity; between democracy 
and dictatorship'. 91 When the language of humanitarianism is used, it requires the 
construction of an `other'. Barkawi makes this point, arguing that by identifying 
88 Statement by the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, in the House of Commons, Tuesday, 23 March 
1999, Weller, 1999a, p. 495 
89 Guicherd, 1999, p. 28 
90 S/PV. 3937. There are many examples of such language in the Security Council meetings on 
24 March, 1999, S/PV. 3988; 14 May 1999, S/PV. 4003 
91 Sunday Telegraph, 4 April 1999. See Hammond, 2000: `Reporting "Humanitarian" Warfare: 
propaganda, moralism and NATO's Kosovo war', Journalism Studies, 1(3) 
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oneself as `humanitarian', one strips others of their humanity, thereby legitimating the 
exercise of often extreme violence against them. This was reflected in NATO's 
representation of the situation as a `clear-cut case of a brutal repressor tormenting 
defenceless victims. '92 Herring concurs with David Campbell that for 
`humanitarianism to be truly human and not dehumanizing, suffering must be put in 
historical and political context so that the extent of the responsibility of actors claiming 
humanitarian motives is identified. '93 The context and complex politics of Kosovo 
demonstrate that it is less easy to distinguish black from white than is perhaps suggested 
by those in favour of humanitarian war; consequently, drawing a distinction between 
friend and enemy `rules out or sidelines dialogue in favour of a stark and ineluctable 
antithesis. '94 Consensus better suits this construction than hermeneutics which attempts 
to break down such barriers. Given the lack of direct and `fair' dialogue, the location of 
control over the agenda, and the dissatisfaction of both parties with the text at 
Rambouillet, it is difficult to see how any real understanding of the `other's' position 
might have been able to develop. Similarly, the emphasis placed on agreement to a 
settlement regardless of the unresolved larger issues (and the awareness of these 
unresolved matters) indicates the international community's preference for consensus. 
5.3.5 Coherence 
The absence of coherence between actors' statements and their actions is 
important because it is relevant for understanding claims to sincerity and their 
communicative or strategic orientation. Similarly, understanding the argumentative 
process by which norms evolve or new norms emerge can tell us something about the 
legitimacy of the process and the norm in question. With regard to the communicative 
imperative of coherence, there are a number of issues which need to be raised in relation 
to different actors. It is suggested that consensus has implications for coherence, 
particularly in terms of the consistency between actions and words when action is taken 
in the name of the `international community'. 
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was consistent in the arguments it presented 
on at least three points: 
92 Goff (ed. ), 1999, p. 17 
93 Eric Herring,: From Rambouillet to the Kosovo Accords', Booth, (ed. ) 2001, p. 240 
94 Dallmayr, 2001, p. 4 
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1) The right of the FRY to oppose terrorism95; 
2) The rejection of attempts to internationalize Kosovo 96 
3) The rejection of independence for Kosovo. 97 
Clear consensus existed on the need to preserve existing territorial borders, including 
the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of countries of south-eastern Europe98 and the Contact 
Group, who made their position concerning the sovereignty of the FRY abundantly 
clear: 
No one should misunderstand our position on the core issue involved. We 
support neither independence nor the maintenance of the status quo. 99 
There is also consensus among the Contact Group (with the exception of the Russian 
Federation) and among other members of the LJNSC concerning several positions: 
1) The situation is a threat to international peace and security100; 
2) Respect for territorial integrity of the FRY; 
3) Further violence might lead to the destabilization of the region (including mass 
refugee flows); 
4) The situation presents a humanitarian tragedy, as evidenced by a mounting death 
toll; the unacceptability of human rights violations, even to counter terrorism; and 
references to previous humanitarian tragedies in the Balkans - the `never again' 
syndrome. 
There are, as a reflection of the consensus on these positions, coherent appeals to legal, 
humanitarian and strategic arguments visible in the speeches of Japan, Costa Rica, 
Sweden, Brazil, Slovenia, the UK, the USA, the EU, Germany, Italy, Turkey, Hungary, 
Poland, Greece, Croatia, and Bosnia & Herzegovina. This indicates a degree of 
legitimacy for such arguments, although this consensus must be seen in the context of 
the constraints and exclusions described so far. On the surface, then, we can see a fairly 
strong degree of coherence in the arguments presented by a variety of actors. However, 
95 S/1998/229. See also S/1998/240 - the recent actions of police forces of the Republic of 
Serbia in Kosovo and Metohija have been carried out exclusively in the function of combating 
terrorism', and S/1998/285. 
96 S/1998/285 
97 S/1998/250, S/1998/361, Annex 1 
98 S/1998/234 
99 S/1998/223, Contact Group statement, London, 9 March, 1998. This was to be echoed 
repeatedly during the course of the conflict by a number of states, including, very publicly, the 
United States (see Press Conference by Richard Holbrooke and William Walker, 29 October 
1998, from Weller, 1999(a) p. 295). See also S/1998/272 
100 S/1998/246 
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it is by being able to analyse the consistency between the actions of states and their 
words, that we are able to be more critical of the dialogue. 
The FRY/Serb position, although outwardly coherent and consistent, reveals 
certain inconsistencies when we try to reconcile actions and words. They refer 
constantly to the need to engage in positive dialogue; that all citizens in Serbia (and 
Kosovo) are equal, irrespective of nationality/ethnicity; that all national minorities enjoy 
full cultural autonomy; that the government of Serbia distinguishes between terrorists 
(legitimate targets) and members of national minorities; and that the government seeks 
to promote a tolerant, multi-ethnic and democratic state. Yet these positions are 
fundamentally at odds with their actions in Kosovo, and provide a misleading picture of 
what is taking place. For example, the FRY representative states that: 
Under the constitution and laws, all of them are granted the same civil and 
human rights: to their language, culture, media and religion; to elect and 
to be elected; and to participate in genuine political processes, from self- 
rule to republican and federal parliaments. '01 
This might be contradicted with evidence from Turkey's statement: 
The dangers inherent in the situation in Kosovo have been visible since at 
least 1989, when the acquired rights of autonomy and self-administration 
of the people of Kosovo were suddenly abrogated. Moreover, the 
economic hardships and deprivation faced by the people of Kosovo 
following the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia put unbearable strain on their endurance. The restrictions on 
the right of education also added fuel to the feeling of deep resentment, as, 
over the years, children have been deprived of adequate education. '02 
Furthermore, the FRY claims, somewhat surprisingly, that, `There are no armed 
conflicts in Kosovo and Metohija. '103 This creates problems with the validity claims of 
truth and sincerity raised by the FRY. Legitimising the use of force implies, at least, 
that there is some form of consensus as to the truth of actors' utterances and their 
relation to reality. Even if we accept that it is not sufficient to make a direct comparison 
between statements and reality but, as Habermas argues, that truth must be defined in 
terms of a `projected consensus' 104, justifiable doubts are raised given the limited 
consensus as to the reality of the situation. This in turn brings into question sincerity 
claims as the gap between other information sources, our own consensus (if there is 
101 S/PV. 3868. p. 15 
102 S/PV. 3868, p. 21 
103 S/PV. 3868, p. 17 
'0' Outhwaite, 1994, p. 41 
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one) and the claims of the FRY jeopardise our belief that the speaker is being honest 
with us. Consequently, this returns us to issues raised by the imperative of maximising 
dialogue over violence; our lack of faith in the speakers' sincerity should leave us with 
two options: to move to a discourse form of communication where the aim is 
`systematically to examine and test problematic truth and normative claims in their own 
right' 105; or to recognise a strategic and instrumental attitude and resort to force. 
However, the international community does neither of these. It accepts the FRY's 
claims and continues trying to broker a settlement without recognising the degree to 
which communication has been distorted. 
It is useful to juxtapose two situations in the light of the actions of the 
international community in order to attempt to understand how easy it is to misconstrue 
both actions and words, particularly when the coherence and consistency of both can be 
questioned. First, Rugova met Annan on 2 June 1998 and was assured that the 
international community would not leave the situation as it was in Kosovo, although 
with no clear indication as to what this might mean for the future of the Kosovars. '06 
Contrast this with Judah's record of a conversation with a KLA commander at a 
checkpoint in Kosovo who is reported as saying that they were not interested in talks. 
`When asked whether or not he should be as the Americans insisted that Kosovo could 
not be independent, he replied with impeccable logic: `And they said that none of the 
six republics of former Yugoslavia could be independent either, '. `They'll come 
round. ' 107 Given the overall level of inconsistency between the actions and words of 
the international community during the 1990s towards the former Yugoslavia, it is not 
surprising that it was widely believed among Kosovo Albanians that attitudes towards 
Kosovo's status would also change. 
Consequently, as we have seen, although there is coherence in the arguments 
presented by the Serbs and the international community within the UNSC, much of 
which centres on the need for dialogue, there is a lack of coherence between the stated 
aim of dialogue without preconditions and the dialogue that was initiated. It was also 
far from clear that Rambouillet represented a coherent settlement: the `non-negotiable 
principles were irreconcilable, the civilian and military annexes on implementation 
were not presented to the parties until the last moment' and both parties were presented 
105 Bernstein, 1995, p. 49 
106 S/1998/470 
107 Judah, 2002, p. 156 
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with concessions which excluded the political concerns of the other delegation. ' 08 
Following the end of the war, a lack of coherence was still present in the position 
adopted by the international community as it seemed that `the goals of both parties were 
(and continue to be) effectively nurtured and nullified simultaneously. ' 109 While the 
territorial integrity of the FRY was reaffirmed, the ongoing legal ambiguity concerning 
the status of Kosovo and the preparation by UNMIK of Kosovo and its institutions for 
substantial self-government and autonomy indirectly supported many Kosovo 
Albanians' continuing aim for independence. The `uncertainty surrounding the intent 
of the agreement continues to engender conflict on an intercommunal level in Kosovo, 
and has arguably contributed to ongoing insecurity in the region. ' i 10 
While there was a degree of consensus present in the decision to use force in 
Kosovo within the Security Council, as is arguably shown by the refusal to support the 
draft resolution tabled by Russia on 26 March 1999111, a rejection of Russia's position 
cannot carry the same weight as a positive affirmation of NATO's action. Much of the 
language in which refusals to condemn NATO's actions by supporting Russia were 
couched resorted to exceptional humanitarian necessity and an absence of alternative 
ways with which to deal with Milogevic and the ongoing human rights violations in 
Kosovo. Indeed, there was insufficient initial consensus to allow the problem to be 
dealt with by the Security Council and there were a number of other UN member states 
which expressed ongoing disagreement with NATO's actions. 112 Consequently, there 
was little suggestion that substantial agreement existed concerning an evolving norm of 
humanitarian intervention which presupposes a right to intervene militarily without the 
authorization of the Security Council. ' 13 The difficulty in maintaining consensus during 
what become known as a `war by committee' indicated the differing political agendas 
of states as well as different determination of states to use force in such circumstances. 
While Britain and America maintained support for military intervention, domestic 
108 Dauphinee, in Bieber and Daskalovski (eds. ), 2003, p, 107 
109 ibid. p. 111 
110 ibid. p. 112. The legal ambiguity sustained by over 7 years of international administration 
has perpetuated and entrenched the irreconcilable positions held by both Kosovo Albanians and 
Serbs. 
"' S/1999/328 
112 S/PV. 4003 
113 S/PV. 3988; S/PV. 3989; Hugh Walker, 2005: `The Case of Kosovo', Civil Wars, 7(1). This 
question in relation to Kosovo is, by itself, the subject of a voluminous literature and will not be 
discussed further here. For example, see Guicherd, 1999, Charney, 1999, Falk, 1999 
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politics and foreign policy in Germany, France and Italy, let alone Russia, were by no 
means either clear-cut or wholeheartedly supportive. 114 
5.3.6 Reflexivity 
The construction of the negotiation of the dialogue demanded by the 
international community between the Serbs and Kosovars has received little overt 
attention. It remains important, however, as a means by which the educational 
orientation of critical theory with practical intent is manifested. We can glean 
something of the attitudes towards this matter from a variety of statements. In the 
OSCE report of 20 April, we are once again faced with the problem of the contradiction 
between the call for genuine dialogue, and the preconditions for dialogue asserted by 
various actors: 
A delegation from Belgrade travelled to Pristina on several occasions 
declaring a readiness to begin a dialogue. The Kosovar Albanians 
declined to participate because there was no agreement on a framework 
and procedure for the talks. Moreover, this invitation for dialogue was 
issued by the Serbian Government in their Pristina offices and with the 
requirement that the question of the status of Kosovo be discussed only in 
the framework of the Republic of Serbia. This has been interpreted by the 
Albanian side as a precondition. At the same time, the request of the 
Kosovar Albanians and the international community to allow participation 
of an outside representative or representatives has been rejected by 
Belgrade. In spite of these factors, the Kosovar Albanians have formed a 
15-member advisory team to prepare a platform for the talks as well as a 
4-member group to participate in the talks once they begin. 115 
As was discussed under the imperative of maximising inclusion, there were 
internal problems amongst the conflicting parties which affected the negotiations. Just 
as the communicative relations among leading Kosovars were not as black and white as 
they were supposed by the international community, neither were those of the Serbs. 
While Rugova showed little desire to share power locally, and by so doing open up 
input on procedural and substantive aspects of the various dialogues, there were some 
Serbs who remained capable of reflexivity concerning their position towards dialogue. 
One such was Artemije, the Serb Orthodox Bishop of Prizren and Raska, who made a 
114 See Agüera, 2001, p. 122-3; Umberto Morelli: `Italy: The Reluctant Ally', in Weymouth, 
Henig (eds. ) 2001: The Kosovo Crisis: The last American war in Europe?, London, Pearson 
Education Limited, p. 60. Germany, Russia and Italy, at different points, requested a pause in 
the bombing. 
115 S/1998/361, Annex II 
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statement which is extraordinary in light of the perceptions of dialogue held by other 
actors involved: 
After the massacre in Drenica, the chances of a dialogue as a way of 
resolving the problem have been missed. Now what remains is what the 
gentlemen in Belgrade have chosen - the loss of Kosovo, just like that of 
Krajina, in war. War in Kosovo would mean the definite loss of Kosovo. 
War would give the international community an excuse to get involved 
and in that case the Serbian army and police would be forced to withdraw 
as occupation forces. [... ] We do not need mediators, people who impose 
solutions, but representatives who would listen to both sides in the 
Serbian-Albanian dialogue and inform the international community. They 
would not be an obstacle but are necessary. Serbia is not capable of 
offering a healthy dialogue without someone from outside. ] 16 
Although the Holbrooke agreement, endorsed in UNSCR 1203, has already been 
mentioned in connection with other communicative imperatives, it is worth reiterating 
that this dialogue showed little awareness of the procedural need for trade-offs to 
maintain the legitimacy of the discourse. Not only was there no public attempt to 
discursively redeem the procedural shortcomings of the negotiations, but neither was 
there an attempt to engage the affected, and excluded, parties in order to justify and 
defend them. The absence of acknowledged and redeemed trade-offs is significant not 
because such trade-offs are impossible, but because their validity lies in the manner of 
their justification. Such trade-offs cannot impede the ability of participants to engage in 
and arrive at future political judgements. The exclusion of the Kosovo Albanians from 
these negotiations without their agreement affected their ability to make relevant 
political judgements and potentially affected their future ability to preserve the 
necessary conditions for their participation. 
The use of proximity talks at Rambouillet instead of direct talks may have been 
a more likely means through which to arrive at an agreement, but not necessarily a more 
effective means of achieving peace as it does not offer the parties a chance to explore 
contested understandings of events or to understand the legitimacy behind the actions of 
the other. Consequently, the enforcement of the settlement is likely to be more difficult 
as the agreement is founded on a threat of force and coercion rather than reflecting 
genuine persuasion and understanding. These conditions do not allow for compromises 
"b Judah, 2002, p. 160. It is worth mentioning that Bishop Artemije's views are decidedly 
Serbian as to his position concerning Kosovo's status, but it is his pro-talks approach that is 
important in this context. Artemije's position is represented in the same way in the ICG report, 
Kosovo Spring, p. 33 
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to be reached and discursively redeemed between parties, as they are only achieved 
through a negotiator and cannot therefore serve to address the sentiments of hostility 
between the parties. ' 17 
Moreover, there is little questioning of these approaches: 
We consider that the Contact Group approach and the documents being 
tabled to the parties, provide the basis for the interim political settlement. 
We therefore expect both parties to use the few remaining days to: 
- agree very rapidly on the Contact Group's detailed proposals for 
self-government in Kosovo which have now been under negotiation for a 
week. 
- accept the implementation arrangements needed to establish this 
self government, including the development of a local police force, and 
measures to end the military confrontation in Kosovo. ll 
This lack of reflexivity on the one hand, can be contrasted with the awareness, 
on the other, of the international community's prior involvement in the Balkans. This 
awareness of historical involvement tends, in the collective memory of the Contact 
Group and UN Security Council, to go only as far back as the early 1990s; a far cry 
from the collective memory of Kosovo Albanians who see the involvement of what is 
now known as the international community go as far back as the Treaty of Berlin in 
1878.119 Indeed, it is the desire to avoid a repetition of the Bosnian war which served to 
motivate and justify military intervention in Kosovo. Despite a recognition of wider 
Balkan involvement, there is little explicit reference to or reflexivity concerning earlier 
refusals to address the problems in Kosovo. 
5.3.7 Recognition 
Recognition of actors, their situated and particular perspectives is important for a 
conflict such as Kosovo. However, as indicated, in response to a diversity of conflicting 
political and ideological aims, there were a number of particular values and identities set 
up as the `right' which gave preference to consensus rather than hermeneutic 
"' Press Briefing by the Contact Group Negotiators, 18 February 1999. Hill: `What happens is 
you get comments from one side, you go in another room and you get comments from the other 
side. You try to incorporate the more sensible of the comments, and then you bring out a new 
draft and, lo and behold, they look and they say, "Where did this come from? " Well, it 
obviously came from the other side and they don't like that. And then they say, "Well, what 
happened to our idea? " and you say "Sorry, the other side couldn't allow that in there and 
neither could we. "' 
118 Chairman's conclusions, Contact Group Meeting, Paris, 14 February 1999, Weller, 1999a, 
p. 431 
119 Conversations with Kosovo Albanians, Kosovo, May 2006 
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understanding. These have to do with the discourses of international law, statehood, 
humanitarianism and human rights, principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. It is 
partly as a consequence of these dominant discourses that certain other exclusions and 
constraints identified were placed on dialogue where some voices had a greater 
opportunity to be heard than others. One such example is that, almost unanimously, 
member states of the Security Council referred to the role of the KLA within the 
conflict as an example of terrorism, in line with the position taken by the FRY/Serbia. 
It is only in the statement of Slovenia that we see a more considered discussion of this 
concept and whether it is accurate to apply it to the conflict in Kosovo. 120 Slovenia 
states: 
In this context, I wish to refer to a specific question that requires attention 
at this stage, namely, the issue of terrorism and the danger of political 
misuse of the word "terrorism". There is a clear need to avoid the trap set 
by those who use the label of terrorism for reasons of political 
convenience and without proper factual foundation. [... ] there are forms 
of struggle that, albeit undesirable, are not terrorism and ought not to be 
labelled as such. 121 
The refusal of members within the UNSC to question the labelling of KLA operations 
as `terrorism' not only strengthened the position of the Yugoslav authorities, but also 
removed any incentive that the KLA might have had to reconsider its activities or limit 
its targets to military objectives as it indicated that they would not be accepted as an 
important actor. Such an approach failed to understand the complexity of the situation 
in Kosovo, the circumstances surrounding the rise of the KLA, and the relationship 
between the KLA and FRY/Serb forces, who incidentally, were not publicly accused of 
state-sponsored terrorism, despite the numerous occasions of violence against Kosovar 
Albanian civilians and the issue of ethnic cleansing. When the military actions of 
FRY/Serb forces against ethnic Albanian villages were condemned by the international 
community, it was in the language of `large scale police actions'. 122 The labelling of the 
KLA as terrorists began early on and was clearly stated by Albright on 9 March 1998: 
`The authorities in Serbia will try to blur the picture by claiming their actions are a 
legitimate response to a terrorist threat. We do not deny that they face such a threat. ' 123 
120 S/PV. 3868 
121 S/PV. 3868 
122 Weller, 1999a, p. 221 
2; Statement by Madeleine Albright at the Contact Group Ministerial on Kosovo, London, 9 
March, 1998, at 1-ittp: //secretaTy. state. gov/www/statements/1998/980309. htn-d 
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The public statements of the FRY also shed light on the imperative of 
recognition, as it demonstrates quite clearly the difference not only between the way 
that the Serbs perceive the current problem in Kosovo and its perception by other actors, 
but also an intrinsic difference between the way that the Serbs and Kosovar Albanians 
perceive their own history. As discussed in Chapter 1, Kosovo is undisputedly, in the 
minds of both Serbs and Albanians, important territory, and plays a significant role in 
the construction of their respective identities. While only the Serb perception is 
portrayed within the Security Council debates due to the absence of a Kosovar Albanian 
voice, this position contrasts with one that is representative of many Kosovar Albanians 
and is voiced by one of the most famous contemporary Albanian authors, Ismail 
Kadare. The FRY/Serbia states that: 
Kosovo and Metohija is a Serbian province that has always been, and is 
today, an integral part of the Republic of Serbia. That territory has never 
been part of any other State. It is the cradle of the Serbian State, one of 
the oldest European States, the birthplace of Serbian culture and 
civilization. 124 
This may be contrasted with Kadare's words: 
If we glance at what is written on Kosovo, we note that the majority of 
writers start the introduction with a legend, a myth: that Kosovo 
historically belonged to Serbia. Kosovo, the birthplace of Serbia. Kosovo, 
Serbia's Jerusalem. Kosovo, ancient Serbian territory on which the 
Albanians appeared later. 125 
Kadare goes on to write that `It is the distortion of history which has fomented this 
crime in the Balkans' 126; `No serious historian, no reliable historical source indicates 
that the Serbs were the first inhabitants of Kosovo, and the Albanians the latecomers. It 
is exactly the opposite: the Albanians have always been there, the Slavs only arrived 
afterwards. ' 127 Neither Serb nor Kosovo Albanian demonstrates a significant attempt 
within limited dialogues to understand the perspectives of the other, nor indeed 
124 S/PV. 3868, p. 15 
125 `Si Fon jette un coup d'oeil ä ce qui s'ecrit sur le Kosovo, on constate que la plupart des 
auteurs reprennent en introduction une legende, un mythe : l'appartenance historique du Kosovo 
ä la Serbie. Le Kosovo, berceau de la Serbie. Le Kosovo, Jerusalem Serbe. Le Kosovo, vieille 
terre serbe sur laquelle les Albanais sont adventices. ' La Question du Kosovo, 1994, p. 17. All 
translations are the author's own. 
126 ibid. p. 18: `C'est en defigurant 1'Histoire que l'on a fomente ce crime dans les Balkans. ' 
127 ibid. `Aucun historien serieux, aucune source historique fiable n'admet que les Serbes aient 
ete les premiers occupants du Kosovo, et les Albanais des adventices. C'est exactement le 
contraire: les Albanais ont toujours ete lä, les Slaves ne sont arrives qu'ensuite. ' 
200 
indicates awareness of their own explicit or implicit involvement in the political 
construction of this conflict and identity crisis. 128 
In terms of facilitating further dialogue, encouraging `the force of the better 
argument', the position adopted by the international community does not help to break 
down barriers between identity or opposing perspectives. A statement issued on behalf 
of the Security Council in August 1998 is worth mentioning for several reasons. 129 By 
affirming the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY, the international 
community simultaneously refuses to recognise the demands of the Kosovo Albanians 
whilst portraying them as victims of a humanitarian tragedy and affirming that they will 
be not be left unaided. This reaffirms traditional legal and humanitarian discourses but 
without constructively furthering communicative potential by adopting and encouraging 
a more reflexive position. 
When we look at the extent to which parties engaged in argumentative reasoning 
or effective persuasion, it becomes clear that all parties have, despite claims to the 
contrary, prejudged the outcome of any dialogue on the issue of Kosovo's status. The 
presentation of `positions' is not consistent with the argumentative reasoning or 
persuasion of a communicative rationality. For Serbs, Kosovo must remain in Serbia, 
and for Kosovars, Kosovo must become independent. Despite attempts at dialogue, the 
position of the Kosovo Albanians also hardened as a result of continuing attacks by Serb 
forces during the summer of 1998. 
There is a fundamental dilemma faced by the international community in trying 
to satisfy two incompatible positions. No political solution can be reached while the 
international community simultaneously supports the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the FRY, and the human and political rights of the Kosovar Albanians so 
long as the actors involved all want more than the international community can give 
without moving away from established norms and practices of international relations. 130 
Any such shift requires that the international community acknowledges that it supports 
one side's claim over the other's which therefore implies that a sense of legitimacy 
inheres in a particular set of moral beliefs or claims. This position is complicated by the 
strengthening perception of the Serbs as the perpetrators and the Kosovo Albanians as 
the victims in order to develop support and justification for military action, whilst 
128 Kostovicova, 2005, Clark, 2000, and Mertus, 1999 
129 S/PV. 3918 
130 A similar point is made by Allin, 2002, p. 51 
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arguing that intervention can only take place on the grounds of human rights, not in 
support of the Kosovo Albanian demand for independence. This intractable and 
complex situation might be ameliorated by adopting a more communicative rationality, 
where incompatible positions might be influenced by innovative communicative 
proposals and greater openness and reflexivity. 131 
5.4 A critique of Bjola's application of theory to practice 
In the light of the above application of the communicative imperatives, what can 
we now make of Bjola's analysis? One of the key concerns raised by the 
communicative imperatives in my analysis is the degree to which all parties enjoyed 
equal opportunities to participate in the argumentative discourses that preceded the 
adoption of the UN Security Council resolutions. Bjola argues that the deliberative 
context preceding the intervention in Kosovo was: 
fairly balanced. Each side experienced basically no difficulties in 
presenting and defending their positions. While the US, UK and France 
were determined to stop Milosevic from inflicting further harm on the 
Kosovar Albanians, the other two permanent members of the Security 
Council, Russia and China, expressed strong reservations about military 
intervention in what they viewed as the `internal affairs' of the FRY. The 
Yugoslav representatives were able also not only to present and defend 
their arguments directly in front of the UN Security Council, but they also 
benefited from having their position taken up and defended vigorously by 
the Russian ambassador to the UN. 132 
The picture presented here by Bjola, however, is somewhat incomplete. The 
representation within the Security Council was largely one-sided as concerns the actors 
directly involved in the conflict, as the Kosovar Albanians had no voice. Moreover, that 
their interests were ably and accurately represented by the US, UK and France is 
questionable when considering these countries previous engagement, or lack of it, over 
the Kosovo issue, their preference for retaining the territorial integrity of the FRY and 
their labelling of the KLA as terrorists. Even controversial moves to protect the 
Kosovars through intervention were taken to end the repression by the Serbs with a 
fairly conventional endpoint in mind. Bjola also overlooks the fact that the control of 
the decisions lay largely with members of the Contact Group; while he raises this with 
131 See Dryzek's argument in favour of a communicative rationality to better address complex 
social problems. Dryzek, 1990, ch. 3 
132 Bjola, 2005, p. 289 
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his discussion of the deliberative context, he does not acknowledge the communicative 
distortion that this might impose on discussions, or that dissenting views from the non- 
permanent member states were largely ignored if we consider the final outcome. The 
question then becomes one which will be addressed in the conclusion: is this because 
their arguments genuinely failed to be as persuasive, or because the power balance 
within the Security Council, weighted in favour of the major powers/Contact 
Group/Permanent 5, distorted the communicative process? 
Bjola also addresses the issue of argumentative reasoning, the willingness of 
actors to change their beliefs in order to reach consensus about the decision to use force. 
This means that actors should not follow their individual goals through strategic or 
rhetorical action, but by actively listening to the arguments of others, and `by 
coordinating their action plans based on the `best argument' available. ' 133 Bjola notes 
that the communicative framework demarcating the debate preceding NATO 
intervention was controversial and contested, although he indicates no concern over the 
lack of contestation of controversial validity claims raised by certain parties within the 
UN dialogue. Bjola's conclusion is interesting; he acknowledges that `the field of 
exchanges and interactions between the parties [meaning the Serbs and Kosovars, but 
also extending to Russia and China] was overwhelmingly dominated by strategic 
considerations and rhetorical actions', yet argues that the `proponents of the 
intervention, the US, UK and France, were apparently the only side making genuine 
efforts to move beyond an instrumental logic of action, and to take into account the 
interests of the other actors as well'. 134 The table below indicates Bjola's conclusions 
concerning the deliberative standards of the use of force. 135 
1 33 ibid. p. 290 
134 ibid. p. 291 
135 ibid. p. 292-the table is modified slightly as it originally 'included Bjola's conclusions 
concerning the war in Iraq which are not relevant for these purposes. 
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Kosovo 
Accuracy of the justifications invoked High 
Deliberative context Balanced 
Interest in argumentative reasoning 
Pro-intervention High 
Against-intervention Low 
Assessment Legitimate 
While it is true that these countries did, initially, push for unconditional dialogue 
and diplomacy over violence, did engage Russia and China in an attempt to forge 
consensus, did call for an end to violence on both sides and did set up the talks at 
Rambouillet, their modus operandi is not free from criticism. There was little, if any 
reflexivity over the structure or procedures guiding the talks prior to Rambouillet, nor 
does Bjola consider the oft-cited argument that Rambouillet was in itself an example of 
strategic action whereby the talks were slanted in such a way as to offer no chance of a 
political settlement, hence ensuring that NATO would have to intervene. He refers to 
the strategic action of Russia at Rambouillet, but makes no mention of contested and 
strategic behaviour on the part of other Contact Group members or even the structure of 
the talks themselves. Although Russia, China and the FRY might rightly be accused of 
strategic or rhetorical action, their positions, as recorded in the reports of the Secretary- 
General and the OSCE, were not directly challenged and the other members of the 
Contact Group were reluctant to reason more openly about the validity of the arguments 
presented by other member states. Bjola's argument is weakened by a lack of empirical 
analysis to support his claim that deliberative legitimacy was present during dialogue 
within the UN. Pertinent political, legal and humanitarian arguments were presented by 
Russia and other countries who were ambivalent about the use of force such as 
Malaysia, Namibia, Gabon, Belarus, India, and Cuba 136, yet these seemingly had little if 
any impact on the argumentative reasoning of the UK, US and France. The crucial 
point is not whether these arguments were made for strategic purposes or even whether 
136 Cuba's statement voices a strong opposition to current global power relations, and in this 
case states that: `Following a series of distressing and highly manipulative political events, 
prolonged armed clashes, and complex - and hardly transparent - negotiations on the question 
of Kosovo, [NATO] finally launched its heralded brutal air attacks... ' S/PV. 3989 
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the arguments were legitimate, but whether justifications were offered for not engaging 
with them. 
Furthermore, although Bjola argues that, from the outset, the international 
community tried to `strike a balance between the claims of the two belligerent parties', 
he provides no analysis as to the content and implications for each side of the political 
settlements constructed. Such an analysis might indicate, given the respective 
situational positions of the Serbs and Kosovar Albanians, that these settlements 
favoured certain sides, notably the Serbs in the sense that their territorial integrity was 
not threatened. Moreover, he states that the talks at Rambouillet indicate that other 
options were exhausted prior to the use of force, but he does not acknowledge the earlier 
repeated exclusions of the Kosovo Albanians from dialogue at this level and the 
consequences of this for dialogue. Interestingly, Bjola does not address the degree of 
internal legitimacy enjoyed by state leaders, and whether or not internal processes 
regulating their own rise to power and consequent legitimacy has any effect on their 
claims to valid speech at the international level. While their internal legitimacy may not 
prevent them from the opportunity to be included within dialogue that affects their 
people's interests, on whose behalf they claim to speak, it does offer an additional layer 
of possible challenges to validity claims when engaging in dialogue at an international 
level. 137 
Despite its shortcomings, Bjola's framework does target the relevant question, 
and it is worth repeating here: 
[D]o the promoters of military interventions try to reach a reasoned 
consensus on the need for the use of force, or do they just engage in 
power games based on credible threats, intimidation or rhetorical 
exchanges with no visible intention to achieve argumentative consensus 
with the other members of the international community on the definition 
of the situation and on the course of action? 138 
Bjola recognises the flaws intrinsic to the decision-making and enforcement procedures 
of the UN Security Council and these are appropriate for further analysis based on a 
communicative framework in order to `see through the veil of inconsistencies and 
political manipulation of the Charter provisions, and in doing so, to provide a clear basis 
137 This question will not be addressed here either, but it is a point which has implications for 
democratic and deliberative legitimacy. 
138 Bjola, 2005, p. 267 
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for distinguishing between legitimate vs illegitimate uses of force. 139 Despite good 
arguments for the appropriateness of communicative action in IR, Bjola neither 
acknowledges nor explicitly addresses methodological or theoretical problems such as 
the limits to theory or the difficulties involved in constructing and applying a 
Habermasian framework to problems in international relations. As a result the 
theoretical model presented here is not as sophisticated as it could be and is unable to 
deliver an empirical analysis which is as critical or detailed as the theory might allow. 
5.5 Learning from the Communicative Imperatives 
A number of constraints and exclusions have been identified in the course of this 
analysis. These centre on the exclusion of key participants, the location of control over 
the agenda and therefore the possible parameters of the dialogue, an absence of 
justificatory discourses regarding contested norms and courses of action, an absence of 
coherence between the actions and words of states, an absence of procedural reflexivity 
and the privileging of certain actors and positions over others without offering 
justifications, not least through the unmistakable presence of preconditions. While the 
focus on dialogue within the Security Council and at Rambouillet excludes other 
communicative fora where important communication may have taken place, this is 
justified by its public accessibility and accountability as well as by the practical 
constraints of this research. While all dialogic and intersubjective interactions are 
highly complex and influenced by a significant number of factors, the copious number 
of potentially affective conditions and motivations at the international level make it 
difficult to interpret practice in as sophisticated manner as the theory discussed in 3.4 
and 4.4 suggests. 
We need now to develop an awareness of the limitations we encounter when 
applying these criteria to a concrete situation. The degree of overlap between the 
communicative imperatives concerning the issues drawn from the material makes it 
difficult at times to provide a succinct and separate analysis of each communicative 
imperative; they all concern different facets of a larger problem of legitimacy. Even 
though the aspects of illegitimacy raised indicate fairly general points, they suggest 
issues which might be broached by future participants if legitimacy is also conceived of 
in communicative terms. 
139 ibid. p. 274-5 
206 
This framework does not seek to legitimate particular dialogues, or indeed to 
demonstrate exactly how speech may be made legitimate, but rather to illuminate the 
inequalities and illegitimacy of dialogue which purports to be justified and legitimate. ' 40 
Neither is it a question of passing judgement on the specific decisions of states 
concerning humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, but rather of demonstrating their 
shortcomings in terms of legitimacy by virtue of the constraints and exclusions present. 
In other words, it reflects Wellmer's argument that the formal criteria cannot be applied 
independent of an understanding and judgement of particular discourses. 14 1 Not all 
elements will apply to all dialogues, so, as Wellmer notes, the use of any criteria must 
reflect the particular character of the dialogue. It is not possible to translate the terms of 
the criteria directly onto the target material. The material may tell us certain things 
about dialogue without directly answering the question posed. It might, therefore, be 
appropriate to consider the communicative imperatives as offering a critical 
interpretative power in relation to practice rather than referring to them as an application 
of theory to practice. In this light, the theoretical framework offers a means by which 
some of these constraints and exclusions may be recognised and removed, but not a 
blueprint for an ideal speech situation. The burden is on those who wish to be 
recognised as legitimate actors to ensure that constraints and exclusions are addressed. 
However, in the absence of greater consciousness by actors of this need, then this 
method of critique against a normative background offers a means of raising awareness 
of the kinds of legitimacy which such decisions required. 
We will further develop these limitations in Chapter 6, however, there remain 
several points to be raised concerning the relationship between the communicative 
imperatives and the conflict in Kosovo. A question raised by the identification of 
constraints upon dialogue which produces decisions claiming to be legitimate and 
justified is as follows: do the arguments of actors who have been excluded or unable to 
influence proceedings genuinely fail to be persuasive, or is this a result of the power 
balance within the Security Council which is weighted in favour of the major powers 
and has consequently distorted the communicative process? Given the absence of some 
key actors from negotiations, the lack of genuine communicative interaction regarding 
140 Blaug suggests that one of the strengths of discourse ethics is its potential to illustrate the 
entropic quality of leg itimacy of institutions and, consequently, to challenge the claims to It, legitimacy of the state. Blaug, 1999, p. 1 19-122 
" Wellmer, 1995. p. 323 
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contested norms and truth claims within the Security Council and the dominance of the 
Contact Group states in setting out both procedural and substantive content for a 
number of dialogues, the latter seems to be the case in this particular context. 
The exclusion of certain actors prevents our knowing whether or not a rational 
consensus might have been achieved through the persuasive force of the better 
argument; consequently, whether there might have been better arguments or not is 
something that we cannot know. The conflicting concerns present in dialogue relating 
to humanitarian intervention reflects dominant paradigms concerning realist and liberal 
conceptions of power and the relation of states to each other, as well as their 
responsibility towards others. 142 However, in the face of claims to universal legitimacy 
and acceptance of emerging norms of humanitarian intervention within organisations 
such as the UN, it remains necessary to look at the fairness of communicative 
procedures and whether we can identify constraints on dialogue, in part, arguably, as a 
result of the dominance of certain discourses and structures. This is not to say that such 
organizations or hierarchies of influence are unacceptable, nor to deny the inevitable 
presence of `interests' in influencing discourse and actions, but merely to suggest that 
their legitimacy must be open to question when these factors affect the interests of 
others. Having noted that instrumental rationality and strategic action pervade the 
sphere of international action, it is important to indicate that this analysis is not 
suggesting that communicative rationality can or should replace strategic action totally, 
but rather that there is a place for both, and that the dominance of strategic action may 
have repercussions for legitimacy when examined from a discursive democratic 
perspective. 
With dialogue as the object of critique, the majority of focus has been on the 
process leading up to NATO's intervention. There are, however, three points to be 
noted by looking at the consequences of the use of force in light of a communicative 
framework. 143 First, the question raised is whether or not strategic action opened up or 
closed off further avenues for dialogue. If, as is suggested, the means used by NATO, 
142 This is not to suggest that these are the only paradigms which influence practice in 
international relations, only that they remain two of the most important ones. 
143 Although we could continue testing the communicative imperatives by analysing events after 
Rambouillet, including NATO's intervention, the consequences of military force and the further 
engagement by the UN, individual states, NGO's and NATO after the use of force, the tests 
carried out in this chapter are sufficient to demonstrate the critical interpretive power of the 
communicative imperatives. 
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including high altitude bombing (including the use of cluster bombs and depleted 
uranium), no ground troops, a force protection doctrine guided by national, not 
humanitarian, interests, and a targeting strategy which effectively treated all Serbs as 
combatants, closed off further dialogue and did not necessarily match the humanitarian 
claims made in order to justify its intervention, then its legitimacy must be called into 
question. 144 Secondly, as Mandelbaum indicates, there is a serious lack of coherence in 
NATO's policy as the organisation: 
intervened in a civil war and defeated one side, but embraced the 
position of the party it had defeated on the issue over which the war had 
been fought. This made the war, as a deliberate act of policy, a perfect 
failure. The humanitarian goal NATO sought - the prevention of 
suffering - was not achieved by the bombing; the political goal the air 
campaign made possible and the Albanian Kosovars favored - 
independence - NATO not only did not seek but actively opposed. 
145 
Thirdly, there is an important link between humanitarian claims made to justify military 
action and the non-humanitarian ends which emerged from NATO's actions. The 
impact of consequences on perceptions of legitimacy is partly captured in the 
framework through the need for coherence between the words and actions of states. 146 
Young supports this critique, arguing that it is very difficult to claim that the war did 
more good or prevented more harm than it caused, a judgement supported by Arendt's 
argument that `[v]iolence can destroy power; it is utterly incapable of creating it. ' 147 
Certainly, if power is understood as cooperation, the ability to act in concert to establish 
collective ends (for example, effective self-government), then Arendt may have been 
right to suggest that violence is capable of destroying power. There is little sense of 
collective action, consent and consensus in community governance and neither Serbian 
nor Kosovan institutions have fully recovered their capacity since the war. 148 
144 Clark, (2005, p. 191) recognises that consensus, a necessary but insufficient ingredient for 
legitimacy, is a matter of voluntary agreement which encompasses ends and means. 
145 Mandelbaum, 1999, p. 5 
146 SACEUR, General Clark, said in relation to NATO's bombing that "It was not designed as a 
means of blocking Serb ethnic cleansing. It was not designed as a way of waging war against 
the Serb and MUP [Ministry of Interior] forces in Kosovo in any way. There was never any 
intent to do that. " Cited by Herring, Booth, ed. (2001), p. 231 
14' Hannah Arendt, 1970: On Violence, USA, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, p. 44,56 
148 For a consideration of the consequences and lessons of NATO's actions, see Mccgwire, 
2000, Booth, 1999; Mandelbaum, 1999; Layne, 1999, Carpenter, 2000 
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6. Evaluating Theory and Practice 
6.1 Assessing the Communicative Imperatives 
As we have discovered, although moral arguments permeate international 
politics, such arguments do not necessarily follow discourse ethical principles and a 
number of problems arise when we seek to consider this relationship. Despite 
undeniable problems with applying normative theory to practice, Habermas's project of 
communicative action is driven with the practical intent of rescuing communicative 
reason from the encroachment of instrumental reason, thus the very notion of 
communicative action and the presuppositions of argumentation have obvious 
implications for any understanding of deliberative democracy, legitimacy, or 
communicatively oriented interactions. It is these implications which have motivated 
our theoretical exploration, development and application to practice. 
Communicative action and dialogue have been presented as an intrinsic part of a 
revised notion of good international citizenship and as part of a generalizable 
framework able to assess the processes by which legitimation is claimed and 
justifications offered in conflict situations. Communicative action as a concept has 
become broader than it originally stands in Habermasian thought. Adopting the moves 
of other critical theorists, communication is not restricted to the rational, abstract model 
situated firmly in the ethics of justice. Instead, communication no longer conceives the 
emotional, imaginative, expressive or other forms of verbal communication to be 
necessarily irrational, and therefore unworthy of attention. Instead, adopting moves 
towards context sensitive discourse as advocated, albeit in different ways, by thinkers 
such as Arendt, Benhabib, Wellmer, Gadamer, Shapcott, and Young, offers potential for 
improving real communicative practices in contemporary politics. 
In response to the question first asked in the Introduction - is a discursive 
approach to decision-making procedures in conflict situations able to help us assess the 
legitimacy of decisions to use force - to what extent are the communicative imperatives 
an effective tool for revealing constraints and moments of illegitimacy in dialogue? 
Inclusion, in all its guises, is a common theme to the communicative imperatives and 
has illuminated a number of areas of concern for deliberative legitimacy in the case of 
Kosovo. Inclusion becomes more than an abstract requirement of discourse ethics and 
embraces different types of particularisms and expressive behaviours. It is not that 
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Habermas's theory is deliberately exclusive: his rejection of the monological categorical 
imperative, insistence on intersubjectivity and his conception of discourses of 
application, along with the conditions of the ideal speech situation, all indicate 
otherwise. Critics, however, have highlighted the need to move beyond the formalism 
of Habermas's discourse ethics and concept of rationality. This aspect of inclusion is 
particularly important when considered alongside the implications for issues of 
recognition and identity, where it becomes apparent when we consider that formal rules 
and institutions, recognising the rights and relevance of minority groups and 
recognising their right to be actively heard, do not necessarily produce the actual 
(empirical) public and political recognition of these groups and their voices. 149 
Inclusion not only refers to participation, diversity and difference, but also to 
empowering the excluded. It is not defined a priori, but is an ongoing process, whose 
limits are articulated precisely through challenges to its existing formulation which 
emerge from those who are excluded and who nevertheless wish for equal recognition. 
That said, decision-making procedures cannot be open to an infinite number of 
viewpoints; closure must be reached at some point. There are many practical reasons 
for limited inclusion of participants or particular interests which cannot be ignored in an 
attempt to come closer to a communicative ideal. Thus, the emphasis on procedure in 
this framework seeks to draw our attention to how closure is determined and who is 
consequently excluded, revealing, in the case of Kosovo, a pattern of power inequalities 
and the absence of justification for the exclusion of actors. 
The analysis offered in Chapter 5 has attempted to demonstrate some of the 
limits of theorising when critical theoretical concepts are extended into the realm of 
international practice, not least, the appropriate balance between strategic and 
communicative action. The normative potential for increased legitimacy and the 
alternative to traditional understandings of power and interests that is offered by this 
framework has not been rejected for being unable to achieve clear ends; an aim which 
theory should not seek to fulfil anyway. It argues that the accepted standards of 
communication should presuppose the norm, for example, of inclusion; it is the 
exclusion sought by actors which must be interrogated and justified. The clashes 
between concepts of the ideal and evidence of the real are not grounds for abandoning 
normative reasoning or critique of extant practices, but rather are grounds for 
149 Pajnik, 2006, p. 393 
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transforming our understanding of how we conceive and judge existing practices. 
Consequently, due to the presence of structural and communicative distortion, 
undisclosed as a result of a lack of reflectivity by state actors and coupled with practical 
concerns over the composition of the Security Council, the argument being made here is 
that consensus alone within the Security Council is a necessary but insufficient measure 
to grant legitimacy to decisions to use force. A detailed analysis reveals inadequate 
procedures and unacknowledged constraints present throughout the negotiations process 
surrounding Kosovo and cannot, therefore, support the claim that there was no 
alternative other than the use of military force and the subsequent methods adopted by 
NATO in order to respond to the humanitarian situation in Kosovo. 
Additional limitations related to the inability of the empirical focus of analysis 
to take into account all of the communicative imperatives contained in the broad 
theoretical framework, particularly the criteria relating to Maximising diversity. Rather 
than invalidating this theoretical framework, however, it indicates the potential for 
application to different foci. The interactions within the Security Council and at 
Rambouillet were unable to provide sufficient data for all criteria offered by the 
communicative imperatives, suggesting that further evidence might be gathered by 
examining different empirical foci such as the role of the media, development and 
cohesion of foreign policy-making at a national level, the impact of non-state actors on 
national and international policy formulation, and inter-state relationships. The 
communicative imperatives may still retain validity in different types of discourses, but 
a degree of sensitivity is required to assess the appropriateness of the tool being applied 
to a particular conflict and, within that, a particular empirical focus. Despite this, there 
is still significant evidence to support the applicability of a communicative approach to 
international politics and conflict resolution. As Booth argues: 
It is not now possible to know whether conflict prevention measures 
would have worked, only that opportunities were missed. Because we 
know the end of the story, it is tempting to assume that it had to be, but we 
know from other situations that different choices can result in different 
outcomes. 150 
Faced with normative theory and the abstract notion of ideal communication 
offered by Habermas, the juxtaposition of theory and empirical practice in international 
relations struggles to assimilate these concepts with the radically different presentation 
150 Booth (ed. ), 2001, p. 321 
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of arguments in practice. For example, state representatives at the UN Security Council 
put forward their `position' on a particular issue, but this does not entail contestation of 
challenging `positions'. The closest that practice comes to emulating the move in 
discourse ethics from ordinary communicative interaction to a more abstract 
contestation of norms and truth claims is the variance of positions within the 
international law and humanitarian discourses. Yet, as has been highlighted, conflicting 
claims and representations of the truth are not necessarily challenged and discussed. 
The debate within the UNSC was not seen to be a reflexive process concerning the 
means of discourse but was concerned only with the desirability of particular ends 
which often reflected the preferred positions of member states. Although this may be 
translated as a debate over both values and the validity of `universal' norms, such as the 
desirability of a norm of humanitarian intervention, there is little consideration given to 
the quality of the communicative interaction taking place or its relationship to normative 
communicative ideals. This linguistic difficulty then, in itself, tells us something of the 
approach to communicative standards adopted by participants within international 
practice and the inadequate perception of the link between communicative standards 
and the legitimacy of decisions. 151 
The communicative imperatives are an effective tool in that they were clearly 
able to offer guidance concerning the illegitimacy of particular practices of exclusion. 
They were also able to reveal specific practices which were coercive, notably pertaining 
to the control over the decision-making processes and agendas exerted by particular 
states. They highlighted the dominance of strategic action within a supposedly 
communicative forum such as the Security Council and indicated that this also affected 
the kind of communication which took place, as, for example, in the case of an absence 
of effective persuasion. Levels of coherence could be ascertained by examining both 
the dialogue and actions of actors and revealed a number of inconsistencies which at 
times led to communication operating under a series of misapprehensions. General 
themes appertaining to the quality of the dialogue, such as any reflexive tendencies and 
the ability or willingness of actors to engage in dialogue more conducive to recognition, 
hermeneutic understanding and the genuine justification of contested norms, were also 
able to be identified - albeit largely through their absence. These conclusions suggest 
that rather than reifying the role of the state and sovereign models of power, dialogue 
151 Deitelhoff and Muller (2005) acknowledge the difficulties in trying to distinguish between 
different types of empirical dialogue: they often appear simultaneously and cannot be separated. 
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might also need to include non-state actors in a variety of forms, including NGOs, 
domestic political opposition groups, and, in this context, arguably, the KLA. 152 The 
ability to reveal exclusions challenges the vested interests of those whose position is 
based on the status quo, and suggests possibilities for empirical and deliberative 'break- 
outs'. 
6.2 Strategy and morality in international politics. 
The dilemma posed by the appropriate role for and degree of strategic power in a 
model which favours communicative action is a troubling one. Faced by the 
impossibility, and undesirability, of precluding strategic action from international 
politics, this research suggests that the real problem is not the presence of strategic 
action, but its role in relation to communicative action. Habermas did not seek to 
prohibit strategic, or instrumental, rationalities from reality; rather he sought to limit it 
to particular spheres which pertained to his distinction between the system and the 
lifeworld. However, recent moves by critical theorists in relation to Kosovo have 
complicated this issue. In Apel's reflections on Kosovo, for example, he acknowledges 
the revival of `manifest uncertainty' over the question of a `hierarchical order in the 
relationship between ethics, law and strategic rationality. ' 53 Herein, as I understand it, 
lies Apel's solution to the problem of power and strategic action in international 
relations: 
This morality of history-related responsibility, [ ... o]n the one 
hand, [ ... ] demands a maximization of problem-solving through discourses (and fair 
negotiations, whose rules must be a priori prescribed by discourses); on 
the other hand, however, sometimes in those unavoidable situations where 
discursive-communicative procedures of problem-solution are not 
possible because one of the potential partners is not prepared to cooperate, 
the morality of history-related responsibility possibly needs to take over 
the risk of using force against force; but this, to be sure, only under the 
regulative idea of simultaneously preparing for the future those conditions 
(especially institutions of law) that make communicative-discursive 
procedures of problem-solving possible. '54 
152 For an interesting discussion on who we should talk to, see Michael Vatikiotis: `Let's talk to 
religious radicals, too', Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, International Herald Tribune, 
November 27,2006 
153 Karl-Otto Apel, 2001: `On the Relationship Between Ethics, International Law and Politco- 
Military Strategy in Our Time', European Journal of Social Theory, 4(1), p. 30 
154 ibid. p. 35 
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This indicates that any solution to the dichotomy between power and morality in 
international relations requires us to commit to some form of substantive normative 
conclusion which might have to be brought about strategically. This is, as elaborated in 
Chapter 5, similar to the approach favoured by Habermas with his preference for the 
institutionalisation of cosmopolitan law. There is, perhaps, an irreconcilable difference 
at times between the sophisticated, other-sensitive approach offered by critical theory, 
and the action needs of international politics as currently structured. In other words, it 
is not possible to remain sitting on the fence indefinitely when faced with the contrary 
positions of real actors who, quite simply, may prefer violence to talking. '55 This 
indicates the inevitable triumph of strategic action even when used for normative ends, 
and so this project loses something of the critical edge it has tried so hard to keep when 
faced with the need for concrete solutions. One approach to this problem is to 
acknowledge Dryzek's argument concerning the relationship between strategic and 
communicative rationalities. They are able to, indeed must, coexist; the question is how 
we arrive at the correct balance. It is suggested in Chapter 5 that the relationship 
becomes unbalanced when strategic action is dominant and impedes the legitimacy 
which may be derived from communicative action. The framework presented here has 
attempted to show that communicative practices should always retain the capacity to 
question strategic action where it appears. 
This dilemma is also tackled by those with post-structuralist leanings in a way 
which reflects the concerns raised by critical theorists for theory or practical 
organisation undertaken without a reflexive element. Campbell argues in this vein: `no 
political theorisation, prior to its materialisation, can legislate for politics (at least while 
retaining a sense of the paradox of politics rather than effecting an authoritarian 
position)'. 156 Similarly against the imposition of specific rules, Bulley argues that 
instituting a program would choose a `conditional hospitality over the unconditional', 
by which he means that the ontopological `at-home' would be further institutionalised 
and entrenched in the minds of diplomats, politicians, academics and citizens, 
preventing negotiation or dialogue between the ontopological and the non- 
155 Shapcott also recognises this relationship between strategic and communicative action, 2001, 
p. 236 
's6 David Campbell, 1998b: `Why Fight: Humanitarianism, Principles and Post-Structuralism', 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 27(3), p. 513 
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ontopological. 157 This problem of institutionalisation is indeed the dilemma faced by 
critical theory when we seek to transpose it into practice. The Derridean approach 
adopted by Bulley is to avoid the offering of concrete solutions, but to wait for the 
opportunity to `change things, to think differently, to invent' `in the moment'. This 
approach means that it is not possible to demonstrate how this kind of negotiation might 
occur, or even if it Will. 158 This places those in the `here and now' in a somewhat 
difficult position. '59 While the conception of dialogue offered in this research is not 
primarily situated in the post-structuralist literature and so cannot fully address the 
concerns it raises, one important point is raised within this literature which is pertinent 
to an alternative understanding of Kosovo, legitimacy and communication, and that is 
Campbell's notion of ontopology. ' 60 
What importance does an ontopological or non-ontopological approach to 
Kosovo hold for this research? 161 The notion of ontopology is singularly relevant to the 
situation in Kosovo as the site of contested ethnic and nationalist narratives and 
Campbell's and Bulley's approaches to it offer a means to support and develop some 
conclusions arising out of earlier analysis. Briefly, the problem does not simply 
concern the reactions of the international community, although they do play a role, but 
also has to do with the approach of the Kosovar Albanians and Serbs themselves. 
While it may be that the link between identity and territory has been constructed and 
manipulated to serve political ends, it is nonetheless still the case that this is also the 
contemporary self-perception of many (although by no means all) Serbs and Albanians. 
Most importantly, it is also the perspective which is entrenched primarily through the 
contemporary political rhetoric of their respective political leaderships to the extent that 
157 Dan Bulley, 2006: `Negotiating ethics: Campbell, ontopology and hospitality', Review of 
International Studies, 32(4), p. 658. Ontopology `describes a form of identity which links its 
essence to a place, normally defined in territorial terms. ' Bulley, p. 646 
158 Bulley is not using negotiation simply in terms of dialogue, but in the Derridean sense of 
resisting closure, of shuttling between different positions; it is not dialectic in the sense that 
there is any easy resolution of two positions in a third, but a negotiation between two 
incompatible imperatives which retain something of their normative purity. It bears some 
similarity to Gadamer's fusion of horizons: a position whereby individuals maintain their own 
perspective whilst listening and understanding the other's perspective. 
159 For a helpful description of this tension see White, 1991, p. 21,28 
160 Campbell, 1998a 
161 This has not been an attempt to apply Derridean principles to a deconstruction of the various 
narratives surrounding Kosovo and the intervention. 
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non-ontopological views are rarely allowed free expression, even if voiced, in the public 
sphere. 
162 
This perspective is perpetuated not only by the peoples themselves and the 
politics and myths constructed around the conflict and their own roles in it, but also in 
the actions of the international community as, indicated throughout this thesis, the 
preferred approach to the conflict by the international community has been that of 
territorial integrity. 
Just as we must look at Kosovo in context and not as a series of isolated events, 
so we cannot look at the responses of the international community in isolation. If 
Kosovo is seen in light of the Dayton Accords, for example, and we acknowledge 
Campbell's interpretation of Dayton which is that it entrenched and legitimised ethnic 
cleansing because it was unable to approach the problem without ontopological 
assumptions, we see that this is an ongoing perspective with relation to conflict in the 
Balkans and that `political possibilities [and correspondingly, dialogic opportunities] 
have been limited by the alignment between territory and identity, state and nation'. 163 
Kosovo demonstrated that the actions of the international community were not 
only insufficient to enable an appropriate response to the conflict, but that they were 
complicit in the conduct of the war: 
because inscribing the boundaries that make the installation of the 
nationalist imaginary possible requires the expulsion from the resultant 
"domestic" space of all that comes to be regarded as alien, foreign and 
dangerous. The nationalist imaginary thus demands a violent relationship 
with the other. ' 164 
The primacy of statehood, sovereignty and non-intervention, in conflict with the 
strengthening human rights regime, notions of responsibility and humanitarianism, not 
only place us in a situation characterised by incompatible imperatives, but also serve to 
limit the political alternatives to conflict and prevent our move away from the 
dichotomy presented by the polis and cosmopolis. Whereas Apel and Habermas see the 
162 ICG report, `Serbia's New Constitution: Democracy Going Backwards', 8 November, 2006, 
p. 1: the new constitution `makes it legally impossible - without further constitutional 
amendment - for Serbia to recognise Kosovo independence'. Even those Serbian politicians or 
parties who wish to move away from the past and adopt more democratic, pro-European 
positions face serious tactics aimed at discrediting them. The new constitution provides the 
means to squash domestic dissent, and may well further narrow Serbia's political spectrum, 
forcing much of its `pro-Western political elite to march in lock-step with resurrected Kosovo- 
centric patriotism or else face accusations of treason. ' (p. 17) 
163 Campbell, 1998a, p. 80 
164 ibid. p. 13 
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need for these conflicting priorities to be resolved through the institutionalisation of 
cosmopolitan law which effectively de-politicises the questions raised by this paradox 
through constituting them in a legal sense, Bulley and Campbell look for a more 
intangible approach which cannot be articulated prior to the moment of its production, 
yet seeks `to avoid technologized or rule-governed responses to the complexities of 
particular situations at all costs. ' 165 
This thesis has theorised an option which seeks to combine elements of both 
approaches. By focusing on the possibilities of dialogue, as opposed to institutionalised 
laws for humanitarian intervention, this framework recognises that we cannot anticipate 
what the solution should be which will develop out of dialogue and that such dialogue 
must not be restricted by constraints not, within reason, discursively redeemed. The 
emphasis placed on process as opposed to substantive content shies away from `rule- 
governed responses' which indicate content without necessarily due concern for 
process. At the same time, it recognises a need to find practical political solutions to 
conflict whilst retaining a normative grounding and reflecting consensus on a number of 
moral norms. Herein lies the role of hermeneutics and reflective judgement in a 
theoretically-informed application in which we do not simply apply universal 
knowledge to a situation, but rather come to understand the universal through particular 
situations. We need to understand each particular conflict prior to applying any singular 
interpretation of international law or designing interventions to achieve an aim in 
accordance with supposedly universal norms. A communicative model should 
recognise actors particular to the conflict and solutions which grow out of dialogue 
among all relevant parties. Rule-governed solutions for the problem of human suffering 
in conflicts which stem only from powerful states without reference to the participation 
of all those affected is, bringing us back to the theory/practice dilemma, problematic: `in 
a process of enlightenment there can only be participants. ' 166 
6.3 Agency and legitimacy in International Relations: the 
deterritorialising of responsibility 
In response to the question raised earlier concerning the location or agents of 
responsible citizenship, it is suggested that civil society actors may also be seen as good 
165 Nick Vaughn-Williams, 2007: `Beyond a Cosmopolitan Ideal: the Politics of Singularity', 
International Politics, 44, p. 122 
' 66 Habermas, 1974, p. 40 
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international citizens, not least because many operate on a local, regional or global 
level. Moreover, this draws a distinction between the state system and the role of states, 
moving away from a state system which is constituted by and imbued with notions of 
national interest, territorial integrity, self-preservation and sovereignty, without 
abandoning the notion of the state which remains, empirically, a powerful actor within 
international society and one which still grapples with ideas of ethics, rights and 
responsibilities. One of the clear implications of the theory adopted in this research is 
that it does not allow us to discern the precise actor. While the context of Kosovo 
focused on here identifies particular actors, notably states, the communicative 
imperatives hold no intrinsic or preferential status for the state as an actor. Moreover, 
the development of good international citizenship raises questions as to appropriate 
actors, thus lending itself to potential confusion over the subject of analysis. The central 
issue addressed in this research, however, is not the identification of specific actors as 
good international citizens, but rather as suggested by the title of Chapter 3, dialogue as 
the object of critique and an analysis of the process by which actors contribute to 
dialogue and processes of conflict resolution. This opens up avenues for further 
investigation of the concept of agency in relation to a revised concept of good 
international citizenship, suggesting non-state actors such as NGOs and transnational 
corporations, and is presented as a strength rather than a weakness of the framework. 
From the critical theoretical position adopted in this thesis, Bulley's and 
Campbell's writings dance around a theme which supports some of the conclusions of 
the present research. Campbell talks of a `deterritorialization of responsibility' and 
indicates that intervention should be rethought to encapsulate and `involve nonmilitary 
and nonstate actors'. 167 What we have called good international citizenship thus no 
longer simply belongs to a state-centric forum, but may be transposed onto other levels 
of participation and engagement. This returns us to Linklater's criteria for good 
international citizenship which requires a shift in focus both upwards and downwards 
from the `national' sphere, and aids to move international relations theory beyond the 
confining realms of communitarian approaches which are complicit in a state-centric 
approach, where the inclusion of some must inevitably produce the exclusion of others, 
and beyond the universalist, somewhat abstract, approach of some forms of 
cosmopolitanism. One of the inadequacies of the concept of good international 
167 Campbell, 1998a, p. 176, p. 240 
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citizenship revealed through a discussion of the role and construction of dialogue in 
international relations was its state-centric nature and the limitations this places on 
effective agency in situations of intervention and conflict. Moreover, it was problematic 
in terms of its critical capacity for analysing legitimacy. If, however, we bring in a 
discourse element and situate it at the core of good international citizenship, then we 
have strong normative grounds to develop a critique of existing practice and we have a 
framework which recognises that states are one among many actors. 
Consequently, an implication that may be drawn from this analysis is that inter- 
state fora are not the only dialogic community needed in global politics, as may be 
concluded by the failure of states to meet the criteria for procedurally fair conversation. 
This failure, coupled with the circumstances of Kosovo, indicates that we should look to 
civil society and non-governmental actors. Moreover, states as good international 
citizens should, when necessary, act reflexively to recognise the flawed nature of the 
UN and other international organisations and look to civil society actors instead of 
resorting to state mechanisms, recognising that state representation cannot be separate 
from the national interest, and therefore in cases such as conflict and humanitarian need, 
may be an intrinsic part of the problem. This reading of good international citizenship 
differs from Wheeler's version as he sees states as having the capacity to protect 
national interest, behave as cosmopolitan good international citizens and protect human 
rights; the state, therefore, remains part of the solution. 
We must recognise that states are unlikely to be keen to widen the dialogue to 
include non-state actors because they currently remain the most powerful actors within 
the global community. Statists proffer the argument that NGOs are not elected and are 
not representative or accountable to the electorate, therefore why should they be 
included in dialogue with those actors who are representative and accountable? This 
argument not only ignores the grass-roots origin of many NGO's, but also the point that 
many state governments, if subjected to a closer inspection, would face questions over 
the legitimacy of their internal power and their accountability; these however, remain 
questions for democratic theorists. 168 The move towards accepting different actors as 
intrinsic to effective and fair dialogue asks why should we limit ourselves to the state. 
168 Allen Buchanan makes a similar point concerning the democratic and representative 
credentials of many states in: `Reforming the international law of humanitarian intervention', 
Holzgrefe, Keohane (eds. ) 2003, p. 139. This suggests that electoral accountability is not the 
only form of accountability or `good citizenship'. The communicative imperatives offer other 
criteria which do not change whether they are being used to assess states or NGOs. 
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They are a practical reality and they claim to be representative liberal democracies for 
the most part, but, as demonstrated in Kosovo, they are not sufficient to an inclusive 
dialogue. 
At this point, it is instructive to refer to Kosovan Nansen Dialogue (KND) as an 
example of a civil society actor working along dialogic principles which strongly reflect 
some of the communicative imperatives offered in this research. 169 KND might be seen 
as a good international citizen, especially in the context of its regional, networked 
character and European links, as it is but one branch of the Nansen Dialogue Network 
which has locally staffed branches across the Western Balkans and is linked to the 
Nansen Academy in Norway. Nansen's methodology offers important parallels with the 
theoretical framework offered here, as its mission statement expresses clearly: 
NANSEN DIALOGUE is marked by the wish to provide a neutral and 
open space where the different actors in a serious conflict can meet face to 
face in truthful and honest communication. The aim is to break down 
enemy images, as well as to increase understanding of each other's 
positions, interests and needs. Facilitators and lecturers try to stimulate 
the cognitive analysis of the conflict itself and the experience of "the 
other's" position. The focus is not on who is right or most guilty, but on 
how to build respect for democratic principles, human rights and peaceful 
conflict resolution for future improvement of society. These principles 
are to be an alternative in political organisation to national chauvinism 
and ethnic loyalty. ' 70 
The projects run by branches of the Nansen Network recognise the power of what 
Habermas refers to as `steering media' - money and power - in supporting and 
reproducing political messages based on ethnic division and ethnic identity and 
controlled by political parties. Consequently, a variety of projects seek to break down 
such essentialized identities and present different understandings of the truth, individual 
and collective experiences. Similarly, education projects seek to address the ethnic 
segregation in schools and communities. This approach explores alternative solutions to 
joint challenges which touch areas of interest for all parties. 
Nansen's dialogue methodology maintains strong hermeneutic elements rather 
than expressing a need for consensus on any particular position. By placing the 
emphasis on listening to the `other' perspectives, dialogue participants can share their 
different explanations of events and `confront each other with alternative interpretive 
169 I spent a brief period in May 2006 working with KND in Kosovo and observing their 
practices. 
10 Nansen Dialogue Network Annual Report, 2004, p. 3 
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frameworks. ' 171 Bryn argues that if `one can come to understand (if not accept) the 
other's perspective, then one comes to understand the "legitimacy" of a decision to fight 
for or against independence. ' 172 This avoids the danger of dominant perspectives 
suppressing other views. It also develops the concept of dialogue as one of 
understanding and recognition. Whilst most people in Kosovo experienced the conflict 
through an ethnic meaning, a hermeneutic approach does not limit itself to the horizon 
of a particular community or tradition. 
Nansen's methodology, like hermeneutics, favours an approach which privileges 
listening and communicating; it understands that different people will hold different 
truths, and it seeks to find ways of understanding these different truths through dialogue 
without eradicating their differences. Thus, we can see a positive shift from the 
adoption of particular `positions' to recognising common interests. 173 The 
entrenchment of positions was an issue raised in Chapter 5, where the representation of 
the conflict by states within the Security Council took on the rigidity of incompatible 
positions, preventing alternative solutions from being explored which were not 
grounded in ontopological assumptions. This problem was also highlighted in Kosovar 
politics as the positions of both Serbs and Albanians became more rigid and 
uncompromising. Mertus is particularly cognisant of the problems with this approach to 
conflict mediation and her position bears a striking resemblance to Gadamerian 
hermeneutics; she demonstrates the need for us to try and understand the truth, whatever 
that may be, from other perspectives and how the Truth has come to be framed in such a 
way: 
Conflict resolution experts who insist on putting seven X's and seven Y's 
in a room and having them slug it out until they come to a compromise are 
asking people to alter their Truths. Yet Truths cannot be compromised. 
They are integral to our identity. We must hear Truths, see them, touch 
them, but not insist on their immediate transformation. Only time can 
change the perception of experience and shape the telling of myths. 
Outsiders who demand an immediate retelling are perceived as 
illegitimate; any reshaping must come from within. 174 
171 Steinar Bryn: `Engaging the "Other": The Nansen Dialogue Network in the Balkans', 
http: //www. peoplebuildingpeace. org/thestories/print. phi)? id= 127&typ=theme 
172 ibid. 
173 ibid. See Ingrid Vik, 2005: Dialogue in Practice: Nansen-dialogue network and activities in 
the West Balkans, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
174 Mertus, 1999, p. 3 
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To borrow the words of Steinar Bryn, the director of the Democracy, Human 
Rights, and Peaceful Conflict Resolution project at the Nansen Academy, `Dialogue did 
not fail in Kosovo. Dialogue had just never been properly tried. ' 175 In the context of 
dialogue initiated at the international level, to develop Bryn's point one step further, it 
may be that whilst dialogue did fail in Kosovo, it did so precisely because it had never 
been properly tried. 
Initiatives taken by other groups within Kosovar and Serb society might also 
have been profitably supported by the international community rather than largely 
ignored. Chapter 1 demonstrated the significant presence of and potential inherent in 
the non-violent resistance movement in Kosovo as well as the missed opportunities for 
civic, dialogic and political engagement on the part of the international community. 
ICG notes that in January 1998, Belgrade's `Appeal of the Fifty Association', a right- 
wing intellectual group, appealed to Kosovar intellectuals to work together to achieve a 
settlement outside the ordinary party and regime channels. Other Serb groups who 
attempted to cross the ethnic border and work with Kosovars included the Humanitarian 
Law Foundation, the Soros Foundation, the Belgrade Circle, Helsinki Committee, the 
Forum for Ethnic Relations, while on the Kosovar side, there was Veton Surroi, the 
editor of Koha Ditore and a respected intellectual, Gazmend Pula, the head of the 
Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Kosovo, and Shkelzen Maliqi, the former 
director of the Open Society Institute's Pristina Office. 176 Whilst these actors could 
often only meet safely at internationally-organised conferences, one action the 
international community could have taken would be to encourage the occurrence of 
these conferences. Areas where increased contacts might have been encouraged and 
facilitated both by states and NGOs include support for education and health provision; 
for emerging civil society actors; for independent media, and for the Kosovar student 
movement. 177 These political opportunities are particularly important in context of the 
lack of engagement with them by the international community and the strong 
justificatory argument of last resort offered in support of NATO's intervention. 
The distinction Young draws between power and violence and her application of 
this Arendtian distinction to the question of military intervention is helpful for two 
175 Bryn, `Engaging the "Other"' 
16 Kosovo Spring, 1998, p. 34-5; See Troebst (1998) for other examples of inter-ethnic attempts 
at dialogue between 1992-1998. 
"' Kosovo Spring, 1998, p. 52-3 
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reasons. Firstly, drawing on Arendt, the concept of power differs greatly from the 
Weberian assumption, which informs most international relations theory, that power is 
dominance and sovereign control over territory and people. Power in Arendt's 
understanding: 
establishes and maintains institutions, that is, regulated and settled means 
of cooperating to bring about collective ends. It has its basis in the 
consent and support of those who abide by, live according to, and interpret 
rules and institutions to bring about new collective ends. ' 178 
Secondly, if we accept this different understanding of power, then arguing that military 
intervention is a moral duty in certain cases raises a number of problems. These 
problems are by no means new or original, however, so it is useful to look at them in the 
light of a collective understanding of the purpose of power and the communicative 
framework presented in this thesis. As Young points out: 
If those who call for making war on human-rights violators think thereby 
that they are bringing power to bear on the situation that will positively 
change relationships, produce new institutions of cooperation, restore 
routines in which people can safely carry out collective activities of 
production, distribution, administration, regulation, and play, they are 
almost certainly mistaken. 179 
Certainly, the experience of post-conflict Kosovo has demonstrated that violence did 
little to repair relationships or institutions. 
Young's argument that violence should not be legitimised (through institutions, 
covenants or laws), as this leaves it open to abuse in a variety of ways, but rather must 
be justified, has clear parallels with the desire voiced here to reject institutionalised 
terms and conditions for humanitarian intervention. Young argues that violence must 
be justified on a case-by-case basis within the limits of only general rules expressing 
circumstances where specific agents may consider violence can be justified. Such 
justification assumes a normative and consequentialist aspect; that the use of violence 
will prevent a greater harm. One way in which it can be justified is in accordance with 
the discourse theory of justification presented in this thesis which not only focuses on 
the process leading up to intervention, but also enables us to comment on the quality of 
the intervention in terms of its consequences in relation to justifications offered. 
Consequences alone may not legitimise or delegitimise a particular intervention, but 
their consideration allows an assessment to take place in terms of the opportunities 
178 Young, from Chatterjee and Scheid (eds), 2003, p. 254 
179 ibid. p. 258 
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opened up or closed off for further dialogue as a result. Strategic actions can both open 
up and close off opportunities for dialogue. Post-intervention conflict resolution and 
the development of lasting peace require that opportunities for dialogue are facilitated 
by intervention, not that ethnic/societal divisions should be further entrenched as a 
result of intervention. 
One theme has kept returning throughout this work and that is the continuing 
tension present between the concepts of the universal and the particular. Chapter 2 saw 
the suggestion that it might be undesirable to transcend this tension, a sentiment that has 
become embedded in this work through the concepts of discourse and reflective 
judgement discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. Sznaider has articulated the relationship 
between these concepts in a way that is fruitful for understanding the kind of 
cosmopolitan orientation embodied by this version of good international citizenship. 
He suggests that the difficulties experienced by Jewish intellectuals in remembering and 
positioning the Holocaust in relation to the dual concepts of their particular Jewish 
status and the modern universal concepts of human rights - `their inability to give up 
either their universalistic dreams or their national identity - were not merely an 
indecisiveness born of trauma and exile. These difficulties were not only matters of 
subjective concern but are directly relevant to cosmopolitan theory and praxis. ' I8° 
Universal maxims such as `we should save the innocents' are merely pious because they 
contain no element of the personal: no one acts upon them until `they are mixed with 
the passion of identity; the feeling that you just can't look yourself in the face if you 
allow this to happen without doing something. ' 181 
In the need to find the particular in the universal we are drawn back to 
Honneth's patterns of recognition, present in the here and now, necessary for 
recognition of others as well as constitutive to self-understanding. Rather than 
advocating a top-down or bottom-up approach to cosmopolitanism, this approach seeks 
to recognise the intertwined nature of our personal identities and the engagement of 
universal values and morality in everyday life. If this speaks for the location of good 
international citizenship within the cosmopolitan and communitarian literature first 
addressed in Chapter 2, then the other core element to good international citizenship 
180 Natan Sznaider, 2007: `Hannah Arendt's Jewish Cosmopolitanism: Between the Universal 
and the Particular', European Journal of Social Theory, 10(1), p. 113 
181 ibid. p. 120 
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addresses the `how' and is located in the concepts of communication, legitimacy and 
judgement. 
Reflective judgement and deliberative reason are articulated by Ferrara in ways 
which meet the conditions laid out above for a cosmopolitan-oriented good international 
citizenship. Viewed through the language of communicative fairness in Chapter 4, 
Ferrara considers that our `reflective endorsement' of what is reasonable begins from 
our particular self-conception, but is by no means required to remain there. Similar to 
Arendt's `enlarged thinking', engagement with and contribution from others through 
dialogue may alter our self-conception by indicating alternative paths. Reflective 
judgement becomes the means to decide what is unacceptable to us when considered in 
relation to the integrity of our identity. Ferrara expands this framework through a 
discussion of communicative, or deliberative, reason which seeks to find the best 
solution to the problem at hand within the given context. Thus, it aims to coordinate the 
actions of a plurality of actors within a given time frame and within a particular context. 
Its claim to universality is two-fold: it lies in the procedures which guide discourse and, 
to use Ferrara's phrase, in the `power of exemplarity: the best solution to the given 
problem commands assent beyond its original context by virtue of its being recognized 
as an instance of excellence within its own parameters. '' 82 Consequently, it retains a 
critical and transformative force by encouraging `a critique not based on principles that 
transcend who we are qua political community but on the authenticity of a modern 
identity in which we partake qua free and equal citizens respecting each other. ' 183 
It is, perhaps, fitting to draw on and adapt Campbell's conclusions on Bosnia to 
Kosovo in closing, arguing that `the international community's response, informed as it 
is by theorizations concerning territory and identity drawn from a broadly defined realist 
discourse, has furthered the violence and would not be difficult to improve upon. ' 184 
This indicates that the dilemmas over humanitarian intervention, in part at least, do 
result from inadequate communicative practices and a lack of reflexivity and 
recognition of the need for intersubjectivity. A dialogic approach has demonstrated 
ways in which we can understand legitimacy and, consequently, humanitarian 
intervention, in the case of Kosovo. Such an approach seeks to mediate and not close 
down the relationship between our `responsibility to act' and our `responsibility to 
182 Ferrara, 2007, p62 
183 ibid. p. 61 
184 Campbell, 1998a, p. 241 
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otherness'. By arguing that those affected by the policies and decisions of a state have a 
right to take part in deliberation over those policies and decisions, a revised 
understanding of good international citizenship attempts to contribute to a normative 
construction of international relations by seeking to influence ways in which we 
understand and participate in processes of legitimacy and justification which are key to 
the global debates surrounding humanitarian intervention, ethics and the use of force. 
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Appendix 1-A summary of the UN Security Council resolutions185 
Resolution 1160 was adopted on 31 March 1998 under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, by a vote of 14 in favour to none against, with 1 abstention (China). It 
established an arms embargo on the FRY, including Kosovo, and banned the sale or 
supply of arms and all related material. A Sanctions Committee was established with 
responsibility for monitoring the ban, examining information concerning violations and 
recommending appropriate measures in response. The Council urged all parties to 
enter `without preconditions into a meaningful dialogue on political status issues' 186 and 
requested the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia to begin gathering information relating to the violence in Kosovo 
which might fall within its jurisdiction. 
Resolution 1199 was adopted on 23 September 1998 under Chapter VII with 
fourteen in favour and one abstention (China). It reaffirms the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the FRY, calls for the cessation of all action by the security forces 
affecting the civilian population and orders the withdrawal of security units used for 
civilian repression. It requires the FRY to facilitate the safe return of refugees and IDPs 
and to allow unimpeded access for humanitarian organizations and aid; to enable 
effective international monitoring in Kosovo and to make rapid progress towards a clear 
timetable for dialogue. It insists that the Kosovo Albanian leadership condemns all 
terrorist action; it reminds states of their obligations concerning the prohibitions 
imposed by resolution 1160 and, it `Decides, should the concrete measures demanded in 
this resolution and resolution 1160 (1998) not be taken, to consider further action and 
additional measures to maintain or restore peace and stability in the region. ' 
Resolution 1203, adopted on 24 October, 1998 under Chapter VII, repeats the 
terms of 1160 and 1199, endorsed the Holbrooke agreement signed in October and notes 
the commitment of the FRY to complete negotiations on a full settlement by 2 
November. 
Resolution 1239, adopted 14 May 1999, addresses the humanitarian relief efforts 
being undertaken, calls for further aid and declares the right of all refugees and 
displaced persons to return safely to their homes. 
185 S, RES'1160 (1998); S/RES/1199 (1998); S/RES/1203 (1998); S/RES/1239 (1999); S/RES/1244 
(1999) 
186 S, A 998/223 
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Resolution 1244, adopted 10 June 1999 under Chapter VII, agrees and endorses 
the peace terms agreed on to end the war and provides a mandate for the deployment, 
under United Nations auspices, of both international civil and security presences. 
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